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The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of changes to the regulatory environment 
governing farm labour employment since the mid-1990s on wages and employment of farm 
workers in the South African sugar industry. This study may be differentiated from previous 
research on the topic, e.g., Conradie (2005), Sparrow et al. (2008), Murray and van Walbeek 
(2008), Bhorat et al. (2012), and Stanwix (2013) in so far as the impacts on wages and 
employment are investigated for four categories of farm workers (namely, drivers, seasonal 
cane harvesting staff, permanently employed elementary farm workers, and casual labour); 
whereas previous studies have analysed the impacts on aggregate employment. The distinc t ion 
is important because not all categories of farm workers historically earned wages less than the 
real minimum wage rate and because the wage elasticities of demand for labour in sugarcane 
farming are expected to vary by labour category and by sugarcane producing region. Whilst it 
is well established that the wage elasticity of demand for farm labour in commercial farming in 
South Africa is relatively price elastic in the long run (Sparrow et al., 2008; Bhorat et al., 2012), 
no published research has determined the wage elasticities of demand for farm labour in 
sugarcane farming in South Africa, per se.   
The time series data on wages and employment of farm workers in sugarcane production by 
large scale growers (LSGs) from 1978 to 2012 based on Labour Utilisation and Cost Survey 
(LUCS) were obtained from the South African Cane Growers Association (SACGA). Analys is 
of the data verifies expectations that the introduction of regulations on wage structure and 
computation through the Sectoral Determination (SD) for the Farm Worker Sector in 2003 is 
associated with an increase in real average cash wages and a reduction in the average real 
absolute value of non-pecuniary benefits (e.g., on-farm accommodation and rations) received 
by workers in sugarcane farming. Furthermore, the increase in cash-wages outweighed the 
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reduction of non-pecuniary benefits, on average composite wages. Implementation of the SD is 
also associated with an increase in standardisation of wages for relatively unskilled seasonal 
and permanent farm employees, which is in line with an intended objective of the SD to 
standardise the farm wage. 
Whilst real average wages of workers in sugarcane farming increased by about 70% from 1978 
to 2012, employment in sugarcane farming, measured as Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) 
Worker, declined by about 36% during the same period, which gives rise to a simple elastic ity 
computation of -0.51 (∆employment/∆wage = -0.36/0.7), without accounting for changes in 
factors other than the wage. In order to account for other factors affecting the supply of and 
demand for the various categories of farm workers in sugarcane production, econometric 
techniques were used to estimate the relationships between real farm wages and employment 
in sugarcane farming, and in turn, the wage elasticity of the demand for each category of labour 
for the industry as a whole and for two particular sugarcane producing regions, the South Coast 
and Midlands of KwaZulu-Natal (due to the topography of the two regions, sugarcane 
production on the South Coast is relatively more labour intensive than in the Midlands). High 
levels of multicollinearity in the data precluded satisfactory estimation of supply and demand 
functions for farm labour using 2SLS regression techniques. Instead, the Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) extraction procedure proposed by Chatterjee and Price (1977) was used to 
estimate the supply and demand functions separately. Whilst the statistical fit of the estimated 
farm labour supply (demand) functions was relatively poor and satisfied, respectively, the 
theoretical fit of the estimated supply of and demand for labour functions was satisfactory.    
After accounting for changes in the area under sugarcane, the price per ton of sugarcane, price 
index of chemicals and labour-related policy implications, estimates of the wage elasticities of 
demand for the various categories of farm labour, regions and aggregate sugarcane production 
by LSGs ranged between -0.028 and -0.488 in the short-run, and between -0.041 and -0.647 in 
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the long-run. This finding that the demand for farm labour in sugarcane production is relative ly 
inelastic is consistent with observations that, by and large, sugarcane production methods 
remained relatively unchanged in the industry and each of the two regions for the 1978-2012 
period. The results further indicate that farmers adjust employment in response to a wage 
change within a period of three years. Over-and-above the impact of changes in the policy on 
wages, the changes in policy are associated with a further reduction in aggregate employment 
of an estimated 4119 FTEs and 5768 FTEs in sugarcane production by LSGs in the short- and 
long-run, respectively. Other things being equal, considering employment levels in 1978 and 
1994, LSGs reduced employment in sugarcane farming by 6.82% and 17.1% in the short- and 
long-run, respectively. This impact may be ascribed to regulation induced changes in non-wage 
costs of employment, such as transactions costs and perceived risk. The results further verify 
that chemicals application is a strong substitute for labour in sugarcane production (especially 
in the Midlands region), and that employment of farm workers in sugarcane production is 
positively related to the price of sugarcane and the extent of area planted to sugarcane.  
Bearing in mind the increases in the real minimum wage of farm workers post 2012, a revision 
of the current labour legislation to reduce some of the non-wage costs of employing farm 
workers is recommended to help preserve employment, especially of relatively unskilled 
workers in sugarcane farming. Activities that increase (reduce) the price received by farmers 
for sugarcane will have a positive (negative) impact on farm labour employment, both through 
the price effect, as well as an increase in the area under sugarcane. Finally, considering the trend 
of declining farm employment, programmes to improve education and training of former farm 
workers and other people in rural areas are important to improve their prospects of finding 
employment in non-farm sectors. Furthermore, more research on compliance issues is 
recommended to improve the effectiveness of compliance on the labour markets that are 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Minimum wage regulations are a common1, but often controversial, policy tool used to protect 
vulnerable or low paid workers in many countries, including South Africa (SA). Although 
minimum wage policies and their impacts have been widely researched globally, sometimes 
with conflicting findings, the research has primarily focused on developed countries, and to 
some extent in Latin America and Asian countries. Despite about 22 African countries having 
some form of minimum wage legislation (WageIndicator, 2015), economic research on the 
impacts of minimum wages in Africa is relatively sparse, save for some fairly recent studies by 
Murray and van Walbeek (2007), Bhorat et al. (2012), Bhorat et al. (2013), Bhorat and Mayet 
(2013) and Stanwix (2013) on minimum wages in SA. Given that SA is one of the largest 
economies on the continent, these studies probably paved the way for the country to be featured 
in a number of International Labour Organisation (ILO) reports and studies focusing on 
minimum wages in developing countries, such as ILO (2013), ILO (2015) and Rani et al. 
(2013).  
The minimum wage legislation was first introduced in New Zealand in 1894, followed by 
Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and United States of America (USA) (Stanwix, 2013). 
Generally, countries with sectoral or national minimum wage legislation have tended to initia l ly 
exempt sectors that absorb relatively unskilled labour, such as the agriculture and domestic 
worker sectors, in an economy. Although minimum wage coverage is usually extended to 
include farm workers, domestic workers and other vulnerable sectors, minimum wages in these 
                                                                 
1 According to BusinessTech (2015), 155 countries of the 196 United Nations member states 
have some form of a determined minimum wage legislation at a national, industrial or sectoral 
level.    
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sectors tend to be set at lower levels, relative to other sectors. This is evident from studies by 
Gallasch (1975) and Dickens (1995), respectively, who investigated the impact of extending 
minimum wage legislation to the farm sectors in the USA and UK. 
Amongst the 22 African countries for which WageIndicator (2015) provides details of 
minimum wage legislation, nine have sectoral minimum wages specific to the agriculture sector 
and four countries have sectoral minimum wages that are specific to the domestic worker sector. 
Most other countries have national minimum wages, some of which exclude agriculture and 
other vulnerable sectors. Despite the extension of coverage to farm and domestic worker sectors 
in some countries, the minimum wage in these sectors remains low relative to other sectors.  
Of the 22 countries, Kenya’s minimum wage legislation for its agricultural sector is fairly 
unique in so far as minimum wages for agriculture in Kenya are differentiated by labour 
category, with relatively more skilled labour earning higher minimum wages. SA and most 
other countries may have multiple minimum wages for a sector, but tend not to differentia te 
minimum wages by skill level. Instead, a minimum wage is typically set to protect the most 
vulnerable workers in that sector, and then market mechanisms determine wage rates of 
relatively more skilled workers. Minimum wages may nonetheless vary by the nature of 
employment, the location (e.g. a municipality) and the size of the establishment. For example, 
the first sectoral determination for Farm Workers in South Africa (Sectoral Determination 8) 
set a minimum wage of R800 per month for farm workers working more than 27 hours per 
week in Area A (relatively more urban municipal areas) and R650 per month for farm workers 
working more than 27 hours per week in Area B (relatively more rural municipal areas). It 
further specified that workers working 27 or less ordinary hours of work per week must earn a 
minimum of R4.10 per hour worked in Area A and R3.33 per hour in Area B (Department of 
Labour (DoL), 2002). 
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A brief history of minimum wage legislation in SA and the SA farm sector  
South Africa was a founder member of the ILO in 1919 by virtue of its membership of the 
League of Nations. It withdrew its membership with effect from 11 March 1966 to avoid 
expulsion, and rejoined the ILO on 26 May 1994. South Africa has ratified 27 ILO Conventions, 
of which 23 are currently in force. For purposes of this study, it is notable that SA ratified ILO 
convention No. 26 (Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention of 1928) on 28 December 
1932 and this ratification currently remains in force, however it has not ratified ILO Convention 
No. 99 (Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery (Agriculture) Convention of 1951) and ILO 
Convention No. 131 (Minimum Wage Fixing Convention of 1970) (ILO, 2015). 
According to ILO (2015), each member of the ILO that ratifies ILO Convention No. 26, 
undertakes to create or maintain the machinery whereby minimum rates of wages can be fixed 
for workers employed in certain trades or parts of trades (in particular, in home working trades), 
where no arrangements exist for the effective regulation of wages, by collective agreement or 
otherwise, and where wages are exceptionally low. Furthermore, each member that ratifies this 
Convention is free to decide the nature and form of the minimum wage-fixing machinery, and 
the methods to be followed in its operation, provided that the minimum rates of wages, which 
have been fixed, shall be binding on the employers and workers concerned, so as not to be 
subject to abatement by them and by individual agreement, nor, except with general or 
particular authorisation of the competent authority, by collective agreement, amongst other 
provisions. 
The SD in South Africa is a system used to protect vulnerable sectors in the instance of failure 
of collective bargaining via a bargaining council to set minimum wages. It evolved from the 
Master and Servant Act (1896) (MSA), to the Industrial Conciliation Act (1924) (ICA), the 
Labour Relations Act of 1956 (LRA) and to the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 1997 
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(BCEA), which led to the establishment of the first national sectoral minimum wage in 1999, 
covering the contract cleaning sector since 2001.  
Theron (2013) cited by Visser and Ferrer (2015) indicated that the LRA seeks to promote 
collective bargaining at a sectoral level. The preferred forum for bargaining at a sectoral level 
is the bargaining council. However, the LRA does not provide for a right to bargain, and a 
bargaining council could only be established voluntarily, by representative trade union(s) and 
employer organisations. Currently, there are no bargaining councils in the SA farming sector 
and there is also little likelihood that one will be established in the foreseeable future. This can 
be ascribed, not only to trade union weakness in the sector, but also to strong resistance 
displayed by organized agriculture and individual farmers to the notion of collective bargaining 
in the sector, due to the diversity of the sector. 
The BCEA sets the minimum conditions of work that apply to all workplaces, whether or not 
there is collective bargaining. The BCEA also empowers the Minister of Labour to make SDs, 
by way of subordinate legislation. The SDs are made on the advice of the Employment 
Conditions Commission (ECC), which was established in 1999. The ECC replaced the Wage 
Board, which fulfilled a similar function in terms of the now-repealed Wage Act (Benjamin and 
Pretorious, 2011, cited by Visser and Ferrer, 2015). Although this is not explicitly stated in the 
BCEA, its function is to set minimum wages in sectors in which workers are perceived to be 
vulnerable, and with limited or no collective bargaining. However, the Wage Board, for reasons 
already noted, never set minimum wages for farmworkers or the agricultural sector.  
The function of the SD is to set minimum wages and basic conditions of employment in sectors 
in which there is little to no collective bargaining. It is an administrative determination, 
preceded by an investigation by the ECC. Although, members of the public are entitled to make 
written representations to the ECC, it does not provide the same platform for an exchange of 
5 
 
views as collective bargaining, and the outcome does not necessarily reflect a consensus 
between worker and employer organisations. Currently, there are eleven SDs in the SA 
economy, namely, for farmworkers, domestic workers, forestry, private security, contract 
cleaning, wholesale and retail, taxi, civil engineering, hospitality, and minimum wages for 
learnerships and children performing advertising, artistic and cultural activities sectors. But 
according to Bhorat and Mayet (2013), SA has around 167 different individual minimum wage 
rates in total across the 11 sectoral determinations. 
The minimum wage policy in the farm sector through the SD was promulgated in December 
2002 and implemented as from the first day of March 2003. It was the fourth sector to have a 
minimum wage set via the SD, following  the contract cleaning sector in 2001, the private 
security sector in 2001 and the domestic workers’ sector in 2002 (DoL, 2015). Before the 
introduction of the BCEA in 1997, the farm sector in SA was treated as a unique sector that 
deserved preferential treatment, and it was consequently largely excluded from labour 
legislation (Visser and Ferrer, 2015). As previously noted, it is not uncommon for farm sectors 
to receive special dispensations with respect to labour policy. Nonetheless, it is evident that, 
prior to 1994, the SA farm sector was under-regulated by global standards and that the 
introduction of regulations governing employment in the sector intended to address a perceived 
power imbalance between farm workers and farm business owners. 
Whereas many provisions of the SD 13 simply recapitulate what is contained in the BCEA, and 
would in an event apply, the BCEA permits the Minister, in making a determination, to go 
beyond what is contained in the BCEA. For example, it permits the Minister to prohibit or 
regulate remuneration in kind, piecework and contract work. It also permits the Minister to set 
minimum standards for housing and sanitation for employees who reside on their employer’s 
premises. In line with the above provisions, the SD also limits the deductions which may be 
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made from a worker’s pay; for example, the supply of food and accommodation is limited to 
an amount not exceeding 20% in total for farmworkers (DoL, 2013). 
Besides the minimum wage, the SD also stipulates that farmers should have a formal 
employment contract, detailing work responsibilities for their employees and deductions 
structure from the farm labour wage. Farmers are also required to ensure a safe and friend ly 
working environment for their labour, and the provision of safety training. The employment 
contract and minimum wage compliance has recently been investigated by Bhorat et al. (2012), 
Stanwix (2013) and Visser and Ferrer (2015) for the SA farming sector and it was also 
highlighted by Roberts and Antrobus (2013) in the Eastern Cape region. Compliance is crucial 
to ensure that labour legislation delivers its intended purpose. 
Initially, the minimum wage rate application was introduced in two categories that were formed, 
based on the relative regional economic contribution to the national gross domestic product, 
where Area A received a higher minimum wage than Area B (DoL, 2002; Murray and van 
Walbeek, 2007). However, following recommendations by Kassier et al. (2003), the minimum 
wage application changed from a category to a single structure in 2009 to reduce the complexity 
and remove wage rate inequality amongst employees in the farm sector. The problem with wage 
zoning as identified by Kassier et al. (2003) was the inability to distinguish between farms that 
can and cannot afford the prescribed minimum wage, e.g. the region’s relative economic 
contribution could be high, however, the majority of farms may be struggling, compared to a 
number of farms that are doing well economically. (It was noted elsewhere in this section that 
minimum wages set through the SD do not necessarily reflect a consensus between worker and 
employer organisations; consequently there is more scope for the minimum wage for farm 
labour to be set at a level that is not affordable for farm businesses). 
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Despite minimum wages only being introduced in the farm sector in 2003, in the wake of the 
political change in SA in the early 1990s, the introduction of this, as well as other changes to 
labour legislation regulating employment on farms, was probably widely anticipated by 
stakeholders in the sector. It is, therefore, likely that employment decisions in commercia l 
farming had partly adjusted in response to expectations of the introduction of new labour 
legislation in the sector before it was promulgated.   
From its inception in 2003 until 2012, the minimum wage for farm workers typically increased 
at a real rate of 1% per annum. The annual changes were predictable and transparent, partly 
because the planned increases for the following years were published in the Sectoral 
Determinations and subsequent amendments to those Sectoral Determinations.  However, after 
consultations conducted by the ECC in 2012, the Department of Labour announced an increase 
in the nominal minimum wage rate of 9.3% and indicated a further increase of CPI plus 1.5% 
in 2013, citing the increase as an attempt to protect labour from vulnerable sectors from rising 
food inflation. Despite the increase, farm workers in the Western Cape, in particular, embarked 
on an industrial action, demanding a further increase in the minimum wage for farm workers to 
R150 per day. A peculiar aspect of that industrial action is that in 2012 wages of farm workers 
in the Western Cape were higher, on average, than elsewhere in South Africa (Visser and Ferrer, 
2015). Following various consultations conducted by the ECC, the DoL decided to increase the 
minimum wage in 2013 by about 51% and announced a further increase of CPI plus 1.5% in 
2014 (DoL, 2013). From 2003 to 2016, the farm-sector minimum wage increased in nomina l 
terms from R650 to R2606.78 per month in the former predominantly rural areas (referred to 
as Area B in the Sectoral Determination 8) and increased from R800 to R2606.78 per month in 
the former relatively urban areas (Area A).  In real terms, using 2012 as a base year, the 
minimum wages in the two area categories increased from R1028.37 to R2201.15 per month 
and from R1265.69 to R2201.15 per month, respectively.  
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Economic arguments for and against minimum wage legislation 
The Minimum wage policy is contentious and has both proponents and opponents (Donaldo et 
al., 1996). The basis of arguments made in favour of setting a minimum wage is usually to 
provide a “living wage” for a targeted group. Olusegun et al. (2012) suggested that minimum 
wages are required to provide wage-earners with necessary social protection. Proponents of 
minimum wages also argue that they reduce poverty by increasing the wages of those earning 
less than the minimum wage, and possibly also some of those earning more than the minimum 
wage. According to Donaldo et al. (1996), proponents of the policy argue that it reduces the 
strong exploitation of labour in vulnerable sectors and reduces income inequality amongst the 
working class. Opponents of minimum wages, on the other hand, argue that minimum wages 
set at levels above the market wage rate may increase poverty levels by increasing the number 
of unemployed or disadvantageously employed people, counterbalancing any favourable effect 
on wages of those remaining in employment (Friedman, 1966).  
Measuring the labour market’s response to a minimum wage can differ with regard to factors 
such as country, region, labour type or category and industry or sector, as well as with respect 
to various attributes, the level at which the minimum wage is set and the methodology used to 
analyse data. Therefore, a consensus about the economic consequences of the legislation may 
not necessarily produce complete unanimity about its desirability, for differences may still 
continue to persist with regard to the political and social consequences. However, given a 
consensus on the objectives, it may end up resulting in agreement. Hence, a consensus on 
“accurate” economic policy is regarded as being largely dependent on the progress of positive 
economics and less dependent on progress in producing conclusions (Friedman, 1966).   
Schuh (1962), Gardner (1972) and Friedman (1962), amongst others, argue that unskilled 
workers in the labour market, such as most farm workers, are more vulnerable than are 
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relatively skilled workers to loss of employment due to the introduction of minimum wages. 
This is especially true for categories of workers for which the supply and demand for labour 
are relatively elastic. In general, the demand for labour is more elastic for categories of workers 
that have close substitutes, and those that account for a relatively high proportion of production 
costs. If the demand for labour is elastic, an increase in wages will result in a proportionate ly 
larger reduction in employment, resulting in a decline in the total wage bill (Friedman, 1962). 
The trade-off between providing workers with a living wage and reduced employment is 
therefore a key consideration for policy makers in setting a minimum wage. Various foreign 
and local empirical studies on the minimum wage have found that minimum wages have a 
positive impact on the wage rate, but a negative impact on employment; for example, Fang and 
Lin (2015) presented evidence of strong adverse impact of minimum wages on employment in 
the Central and Eastern regions of China, especially for young adults, female and unskilled 
workers. Nonetheless, the impacts of the minimum wage legislation on wages and employment 
are primarily determined by the wage elasticities of the demand for and supply of labour, as 
well as matters of enforcement of and compliance with the minimum wage by employers. 
Another important consideration for policy makers should include the prevailing rate of rural 
unemployment and their goals for employment creation in the sector(s) affected by the 
minimum wage. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Statistics on estimated employment in sugarcane farming computed from the South African 
Cane Growers’ Association’s (SACGA) annual Labour Utilisation and Cost Survey (LUCS), 
indicate a trend of decreasing employment in sugarcane production by LSGs from 1978/79 to 
1999/2000, but which stabilised at about 67 000 employees from 2000/01 to 2011/12 (SACGA, 
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2014). In contrast, the recent trends of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey (QLFS) suggest a strong decreasing trend in agricultural employment in KZN 
(STATSSA, 2015). In other words, employment in sugarcane farming may have been relative ly 
more resilient than many other types of farming operations over the past decade. 
The change in employment by LSGs in sugarcane farming may be attributed to several 
contributing factors. On the demand side, the area under sugarcane (AUC) farmed by Large 
Scale Growers (LSG)2 may have changed due to changes in the relative profitability of 
sugarcane farming, transfers of farmland from miller-cum-planters to LSGs, and the 
establishment of new sugar mills, amongst other reasons. Sugarcane production technologies 
may have changed on some farms, for example, labour employed in sugarcane production may 
have been substituted for machinery and chemicals, or vice versa, due to changes in the relative 
cost of labour. On the supply side, growth in the availability of alternative competit ive 
employment opportunities (e.g. in the construction sector), rural emigration, and changes in 
relative wage rates for relatively unskilled workers across the various sectors in the economy, 
amongst other factors, may have reduced the supply of some categories of farm workers, 
resulting in a reduction in the quantity of labour employed.   
Researchers, such as Newman et al. (1997) and Murray and van Walbeek (2007), have studied 
the impact of a change in labour legislation on sugarcane farming in the KZN Province. Both 
studies made use of cross-sectional data of farmers’ planned responses to changes in labour 
legislation (Newman et al., 1997) and farmers’ accounts of their actual responses to changes in 
                                                                 
2 In general, all sugarcane growers are commercial farmers, given the nature of the industry. 
However, the term LSG, as defined by the SA Sugar Industry, refers to registered sugarcane 
growers (excluding Miller-cum-Planters) that produce an average of greater and equal to 225 
tons of Recoverable Value (RV) for three to four consecutive seasons. For dryland sugarcane 
production in KwaZulu-Natal, LSGs typically farm a minimum of about 40 hectares of 
sugarcane. As at 2012, approximately 19% of the area of sugarcane farmed by LSGs was 
farmed by Previously Disadvantaged Individuals (PDIs) (SASA, 2013). 
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labour legislation (Murray and van Walbeek, 2007). Neither study provided an estimate of the 
wage elasticity of demand in sugarcane farming, nor did they investigate the distribution or 
dispersion of wages between categories of farm workers. 
According to Friedman (1962), it is expected that the demand for farm labour, in general, is 
relatively elastic, especially for unskilled farm labour. Although several studies have 
established that the demand for labour in the farm sector of South Africa is, indeed, relative ly 
elastic in the long-run (e.g., Latt and Nieuwoudt, 1985; Sparrow et al., 2008), and Bhorat et al. 
(2012) and Stanwix (2013) have studied the impact of the SD on employment in the farm sector, 
no published research to-date has reported on estimates of the wage elasticity of demand for 
farm workers in sugarcane production in South Africa.  
Based on the determinants of the wage elasticity of demand identified by Friedman (1962), it 
is uncertain whether the wage elasticity of demand is more or less elastic in sugarcane 
production than for the farm sector as a whole. The reason for this is that although farm staff 
(wages and expenditure of labour) accounts for a large proportion (about 24%) of production 
costs in the sugar industry (SACGA, 2014), there are relatively few substitutes for sugarcane 
harvesting staff, in particular, in sugarcane production on most farmland used for sugarcane 
production in South Africa. Nonetheless, Newman et al. (1997) predicted that because labour 
accounts for a relatively high proportion of costs in sugarcane farming, employment in 
sugarcane farming would be relatively more responsive to a change in the cost of labour.   
Farm labour employed in sugarcane farming is highly heterogeneous. It ranges from relative ly 
unskilled (e.g., general field staff) to semi-skilled (e.g., drivers and junior managers or indunas) 
occupations, with some farm workers employed on a permanent basis and others on a seasonal 
basis. Moreover, some jobs (notably cane harvesting) are undertaken predominantly by migrant 
workers. Furthermore, sugarcane harvesting staff are typically paid on a piecemeal basis rather 
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than at a daily or hourly wage rate. Research on the impact of the minimum wage on 
employment in South African agriculture, e.g., Sparrow et al. (2008), Bhorat et al. (2012) and 
Stanwix (2013), have not investigated the impact by labour category. This study seeks to bridge 
the gap by employing descriptive statistics and econometric approaches to investigate the 
impact of the minimum wage on employment, wage structure and redistribution between labour 
categories in the presence of a minimum wage.  
The aim of this research is therefore to investigate how the minimum wage legislation has 
impacted not only on wages and employment of farm workers in sugarcane production that 
typically earn minimum wages (e.g., seasonal and permanent field workers), but also how it has 
impacted on the wage rates and employment of categories of workers that typically earn more 
than the minimum wage rate (e.g., cane harvesting staff and drivers). Because the demand for 
and the supply of labour in the various labour categories may vary across sugarcane producing 
regions, the impact of the minimum wage on employment in sugarcane farming is compared 
for the South Coast of KwaZulu-Natal region (hereafter referred to as the South Coast - which 
is relatively more labour intensive) with the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands (hereafter referred to as 
the Midlands - which is relatively more mechanised.   
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The general objectives of the study are to determine: 
 factors affecting farm employment of four selected categories of labour in sugarcane 
farming in the industry as a whole and in each of the two selected sugarcane producing 
regions in a minimum wage environment; 
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 the impact of the minimum wage on the wage structure and wage redistribution between 
the semi-skilled labour category (Drivers) and other elementary categories (seasonal 
and permanent field workers) of labour; and 
 the impact of the minimum wage on basic wages in the sugarcane farming industry.  
The specific research objective is to show how the impact of a change in the minimum wage 
varies across various farm labour categories, from highly unskilled to semi-skilled workers, and 
between sugarcane producing regions. This will be achieved by estimating and comparing wage 
elasticities of the demand for the four categories of farm workers in sugarcane production, and 
to compare these estimates across the two selected regions and the industry aggregate.   
The general objectives will be achieved through: 
 the use of relevant data to estimate various demand models;  
 trend analysis of the wage components proportion and wage redistribution between 
labour categories; and 
 trend analysis comparing the minimum wage to basic wages in the industry as a whole, 
selected regions and farm labour categories. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation 
The study is organised as follows: In this chapter, the study was introduced, outlining the 
specific problem and motivation for undertaking the study. The research objectives are also 
presented, to give the literature review and analysis direction. Chapter 2 provides a broad 
literature review, which is important for the development of a theoretical base for the study. 
Theory is important to assist with the development of an appropriate model through the 
identification of important variables, to pre-empt possible outcomes from the study, and to set 
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a strong base to guide discussions in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the farm wage 
structure and the implications of an effective SD on farm wages and wage structure. The 
demand for and supply of farm labour is followed by a discussion of the minimum wage 
implications on employment and wages, as well as the resultant substitution effects.  
Having discussed various implications in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 identifies and describes the sugar 
industry structure, while Chapter 5 justifies and provides a description of each selected region 
and the availability of suitable data required for descriptive and econometric analysis. The 
perception of growers about the impact of increasing wages on production systems are also 
incorporated in the description of selected regions. A description of data availability is 
important for the development of an appropriate econometric model in Chapter 6, a model that 
must be suitable for the comparative analysis of selected labour categories in the industry and 
regions, and be able to deal with expected high collinearity in the data sets. Chapter 7 presents 
the estimated econometric model results, the wage and cross-elasticity of demand for the price 
of chemicals on the demand for farm labour.  
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CHAPTER 2: A REVIEW OF MINIMUM WAGE-RELATED STUDIES 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a review of empirical economic research on (a) the 
supply of and demand for farm labour, and (b) the implications of minimum wages on farm 
employment and wages. The notion that past studies provide contentious and conflic t ing 
evidence about the economic impacts of minimum wages on employment and wages is explored 
in the review. Considering that Machin et al. (2003) and Bhorat et al. (2013) drew attention to 
the importance of methodology in studying the outcomes from the introduction of minimum 
wage legislation, there is a particular focus in this chapter on which methodologies were 
adopted in the various studies.  
The discussion of these and other aspects of the literature reviewed subsequently guides the 
development of an appropriate study approach for this study. Both local and foreign peer-
reviewed articles are included in the review of literature. South African studies are reviewed in 
Section 2.1 and studies in other countries are reviewed in Section 2.2.  Section 2.1 is sub-divided 
into studies of the South Africa farm sector, in general, and studies of particular sub-sectors or 
regions of the farm sector in South Africa.  Section 2.2 considers both studies of the farm sector 
in other countries, as well as some relevant studies of non-farm sectors. 
 
2.1 South African Studies 
2.1.1 Studies of Employment in the Farm Sector 
Latt and Nieuwoudt (1985) analysed the demand for and supply of farm labour in KZN between 
1972 and 1978, to assess the impact of trade unions on wages and employment. A Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) log model was used to estimate demand and supply wage elasticities of 
-1.389 (excluding real expenditure on new equipment) and 5.185, respectively, while the linear 
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2SLS model presented demand and supply wage elasticities of -1.44 and 5.8, respectively. 
These estimates and the strong correlation coefficient estimate between the farm and non-farm 
wage imply strong competition for labour between agriculture and non-farm sectors. This 
demonstrates the vulnerability of agriculture to losing labour to other sectors due to an increase 
in off-farm wages relative to on-farm wages for relatively unskilled workers. The coefficient 
estimate of expenditure on new equipment was positive, suggesting a complementary 
relationship between labour and investments in new equipment.  
Sparrow et al. (2008) used OLS and 2SLS to estimate the long and short run supply and demand 
wage elasticities of regular farm labour for the 1960-1990 and 1991-2002 periods, respectively, 
to determine structural change in labour demand over time, due to the increase in stringency of 
labour legislation in agriculture. The results showed low (high) elasticity during the early (later) 
period, indicating a structural change in the demand for labour as a result of the financ ia l, 
transaction and risk costs associated with the change in labour-related legislation. The OLS 
Model gave -0.25 and -1.32 elasticities for the 1960-1990 and 1991-2002 periods, respective ly; 
similarly the 2SLS Model yielded elasticity estimates of -0.23 and -1.34, respectively.  
The increase in elasticity between the periods suggest that regular labour has become more 
wage elastic over time, probably due to more substitutes for labour in many farming operations 
becoming available over time, due to technological improvements in machinery and agro-
chemicals, amongst others. The results further indicate that adjustments to employment level 
on farms lag change in real wages - approximately 80% of the adjustment is made within three 
years, whilst the full adjustment is complete in approximately six years. The results also indicate 
that chemicals are a strong substitute for regular farm labour, compared to casual labour and 
mechanisation. Importantly, the findings indicate structural changes in the demand for regular 
farm labour that coincided with the expected and actual change in labour relations. 
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Bhorat et al. (2012) applied the difference- indifference model adopted from Card and Krueger 
(1994), as well as descriptive statistics on 15 waves of the biannual LFS treated as repeated 
cross section between September 2000 and September 2007, to investigate the impact of 
minimum wage on employment, wages and non-wage benefits in South African agriculture. 
The descriptive statistics analysis indicates a substantial immediate increase in the nomina l 
average wage, with an immediate unrecovered decrease in employment of over 20%, while 
econometric results suggest an increase in average wages of about 17%. The results also show 
a significant wage increase in regions, where there was a huge gap between average wages, 
compared to the sector average wage. The legislation has also improved employment security 
through contract requirements, which suggests an improvement in farm workers’ job security. 
Nonetheless, employment remains stable as the average number of hours worked has remained 
stable above 45 hours per week.  
The farm labour wage elasticity demand estimate using the 20% decrease in employment and 
17% increase in wages, i.e. ∆employment/∆wage = -0.2/0.17 = -1.18, suggests an elastic 
demand for farm labour in the SA agricultural sector; however, this simple calculation does not 
account for changes in factors other than the wage. The estimate is nonetheless similar in 
magnitude to Sparrow et al.’s (2008) long-run wage elasticity of demand estimates. The study 
is important in the sense that it reflects farm labour data variation, since it accounts for factors 
such as wage rates, hours worked, contracts, etc., whereas Sparrow et al. (2008) only used 
average/aggregate wage and employment statistics. The differentiation makes this study 
appropriately regarded as a more holistic study of the impacts of the minimum wage, as it 
considers both employment impact and aspects of working conditions other than wages.  
In a similar study, Bhorat et al. (2013) studied the impact of minimum wage legislation on 
employment, wages and hours worked in the retail, domestic worker, forestry, security and taxi 
18 
 
sectors in SA during the 2000 to 2007 period. The study provides evidence that the introduction 
of minimum wages significantly increased hourly wages in districts where the wage rate was 
previously below the minimum wages in the retail, domestic, taxi and security sectors. The 
findings did not show clear evidence of a negative impact on employment in these sectors – a 
very different result to Bhorat et al.’s (2012) study of the farm sector. Importantly, higher real 
hourly wages significantly outweighed the consequent decrease in employment (including cuts 
in the average number of hours worked per employee), which resulted in a real monthly wage 
improvement in the retail, domestic and security sectors. No benefit in the real monthly wage 
was noticed in the forestry and taxi sectors as a result of the legislation. The review of this study 
is important, as it accounts for other major sectors that are considered vulnerable by the DoL, 
since they are not covered by any bargaining council. The findings reported in this study 
presents outcomes that are relevant to the farm labour market. 
Stanwix (2013) deduced that, after plotting provincial farm median wages, SD resulted in an 
increase in wages for permanent labour. He also indicated that there has been an improvement 
in job security through an increase in employment contract compliance by farmers since 2003. 
There has also been an improvement in employment conditions for those remaining in 
employment and new employees that are able to find employment in the sector, and there was 
the likelihood that more labour understood their employment terms over time. However, he 
found that the minimum wage had resulted in a 13% decrease in aggregate employment.  
 
2.1.2 Studies of Employment in Sub-Sectors or Regions of the Farm Sector 
Newman et al. (1997) surveyed a stratified sample of commercial sugarcane, beef and dairy 
farmers in the KZN Province to elicit their perceptions of and planned responses to anticipated 
and actual changes in the regulatory framework governing employment of labour on farms post 
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1994. Although this study pre-dates the introduction of a minimum wage in the farm sector, it 
provided valuable insights on the likely consequences of changes in labour legislation that were 
anticipated at that time. The three enterprise studies were selected partially because they vary 
in capital-use and labour-use intensity: of the three enterprises, dairy farming is most capital 
intensive, followed by sugarcane farming and then beef production; and wages as a proportion 
of production costs is highest for sugarcane, followed by dairy and then beef, which is 
influenced by their respective labour intensity. Sugarcane growers often also have to make 
incentive payments to induce productivity and to get more work done, as sugarcane requires 
more hard work, compared to other enterprises.  
Their findings suggest that farmers who were paying relatively lower wages tended to provide 
more rations per labourer and allocated more land use rights for their labour. Responding 
farmers supported the view that there is some need for labour legislation in agriculture, but most 
of them lamented that it is time-consuming and costly, and desired a legislation that is less 
ambiguous, more flexible and less extensive. The study found that the legislation has resulted 
in an increase in wages and transaction costs, which was anticipated to stimulate substitut ion 
of mechanisation and contract labour or contract machinery for labour. Majority of the 
respondents indicated that if the minimum wage was to be imposed, they will start paying more 
cash wage, charge for perquisites and start replacing labour with machinery and contractors.  
Conradie (2005) conducted the first economic study of the impact of the minimum wage on 
farm labour in a sub-sector or region of the South African farm sector, namely the wine and 
table grape industry of the Western Cape Province. She used farm level data collected between 
2003 and 2004, such as employment and wages, production, mechanisation and fuel. She used 
the data to estimate an econometric model (partial derivative of the short-run cost function) 
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specified in double-log form, to compare short-run wage elasticities of farm labour demand for 
wine and table grape farming operations.  
In general, her findings show inelastic wage elasticities of farm labour in grape production. 
However, it was relatively more inelastic for wine grape farms (-0.33), compared to table grape 
farms (-0.59). She attributed the difference in the estimates to wine grape farms being 30% 
more productive than grape farms due to the relatively higher levels of mechanisation on wine 
grape farms, and because table grape production is four times more labour-intensive than wine 
grape production. This study is important because it highlights variation in wage elasticities of 
demand across two relatively similar enterprises. This, in turn, supports the argument that the 
wage elasticity of demand in sugarcane production may differ significantly from that of the 
agricultural sector as a whole, and may even vary between sugarcane farming regions because 
some production practices are not equally well suited to all sugarcane producing regions. 
Murray and van Walbeek (2007) analysed descriptive statistics generated from a survey of 
sugarcane farmers on the South and North Coasts of KwaZulu-Natal to produce a regional 
comparison of the impacts of the minimum wage on sugarcane farmers across the two regions. 
They found that wages were, on average, higher on the North Coast, and attributed this to (a) 
relatively more farmers in their sample on the North Coast were required to pay the higher of 
the two minimum wages specified in SD8 because they farm in relatively urban munic ipa l 
areas, (b) a high compliance rate, and (c) the greater availability of alternative employment 
opportunities for relatively unskilled workers on the North Coast. It is also noted that because 
sugarcane yields per hectare per year on the North Coast are generally higher than on the South 
Coast, farms in the former region may be in a stronger financial position to pay the minimum 
wage.  Besides the increase in wages, other positive impacts of the minimum wage identified 
21 
 
in their results include that some farmers (especially on the North Coast) planned to invest more 
in training their labour to improve labour productivity. 
Negative impacts of the minimum wage include that surveyed growers in both regions planned 
to reduce employment on their farms. In the short-run, the farmers proposed to reduce 
employment via decreasing the number of hours worked per worker per day. Farmers on the 
North Coast planned to cut working hours to between 27 and 36 per week.  Secondly, 
approximately half of Murray and van Walbeek’s (2007) survey respondents planned to 
substitute casual and seasonal labour for permanent labour and to outsource activities to 
contractors in response to the minimum wage. Labour contracting was found to be a strong 
substitute for regular labour, compared to complementary seasonal labour, especially on the 
North Coast. Thirdly, growers in both regions planned to reduce the perquisites provision, with 
North Coast growers mainly planning to cut down more on rations and less on accommodation. 
Finally, surveyed farmers on the North Coast reported that payment of a higher wage had 
resulted in growers dealing with more alcohol related disciplinary incidents. 
Roberts and Antrobus (2013) analysed case studies spanning the past five decades (1957 – 
2008) to monitor change in farming practices in the Upper and Lower Albany regions of the 
Eastern Cape Province as a result of changes in labour legislation. The results show a decreasing 
trend in employment over the study period, which started to accelerate in 1994, as well as a 
strong labour casualisation. Farmers also reduced the daily working hours and shortened the 
length of the working season. The reduction in employment was attributed not only to changes 
in labour legislation, but also to a general input price squeeze. They found that land use has 
shifted in favour of relatively less labour-intensive enterprises, e.g. livestock, rather than cash 
crops, and that this was also associated with an increase in the average farm size. They found 
that imposition of the SD resulted in an increase in cash wages relative to the value of other 
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non-pecuniary benefits, such as provision of accommodation and rations. Whilst this change is 
attributed to SD rules, they argued that the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) has 
also contributed to the cut in provision of accommodation. Consequences of farm workers 
residing off-farm include high transport costs incurred by farmers, and that farm workers are 
increasingly exposed to more lucrative jobs and lifestyles. Furthermore, it has resulted in an 
increase in demand for service delivery in towns. They further found that minimum wage 
legislation caused: (a) increased standardisation of wages (reduced variation in wages), which 
may have compromised incentives for employees to be relatively more productive, and (b) 
decreased wage inequality between relatively skilled and unskilled labour.  
An important aspect of this study is that it provides empirical evidence that changes in labour-
related legislations contributed to a shift in land use from labour-intensive cash crops to 
extensive livestock farming in the Eastern Cape Province. The consequences of this change in 
land use patterns included: (a) reduced employment of farm labour, (b) an increase in the 
casualisation of farm labour in the area, and (c) a decline in the total wage bill as a proportion 
of farm expenditure. The findings, therefore, reflect that farmers not only change how they 
farm, but that they also adjust what they farm in response to a minimum wage induced change 
in the relative price of unskilled farm labour.  In general, an increase in the relative price of 
unskilled farm labour results in a shift towards relatively less labour intensive farming. 
 
2.1.3 Discussion 
Studies reviewed in this section indicate that the SD did impose a minimum wage for farm 
labour that exceeded the market equilibrium wage rate in the absence of a minimum wage 
(Bhorat et al., 2012; Stanwix, 2013). There is consensus in the findings of Conradie (2005), 
Sparrow et al. (2008), Murray and van Walbeek (2007), Bhorat et al. (2012) and Stanwix (2013) 
23 
 
that after accounting for other possible contributing factors, the increase in the wage rate of 
farm workers due to the SD contributed to labour shedding in the sector. 
Sparrow et al. (2008) and Bhorat et al.’s (2012) findings concur with those of Latt and 
Nieuwoudt (1985) that for the sector as a whole, the wage elasticity of demand for farm labour 
exceeds unity in the long-run in absolute terms. However, it may vary across the sector 
(Conradie, 2005), and none of the studies reviewed considered how it varies across categories 
of farm labour by skill levels (e.g., “elementary labour” and farms hands vs. machine and 
vehicle operators). The decline in employment may be attributed not only to how production 
takes place (e.g., Conradie’s (2005) example of labour substitution in wine grape production), 
but also to changes in land use in favour of less labour intensive land uses (Roberts and 
Antrobus, 2013). 
The findings of Sparrow et al. (2008) and Murray and van Walbeek (2007) both indicate that 
there may be a lengthy period of adjustment to employment on farms following a minimum 
wage induced hike in the cost of unskilled labour. Murray and van Walbeek’s (2007) and 
Roberts and Antrobus’s (2013) finding that farmers reduced employment by reducing workers’ 
working hours may reflect high transactions costs of retrenching permanent workers; thus 
farmers may be inclined to wait for resignations and retirement of workers to reduce their 
number of employees. An alternative argument is that farmers avoid labour shedding in order 
to protect the livelihoods of people with whom they already have a relationship.   
There is also clear evidence that because SD8 imposed different regulations on regular labour 
relative to casual labour, the legislation induced substitution of casual and seasonal labour for 
permanent labour (Sparrow et al., 2008; Murray and van Walbeek, 2007; Roberts and Antrobus, 
2013). Murray and van Walbeek (2007) also noted that farmers planned to increasingly 
outsource farming activities in response to labour legislation and the minimum wage.  
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Considering that the minimum wage legislation applies equally to workers directly employed 
by farms and those employed by contractors and labour brokers, the benefit to farmers of 
outsourcing labour is not immediately apparent. A possible explanation is that the transaction 
costs of employment of farm labour as a result of labour legislation may be higher for some 
farmers than for others, based on their relative skills and abilities.  Some farmers may therefore 
be willing to pay a premium to avoid those costs, whereas others may be willing to specialise 
in those functions in return for earning a premium (or contractor fee). This argument is 
supported by Sparrow et al.’s (2008) findings.   
Besides its impact on employment and cash-wages (including adjustments for changes in 
working hours), the SD and other changes to the regulatory environment for the employment 
of farm workers has had other intended and unintended consequences for the living and working 
conditions of farm workers (Visser and Ferrer, 2015). Some changes identified in the reviewed 
studies are to the benefit of workers, e.g., the proportion of farm workers with formal 
employment contracts increased (Bhorat et al., 2012; Roberts and Antrobus, 2013), whilst 
others are negative, e.g., reduced provision of non-pecuniary benefits such as rations (Murray 
and van Walbeek, 2007; Roberts and Antrobus, 2013).   
 
2.2 Studies of Minimum Wages in Other Countries 
2.2.1 Studies of Minimum Wages in the Farm Sector of Other Countries 
The implications of introducing a minimum wage in the agricultural sector have widely been 
explored in the USA and UK by renowned researchers. Scholars in these countries employ a 
variety of methodologies, such as descriptive statistics, cross-sections, simple regression and 
simultaneous models on cross-section and time-series data. Their research approach and key 
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findings are discussed in this section to provide a guide for the development of an appropriate 
model to study farm labour in sugarcane farming in South Africa. 
Schuh (1962) analysed 1929-1957 time series data for hired farm labour in the USA, using a 
simultaneous model to determine the structural change in aggregate demand and supply over 
time, while assuming no change in quality of labour and hours worked. Data showed varying 
employment and composite wage between 1870 and 1960; however, employment (wages) fell 
and rose by about 44% (236%) between 1929 and 1960, respectively. The supply (demand) 
indicated a coefficient of adjustments of 0.68 (0.7), which means 32% and 30% of the supply 
and demand disequilibrium is adjusted in a given period. Estimated supply elasticities in respect 
of farm and non-farm wages at the mean were 0.25 and 0.36, which suggest a higher labour 
supply response to non-farm wages, compared to farm wages. Short- and long-run demand 
elasticity estimates at the mean were -0.12 and -0.4, which suggests a change in the demand for 
labour over time. Short and long run supply elasticities were also estimated at the mean as 0.25 
and 0.78, which show a larger change in the supply of labour over time. 
Gardner (1972) applied a reduced-form supply-demand model on the hired labour market to 
determine the impact of a minimum wage on farm wage and employment between 1929 and 
1967 in the USA. The minimum wage was first introduced in non-farming sectors in the USA 
between 1938 and 1967 and extended to some farm labour in 1967. The results show that the 
minimum wage coverage extension to some farm labour resulted in a decrease (increase) in 
aggregate employment (farm wage) of about 18% and 13%, where wages would have only 
increased by 7% without the minimum wage. The extension of coverage was expected to impact 
greatly on employment, as the wage demand elasticity for low paid labour is much higher than 
overall labour elasticity, which makes it important to explore demand elasticity in various 
labour categories.   
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Gallasch (1975) investigated the impact of minimum wage extension to cover farm labour in 
the USA, by applying simultaneous and reduced-form equations on data for covered and 
unaffected portions of the farm labour market between 1959 and 1971. The findings suggested 
that the extension of coverage resulted in an increase in wages and a decrease in employment 
in excess of the labour emigration trend. The mean based demand elasticity estimate suggested 
that a 10% increase in the real minimum wage resulted in a 2% increase in the real equilibr ium 
wage and a 6% decrease in employment. Whilst the estimated elasticity of the real alternat ive 
wage suggested that a 10% increase in non-farm wage lead to a 17% and 5% decrease (increase) 
in employment and wages, respectively.        
Gallasch and Gardner (1978) studied the impact of minimum wage extension, years of 
schooling and the interaction of the two factors on employment and average farm wage in the 
USA, using econometric modelling. The model consists of four equations, namely, demand, 
supply, excess supply and market equilibrium interacting, to determine the quantity demanded 
and supplied, the wage rate and excess supply. The reduced form equations were estimated and 
empirical findings demonstrated that higher schooling (higher productivity) or minimum wage 
introduction and/or increase resulted in a decrease (increase) in employment and average 
wages, respectively. The minimum wage attracted labour to the limited availability of jobs, 
while an improvement in schooling redirected farm labour to non-farm sectors. The mean based 
elasticity estimates showed that the legislation increased (decreased) average wage 
(employment) by about 5% (42%). On the other hand, an increase in the alternative wage would 
increase (decrease) average farm wages and employment by attracting labour with high 
schooling to non-farm sectors with good economic performance. The removal of the minimum 
wage from the economic model showed that a 10% increase in schooling raised (reduced) the 
average farm wage (employment) by 3% (8%) to non-farm sectors, respectively.   
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Machin et al. (2003) examined the impact of minimum wage coverage extension from the 
agricultural sector to other vulnerable sectors of the economy in April 1999 in the UK using 
descriptive statistics and cross-sectional modelling. The earmarked minimum wage 
introduction was ₤3.6 per hour for the 22 years and above age group and ₤3 per hour for the 
age group between 18 to 21 years. The main focus was on the residential home care industry, 
the labour market believed to cater for relatively low income employees, with vulnerab le 
employment and wages to the minimum wage. Initially wages were about 33% below the 
minimum wage and they subsequently rose by 30% in response to minimum wage introduction. 
The findings showed wage redistribution with little evidence of non-compliance, as a large 
number of low paid workers received wage increases, which resulted in wage standardisat ion 
at the lower end of the distribution and a reduction in wage inequality. To some extent, the 
results also showed a decrease in employment and the number of hours worked. Although the 
study focused on a non-farm sector, its review is important since it covers a low income sector 
that is also considered vulnerable, which has direct expectation of results from this study. 
 
2.2.2 Studies of Minimum Wages in Non-Farm Sectors of Other Countries 
Card (1992) used descriptive statistics and the difference in difference cross-section model to 
determine the impact of a minimum wage increase of 26.87% in California State in July 1988, 
using data from between 1985 and 1990. The adjustment was in response to a decline in the 
real federal minimum wage, due to infrequent adjustments in nominal terms, which made its 
impact less noticeable on the labour market. The impact on the State’s general, teenage and 
retail labour markets (trade and restaurant) were determined through comparison with control 
states (the group of states without a minimum wage increase). In general, the results 
demonstrated that a minimum wage increase raised earnings for the low base employees with 
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low employment loss, while hourly and weekly wages (employment) in the teenage labour 
market increased by 10% and 4%, which contradicts the competitive labour market 
conventional theory. Hence, it was suggested that more research into the impact of the minimum 
wage and an exploration of alternative models, such as the monopsonistic model in the 
California State, are needed to determine if labour has market power.  
Card and Krueger (1994) studied the impact of a minimum wage increase by 18.82% per hour 
in the restaurant industry, by comparing employment, wages and prices at stores in New Jersey 
and eastern Pennsylvania (where minimum wages did not change) before and after the rise, 
using descriptive statistics and the difference in difference model on cross-section data. The 
results were inconsistent with the general theory of the competitive labour market, as 
employment in New Jersey increased and product price did not rise. Alternative models based 
on the monopsony theory showed an increase in employment, no impact on the number of 
outlets opened and at least a rise in product price. 
Machin and Manning (1994) investigated the impact of the minimum wage on the adult labour 
market, as well as wage dispersion in the UK, using the descriptive statistics and simple 
regression model to determine if abolishing the Wage Council would increase employment. 
Empirical findings showed that a decline in the strength of regulations imposed by the Council 
in the 1980s contributed to wage inequality and resulted in a decrease in employment in covered 
industries. It was also established that the Council did not impact negatively on employment 
and its absence would result in huge wage disparity. An unfavourable employment effect was 
noticed as a result of a minimum wage, while the Council showed a positive employment effect. 
A relatively more theoretical explanation for these findings was outlined, which suggests that 
monopsony power may account for some observed positive relationships between the minimum 
wage and the employment of the low wage based labour market, such as the Wage Council 
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sector. A modern version of the monopsony model was suggested for the high income labour 
market, in which market frictions make the supply of labour to individual firms inelastic.   
Rama (2001) examined the impact of tripling (doubling) the nominal and real minimum wage, 
respectively, on wage earnings and employment in Indonesia during the first half of the 1990s, 
by applying simple statistical tools and a regression model on both individual and aggregate 
data. The increase in wages was intended to safeguard labour, as it was not the case for almost 
two decades. In general, the results showed a moderate minimum wage impact in the country. 
Wage distribution analysis only presented minor clusters at or around the minimum wage, 
which were hardly visible for some provinces and groups of workers. Regression results showed 
poor statistically significant coefficient estimates with smaller elasticities, which may suggest 
less compliance, due to a lack of stringent compliance with an enforcement mechanism. 
However, the results suggested that doubling the minimum wage increased the average wage 
by five to 15% and led to a less than 5% decrease in urban wage employment. Arguably, the 
low magnitude of the decrease in aggregate urban wage employment conceals the disproportion 
across firms, which suggests that employment in small firms would have probably fallen 
significantly, while large firms would have noticed an increase in employment. 
Neumark et al. (2002) applied the descriptive statistics and regression model on time series data 
spanning between 1979 and 1997, to examine the impact of the minimum wage increase on 
wages, hours worked, employment and labour income at different wage distribution points, but 
with main focus on the low end of the distribution. It was shown that workers initially earning 
near the minimum wage experienced wage gains with a decrease in working hours and 
employment, but the net effect suggested unfavourable outcomes for the low wage workers. 
Empirical findings also presented an instant increase in the magnitude of wage gains, the 
reduction in working hours and income loss. The average income of low wage workers declined 
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in response to the rise in minimum wage, due to an increase in the number of relatively poor 
families. The conclusion is that the minimum wage rise leads to a lower immediate increase in 
wages than the minimum wage rise, the decline in working hours and employment, which leads 
to a higher unemployment and a reduction in wellbeing of workers due to a loss in income. 
Maloney and Mendez (2004) investigated the impact of the minimum wage on wage 
distribution and the unregulated/informal sector in Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Honduras, Mexico and Uruguay) using numerical, kernel density plots and 
econometric analysis. These countries were compared and the conclusion focused on Colombia, 
since the minimum wage in the country was relatively higher and binding. The results show 
that the minimum wage also impacted on wage distribution in the vicinity, through its potential 
to resonate wages. Labour market inflexibility was noticed with poverty or flexibility dependent 
on the attributes of the labour market. The impact on the informal sector for salaried workers, 
revealed that, on aggregate, the impact was large. Therefore, the legislation impacted on both 
the formal and informal high level workers, which shows that distortions on the labour market 
are much larger than anticipated. The probability of losing a job decreases with an increase in 
the position on the wage distribution. The impacts were not immediate; however, the 
simultaneous effect was almost double, relative to findings in developed economies.  
Fang and Lin (2015) used country-level minimum wage data combined with urban household 
survey micro-dataset from 16 representative provinces as a merged country-level panel data to 
estimate the impact of changes in China’s minimum wage regulations over the 2002 – 2009 
period on employment. The change in the regulation involved extension of coverage to state 
owned, private enterprises, private non-enterprise units, and employees in self-employed 
businesses. Particularly, it introduced two types of minimum wages, i.e. a monthly minimum 
wage applied to fulltime workers and an hourly minimum wage applied to no-fulltime workers. 
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Descriptive statistics and econometric modelling were used and the findings presented evidence 
of a sizeable adverse impact on employment in the Eastern and Central regions, resulted in loss 
of employment for female, young adults and low skilled workers. 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
In Section 1.2 it is noted that Machin et al. (2003) attributed disagreement in empirical research 
on the economic outcomes from the introduction of minimum wage legislation to a 
methodological divide between economists. Section 2.1 presented a broad literature review, 
while Section 2.2 discussed the methodologies adopted in those studies and to consider the 
relationship, if any, between the research methods used and the results. The research methods 
used in those studies involve the use of descriptive statistics and econometric modelling, or the 
application of both, to analyse the minimum wage implications on employment and wages in a 
given labour market in SA and markets for farm labour in other countries.  
Most of the research was conducted assuming a competitive labour market. However, find ings 
from some studies provide a theoretical base to explore the application of the monopsony model 
to explain unusual relationships, which suggests the need for more research to focus on the 
monopsony approach on labour markets initially presumed to be competitive. Machin and 
Manning (1994), for example, found that under monopsony conditions a minimum wage may 
have no unfavourable impact on employment and may reduce wage disparity between 
employees. The low availability of research using this approach may be due to the limited 
availability of markets with such characteristics and such markets also tend to be sophistica ted.  
Nonetheless, considering low levels of unionisation in the South African Farm Sector and the 
large number of employers, the assumption of a competitive labour market is probably 
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reasonable in this study. The application of a simultaneous estimation of the aggregate supply 
of and demand for farm labour by Schuh (1962), Gardner (1972), Gallasch (1975), Latt and 
Nieuwoudt (1985) and Sparrow et al. (2008), amongst others, fits the conventional assumption 
of a competitive market. Findings of these studies concur that an increase (decrease) in wages 
due to minimum wage legislation impacts negatively (positively) on employment. Neumark et 
al. (2004) compared the impact of the introduction of a minimum wage on low and high income 
earners, and showed that there is a relatively strong (weak) employment effect on low (high) 
income workers. This suggests that in a competitive labour market the brunt of the impact of 
minimum wage legislation is borne by relatively less skilled workers, which is in line with the 
aim of this study as it aims to brig such gap in the context of SA Agricultural Sector.   
The SA studies review suggests a diverse coverage of the minimum wage impact, 
simultaneously with other labour-related legislation on unskilled labour markets, to capture a 
holistic view. The studies from other countries, however, have largely focused on minimum 
wage implications only. Studies in SA have mostly utilised either case study analyses (e.g., 
Roberts and Antrobus, 2013), case studies with descriptive statistics analysis (e.g., Newman et 
al., 1997; and Murray and van Walbeek, 2007), econometric analyses of cross-sectional data 
from a survey of farmers (e.g., Conradie, 2005), or econometric approaches to study farm labour 
markets using secondary data (e.g., Latt and Nieuwoudt, 1985; Sparrow et al., 2008; Bhorat et 
al., 2012). These studies mainly focused on aggregate employment, i.e. sector, industry etc., 
which does not compare the impact between various categories of farm labour. Hence, the aim 
of this study is to compare the impact of the SD between farm labour categories and regions in 
the sugar industry using descriptive statistics analysis and an econometric model, since a 
simultaneous model is relatively appropriate to study the impact of SD on the demand for labour 
dynamics using time-series. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ECONOMICS OF MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION IN THE 
MARKET FOR FARM LABOUR 
 
This chapter provides a theoretical framework for studying farm labour wage structure, sectoral 
determination compliance, demand for and supply of farm labour, supposition of the 
implications of the minimum wage on wages and employment, as well as the resulting 
substitution effect from minimum wage introduction and increases. This theoretical framework 
provides a foundation for the research methodology detailed in the next chapter.  
The components of the costs of farm labour, and the farm wage structure for farm workers in 
sugarcane production are discussed in the first section, followed by a consideration of factors 
that affect the demand for and supply of farm labour in the next two sections. This is followed 
by a supply and demand analysis of the theoretical impact of the minimum wage on wages and 
employment in sugarcane farming, assuming that employers of farm workers comply with the 
minimum wage. In the final section the assumption that farmers always comply with stipulated 
minimum wages is relaxed and the matters of enforcement and compliance are discussed.  
 
3.1 The Costs of Farm Labour and Structure of Farm Workers’ Wages 
As indicated in the introduction and the literature review chapter, the introduction of the SD 
and ESTA has resulted in a change in the economic costs of hiring farm labour, since it has 
impacted on cash wages, non-pecuniary benefits, transaction costs and risk. The composite 
wage has increased to relatively high levels, where cash wages rose at the expense of non-
pecuniary benefits as a result of a change in wage computation, and it has become difficult for 
farmers to adjust their labour due to the legislation. 
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It is important to start with the farm wage structure section to highlight the impact of the rules 
governing wage computation, for the purpose of compliance with the impact of the minimum 
wage legislation on the farm labour wage structure and associated complications. The SD 
compliance follows, discussing the challenges and compliance associated with the legislat ion, 
as the impact of the legislation is only realisable when there is compliance. A discussion of the 
demand for and supply of farm labour hypothesises the impact of the legislation on the 
compliance of farmers with regard to the demand for and supply of labour. Lastly, the 
consequences of the minimum wage introduction are highlighted and hypothesised, on the 
impact of relevant legislation, and substitution and output effect sections.   
The estimated farm labour wage in the industry is made up of basic or cash, a monthly and an 
annual bonus, and other benefits (an estimated value of all non-pecuniary payments as a form 
of payment). These non-pecuniary wage components are comprised, amongst others, of 
accommodation, food rations, other hand-outs, etc., which are often difficult to estimate their 
true value and their estimated values often vary by enterprise type (Newman et al., 1997). 
Hence, most of them are often left unaccounted for or are subjectively estimated in calculat ions 
of workers’ wages.  
Post introduction of the farm sector SD, not only has the minimum wage regulated, but also the 
proportion of the composite wage cash and non-cash. In particular, the provision of 
accommodation (provided that it satisfies stipulated guidelines) and rations may each be limited 
to an estimated maximum value of 10% of a worker’s composite wage, regardless of the actual 
costs to company of their provision. All other forms of non-pecuniary benefits are not covered 
in the computation of a workers’ wage, and growers will be providing them on a free-will basis 
(DoL, 2006). As a result, growers have an incentive to (a) reduce provisions of accommodation 
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and rations if the cost to company of those provisions exceeds the deductions from wages 
permitted in the SD, and (b) to charge labour for all other provisions on a user basis.  
There is a school of thought that holds the view that provision of most non-cash benefits by 
farmers to their workers reflects “a paternalistic relationship between the farmer and labour”, 
and that one objective of the SD was probably to make labour more independent. The consumer 
choice theory presented in Perloff (2012) and Mankiw (2009), amongst others, also indicates 
that employees would be better off with more cash relative to more non-cash benefits in the 
form of food rations (or food stamps), various hand-outs and accommodation-related benefits, 
because provision of non-cash benefits may compromise the utility attainable by each employee 
relative to a cash-only wage at the same composite wage. A farmer does not know each worker’s 
preferences with certainty, and consequently cannot determine the best affordable bundle of 
cash wages and non-cash benefits for each employee. Therefore, by encouraging farmers to 
provide more cash and fewer rations to workers, the SD relaxes limitations on farm labour 
choices to select products and services (relatively controlled consumption) based on their 
preferences and enable them to change their consumption bundles with time.  
Considering the remote location of many farms to shops and residential areas, as well as 
challenges of storing perishable food faced by many workers (and especially migrant workers), 
it is likely that some farm businesses can provide some non-pecuniary benefits to workers at a 
cost lower than a similar benefit could be directly procured by its farm workers, after accounting 
for all transaction costs. Visser and Ferrer (2015) argued that for this reason, stipulations in the 
SD that discourage provision of non-pecuniary benefits to farm workers may have had a 
negative impact on the wellbeing of some farmworkers. Murray and van Walbeek (2007) 
further raise concerns that cash wages intended for food consumption may be used irresponsibly 
by workers for other purposes, such as to increase their consumption of alcoholic products.  
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Provisions of rations to workers also help protect them against food price inflation (Murray and 
van Walbeek, 2007; Roberts and Antrobus, 2013). 
On the other hand, findings of Roberts and Antrobus (2013) suggest that aspects of farm 
workers’ wellbeing has improved following minimum wage introduction. Their find ings 
indicate that labour now buy a wider variety of goods and services than before, includ ing 
various appliances and gadgets. Some growers also noted that some workers tend to purchase 
relatively more luxurious foodstuffs than before. General consumption levels were, however, 
related to labour type, which is closely associated with wages. For example, relatively high 
income labours, such as drivers, tend to buy more sophisticated and expensive items. These 
findings reflect that real wages increased due to the minimum wage, and are not conclusive ly 
related to farmers reducing the proportion of non-cash benefits in the wages of farm workers.  
The purpose of this section was to assist with identification of (a) the theoretically correct price 
of labour to specify the demand for farm labour model, and (b) the appropriate wage rate to 
specify in the supply of labour. In both instances, the cash wage must be adjusted. It was 
indicated that some of the costs to farmers (e.g., transaction costs of hiring and managing 
workers) and benefits to workers (e.g., the transaction costs of procuring, storing and preparing 
food, vs. provision of rations) value cannot be easily observed. However, a dummy variable 
can be used to capture the impact of transaction and risk costs of hiring labour since the year of 
anticipated change in labour policy, e.g. putting 0 and 1 for the years before and after 1994, 
respectively. This observation also has a bearing on the discussion of matters of compliance 
and enforcement in Section 3.5. The discussion of transaction costs as a cost of hiring labour 
leads to a conclusion that the SD must be considered together with all legislations relevant to 
farm labour conditions. 
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3.2 The Demand for Farm Labour in the SA Sugar Industry 
The law of demand indicates that the quantity demanded of a factor in production (in this case 
farm labour) will decrease as its price (wages) increases, ceteris paribus. The opposite is 
expected when the price of that production factor decreases. In a perfectly competitive market 
for farm labour, growers (and other employers of farm workers) are price takers in the sense 
that they are unable to individually influence the price of inputs (the grower is a buyer) or the 
price received for  sugarcane deliveries (the grower is a seller).  
Growers do not necessarily compete to sell their sugarcane to millers; their sugarcane, when 
delivered to a mill, is guaranteed crushing as long as it meets the crushing quality standard . 
They accept the price of nondiscretionary inputs as given, e.g. the price of fertiliser relative to 
the price of labour and can adjust their labour requirements in line with its prices (real wage) 
and the availability of technology. Sugarcane as a product determines the type of inputs 
demanded and their level of importance. The industry has a relatively low availability of 
appropriate high labour saving technologies and it is even worse in the South Coast region, due 
to the steep terrain. Therefore, the demand for farm labour can be expressed as a function of the 
real price of sugarcane, the real wage for farm labour, the real price of other important inputs 
and a measure of technology (Schuh, 1962; Friedman, 1962).  
The real price of sugarcane determines the strength of the derived demand for labour in the 
industry from an increase in the demand for sugarcane (derived from an increase in demand for 
sugar) and/or the sugarcane price, which stimulates sugarcane production and labour 
requirements. To support the latter, Conradie (2005) found that the labour demand increased 
with an increase in grape output, given that a production function represents the relationship 
between inputs and output. Hence, in order for growers to maximise profit in a perfectly 
competitive market, they must produce the quantity of sugarcane at a point where the margina l 
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cost equals marginal revenue or sugarcane price. Using production economics concepts, it can 
be established that this point is where the value of the marginal product of an input (VMPL) 
equals the price of the input (real wage). Therefore, a rational grower will employ labour until 
a point where the real farm wage equals the VMPL of labour (Doll and Orazem, 1984).  
If the minimum wage is set higher than the market wage, raising the wage more, relative to 
prices of other inputs and their VMPs, growers will start substituting other inputs for labour 
and reduce their demand for labour. When the real wage rises faster than the VMP, labour will 
reach diminishing returns quickly. Hence, the VMP represents the demand for labour curve, 
where the slope and elasticity are largely dependent on the proportion of labour from total 
production costs, availability of substitutes and complements, as well as the importance of 
labour (Friedman, 1962). The importance of labour may be relatively strong in sugarcane 
farming in the short-term; however, it is expected to decrease over time, with the improvement 
in technology, and become less essential in the long run. It is expected that the labour 
requirements per hectare in sugarcane farming have decreased over time (SACGA, 2014). 
This is due to the fact that the price of sugarcane is a determinant of the demand for labour in 
sugarcane farming.  When control of the price of cane is taken away through legislation causing 
the price of cane to decline, employment in sugarcane farming is therefore expected to decrease. 
Goedecke and Ortmann (1993), Newman et al. (1997), Conradie (2005) and Sparrow et al. 
(2008) all hypothesised that, as the relative costs of labour increase, growers are likely to 
substitute machinery, casual labour, labour contract service and capital for labour. The 
supposition is largely dependent on instantaneous reactions by all growers to input price 
changes (Friedman, 1962). Bhorat and Hodge (1999) also indicated that an increase in the rate 
of capital-intensive production practices, in general, will lead to a low (high) demand for 
unskilled (skilled) labour to meet the growth in capital requirements in the SA economy. This 
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could be dire for labour, as it is predominantly unskilled and unemployable, and agriculture is 
usually a step-up employment provider for unskilled labour. 
 
3.3 The Supply of Farm Labour in the SA Sugar Industry 
The law of supply states that there is a positive relationship between the quantity supplied of 
an input (in this case, labour in sugarcane farming) and its price (the wage rate), ceteris paribus. 
The concept of labour supply suggests that individuals have to make a choice between leisure 
and employment. Individuals choosing employment become economically active and make use 
of sector/industry relative earnings/wages as a guide for selecting a sector/industry as an 
employment choice. If an individual chooses leisure, the opportunity cost of leisure is the real 
wage (Latt and Nieuwoudt, 1985).  
An individual will only decide to work when perceived benefits (monetary and non-monetary) 
from work are greater than not working. Hence, an individual’s choice to be economica lly 
active by working in any sector (especially in the farming sector) depends on expected wages, 
the availability of alternative non-farm labour opportunities and the attributes of the labour 
force. Given the average unemployment rate in SA of over 20%, it can be argued that the 
unemployment of unskilled labour is likely going to be higher than of skilled labour. The 
increase in capital intensity suggested by Bhorat and Hodge (1999) is expected to worsen the 
unavailability of jobs, especially for unskilled labour. 
Therefore, the supply of labour in the industry can be expressed as a function of the real wage 
rate, the average non-farm labour wage, and a measure of unemployment rate (preferably in 
KZN Province to determine the availability of non-farm employment opportunities). In general, 
the supply of labour is still rurally based, with low levels of education, given the level of 
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economic development, the location and nature of farm inputs and the requirements in farming. 
However, over the years, due to an improvement in economic development (urbanisation) and, 
to some extent, the end of apartheid government policies that restricted free movement in the 
country, the urban population has increased at the expense of the rural population in certain 
instances. Nonetheless, this movement does not guarantee employment in the cities, given low 
levels of education of migrants.  
President Jacob Zuma, in his 2014 State of the Nation address, indicated that since 2011 the 
proportion of the SA population residing in urban areas has been approximately 63%, and the 
urbanised proportion of the population is expected to increase in the near future (Presidency, 
2014). These developments have the potential of threatening the supply of labour in the farming 
sector. To support the latter, data from the World Bank obtained in 2014, show that the rural 
population in SA has been growing at between 1% and 2% before the year 2001, but since then 
the rate increase has been below 1% and is continuing to decrease. The rural population, as a 
proportion of the total population, has also decreased from over 50% to about 38% between 
1960 and 2012.  
 
3.4 The Impact of Labour Legislation Relevant to the SA Farm Sector 
Conventional neoclassical economic theory on the competitive labour market suggests that, 
ceteris paribus, the introduction of a binding minimum wage set above the market equilibr ium 
wage (wage floor) in the farm sector would result in job shedding and a decrease in the 
availability of new job opportunities, unless the demand for farm labour is perfectly inelast ic. 
Although the number of workers willing to work on farms would increase if wages in the farm 
sector increased relative to wages for relatively unskilled workers in other sectors, because the 
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imposition of the minimum wage makes labour relatively more expensive, less labour is 
employed on aggregate (Friedman, 1962).  
Ippolito (2003) illustrated a model resembling that of Friedman (1962), to suggest the 
intolerance of a strong perfectly competitive labour market towards the introduction of an 
effective minimum wage. Such labour markets usually resemble a relatively elastic supply and 
demand for labour, mostly predominant to relatively unskilled labour. Growers will tend to 
retain hardworking labour and ensure a strong separation from poor performing labour. The 
determination of the strength of labour performance and selective hiring will ensure that 
growers eventually reach an optimal allocation of labour on various farm tasks.  
The repetition of this exercise is necessary for growers to minimise the cost implication of the 
minimum wage through increased productivity and profit. Initially, it may look like rent is 
transferrable from higher wage earners to relatively low skilled labour; however, rent gets 
eroded as the competition for a limited availability of the number of jobs increases. In the end, 
labour that is able to maintain employment and labour from non-agricultural sectors that is 
convinced that the agricultural sector is paying a higher wage rate and is able to find 
employment, will earn a higher wage rate, but with less rent. These resulting effects of a wage 
floor introduction can be referred to as market failure to efficiently allocate and remunerate 
labour, as well as other factors of production.  
A freely-operating, strong and perfectly competitive labour market in the industry would 
employ an equilibrium L0 amount of farm labour at W0 wage rate in Figure 1.  At this point, 
labour earns area BDF rent, while other factors of production, mainly 
entrepreneurship/growers, earn ACE rent. Labour that is able to maintain employment over 
time and those able to find employment in the industry, earn the most rent, with those on the 
bottom of the supply curve (probably first entrants labour) earning higher rent, which decreases 
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with the movement up the supply curve. The immediate impact of the minimum wage 
introduction will result in a hypothetical decrease in employment from L0 to L2 quantity of 
labour and the difference between the points represents employment loss. The minimum wage 
raises the wage rate from W0 to W1, where the gap between the points indicate minimum wage 
portion from total wage rate. 
 
Figure 1: The Impact of Minimum Wage Introduction (Ippolito, 2003) 
 
As a result, the rent to all factors of production decreases by area A and B, the measure of dead 
weight loss. The intermediate and long-run effects are that the higher wage rate is expected to 
attract more labour from competing sectors/industries, if the wage in the industry/farm sector 
is believed to be relatively higher. The increase in the supply of labour for limited number of 
jobs is indicated by the L3 quantity of labour. The difference between L3 and L2 represents the 
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amount of labour in search of employment and associated searching costs in the form of time 
and monetary terms. Even if farm labour in search of employment does get employed at a higher 
wage rate, they will be employed at a relatively lower rent. Growers will also incur searching 
costs in the form of time spent evaluating suitable candidates and monetary costs related to the 
recruitment process. This labour will also be willing to take employment at wage rates below 
W1. Given the poor unionisation influence in agriculture, the SD is the only factor preventing 
this adjustment from occurring, enforcing a long-run and stable equilibrium position at less than 
“full” employment. Anecdotal information provided by growers generally confirmed this 
impact, and indicated that job seekers often indicate their willingness to work at a wage rate 
below the minimum wage rate. An effective SD through voluntary compliance and inspection 
will result in the supply curve starting at point W1 relative to 0. 
However, the industry and study coverage comprise elementary and semi-skilled farm labour. 
Hence, it is also important to discuss the implications of the minimum wage introduction on 
semi-skilled labour. Assuming that the two labour categories are substitutes for one another in 
production, and pre-minimum wage semi-skilled workers earned a wage premium and the 
minimum wage is set between the wage rates. The imposition of the minimum wage lowers the 
wage premium attached to the skills possession of the semi-skilled workers, reducing the 
incentive for workers to invest in obtaining those skills, and therefore reducing the supply of 
semi-skilled workers. However, because the imposition of the minimum wage causes semi-
skilled workers to be less expensive relative to unskilled workers, the demand for semi-skilled 
workers is likely to increase. Consequently, the wage rate of semi-skilled workers will 
eventually increase over time. Therefore, it can be concluded that all unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers who retain their jobs and new entrants (mostly semi-skilled workers) will experience 
a wage benefit. However, it is expected that the shift in employment composition in the sector 
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is likely favour semi-skilled workers over unskilled workers, since farmers require semi-skilled 
labour to facilitate the use of capital to replace unskilled labour to reduce the costs of labour. 
 
Substitution and Output Effects of a Wage Increase 
Figure 2 was adopted from Griffiths and Jones (1980), it hypothesises the impact of a unit 
change in the composite wage rate on farm output and the resultant substitution effect between 
labour and capital.  
  
Figure 2: The Impact of a Change in Composite Farm Labour Wage Rate on Output 
and Substitution Effect (Griffiths and Jones, 1980) 
The tangency points (E1, E2 and E3) show different combinations of the wage rate and quantity 
of labour demanded. Point E1 is the initial equilibrium combination, the tangency point between 
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isoquant I2 and isocost KL1. Hypothetically, an increase in composite wage rate from OK/OL1 
to OK/OL2 units, provided that the price of capital remains the same, will result in a decrease in 
the quantity of farm labour demanded and output from OW1 to OW3 units and I1 to I2 units, 
respectively, and an increase in the quantity of capital demanded from OC1 to OC3. 
Since it is rather impractical, from an efficiency point of view, for growers to decrease 
sugarcane output by working a smaller area from the total AUC, as a result of a decrease in 
their purchasing power, they are likely going to make use of relative price adjustments to find 
an affordable inputs combination, in order to remain on the same isoquant I1 with relatively low 
operating costs ceteris paribus. This compensation for a loss of affordability through input 
combination adjustment is indicated by drawing a “fictional” iso-cost line (MM) with the E2 
tangency point on isoquant I1. If growers manage to maintain production on the same isoquant 
I1, the quantity of labour demanded will only decrease from OW1 to OW2 units, while capital 
utilisation will increase from OC1 to OC2 units. The latter change is referred to as the 
substitution effect. The substitution effect entails, amongst other things, a reduction in the 
quantity of labour demanded at the extensive (head count reduction) and intensive (decreasing 
number of hours and days worked) margin, etc. 
Similarly to the partial equilibrium discussion, the implication of capital as a substitute for 
labour between unskilled and semi-skilled labour is highlighted, as minimum wage introduction 
is likely to result in different capital replacement for different labour categories. Assuming that 
the two labour categories are substitutes for one another, and before the minimum wage semi-
skilled workers earned a wage premium and that the minimum wage is set between wage rates 
of the two labour categories. The minimum wage is expected to lower the wage premium 
attached to the skills possession of semi-skilled workers, reducing the incentive for workers to 
invest in skills development, and therefore reducing the supply of semi-skilled workers. 
46 
 
However, labour replacement by capital to reduce the wage bill is dependent on semi-skilled 
and skilled labour (complimentary relationship). Hence, the wage rate and demand for semi-
skilled labour is expected to increase at the expense of unskilled labour to facilitate the 
replacement of unskilled labour with capital. Consequently, the shift in employment 
composition will likely favour semi-skilled over unskilled workers in the long-run. 
 
3.5 Sectoral Determination Compliance in the Farm Sector 
It is widely acknowledged that, in order for the minimum wage to effectively impact on median 
wage rates in the farm labour market, it must be set above the perfect competition market 
equilibrium wage rate of relatively unskilled workers and the compliance of farmers must be 
effectively enforced. Young (1979) defined compliance as the actual behaviour that conforms 
to proposed behaviour, and non-compliance as the behaviour that deviates noticeably from 
proposed behaviour. It is believed that compliance may sometimes not always happen 
voluntarily, especially when farmers are not prepared and offered some form of assistance or 
incentives (Newman, 1997).  
Benassi (2011) presented a theoretical framework indicating the basis of compliance that 
suggests an argument for an effective system for implementation of the minimum wage to 
comprise soft (e.g. persuasion and capacity building) and hard (sanctioning) mechanisms, as 
well as measures to empower workers. In realisation of expected poor compliance, the focus is 
often placed on imposition of penalties (hard mechanism), in order to enforce compliance to 
relevant legislations, and less on persuasion (soft mechanism).  
Compliance is commonly measured by researchers through the determination of a proportion 
of workers that are paid less than the minimum wage. Bhorat et al. (2012) and Stanwix (2013) 
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used the method to measure the level of contravention in agriculture and noticed an 
improvement in compliance over time. Rani et al. (2013) suggested another compliance 
measure based on a number of complaints made by workers to enforcement bodies. This 
approach receives less attention, yet it may be useful, especially given the inability of the DoL 
to inspect all employers at once. If implemented well and labour is educated and encouraged to 
report such cases anonymously, it can be used to guide the planning of blitz inspections by the 
DoL.  
Visser and Ferrer (2015) highlighted certain areas of non-compliance with SD and attributed it 
to the weakness of the unions in agriculture, as well as the relatively inconspicuous role played 
by civil society in farm employment matters in many  rural areas. However, they suggested that 
the emergence of private sector codes of conduct or ethical standards in agriculture are likely 
to impact positively on compliance, especially in the LSG commercial farming, as it creates an 
incentive through access to lucrative markets, that are willing to pay a premium for the 
assurance that a product conforms to a recognised ethical standard (Barrientos and Visser, 2012, 
cited by Visser and Ferrer, 2015).  
The system is relatively decentralised and effective, and the government may only need to 
provide incentives for farmers to comply, since these standards tend to include compliance with 
national labour legislation and even International Labour Organisation (ILO), in the case of 
more progressive codes (Barrientos, 2002:39, cited by Visser and Ferrer, 2015). Rani et al. 
(2013) suggested that countries with a national minimum wage, set at a meaningful level, tend 
to realize higher compliance rates relative to countries with job-related or industry-spec ific 
minimum wage systems, such as SD. Similar to Visser and Ferrer (2015), Rani et al. (2013) 
argued that compliance is also dependent on, amongst other factors, appropriate comprehens ive 
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minimum wage policies, in combination with union/employer involvement, awareness-rais ing 
and credible enforcement. 
The DoL’s compliance system is currently centralised and costly to implement and monitor, as 
it attempts to enforce and monitor compliance through the inspection of employers in sectors 
covered by the SD. In this case, the compliance rate is measured by determining the proportion 
of complying employers relative to those that are non-compliant. According to a provincial staff 
member from the DoL, non-compliant employers are issued with a contravention notice, 
followed  by an inspection after 14 days, and if there is no change, a compliance court order is 
issued, where a judge in a court of law will make a ruling, stipulating appropriate penalties in 
line with the legislation. If the employer contravened the minimum wage legislation, a court 
judgement may rule that a back-payment be made to labour, however taking into account any 
plea for leniency made by the employer.  
Stanwix (2013) also listed a number of fines that may be applied against non-compliant farmers. 
The staff members indicated that employers do not usually come out voluntarily to inform the 
DoL about their inability to meet the minimum wage, until they are found contravening the 
legislation, which makes things difficult for them. Stanwix (2013) highlighted the low number 
of inspectors as one of the major reasons for the lacklustre compliance performance. The staff 
member concurred with the challenge, however, he also mentioned that the Department has 
made a good effort to increase the number of inspectors over time. He also indicated that, 
although there is non-cooperation by some employers during inspections, this problem has 
improved over time. Nonetheless, anecdotal comments from some union officials indicate that 
the improvement may not be celebrated, since some employers offer bribes to inspectors. 
Relatively speaking, the staff member indicated that compliance is still problematic in 
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agriculture, compared to the domestic sector, but is worse in the security and construction 
sectors.  
Stanwix (2013) demonstrated the low probability of an employer being inspected and attributed 
it to the low availability of resources (including inspectors, as indicated) at the disposal of the 
Department. This is not surprising, as the staff member indicated that there is no structured 
sampling methodology, e.g. stratified random sampling, when conducting inspections. 
Inspectors only use a list of employers available from the database of employers at the 
Department to identify employers to visit, which is mainly a first to last approach. Once an 
employer is inspected, the same employer may not be inspected within a space of four months, 
due to complaints often made by employers to the Department, saying they feel targeted. This 
approach reduces the probability of an employer from being inspected, and the waiting period 
probably gives some employers a compliance break. Newman et al. (1997) and Stanwix (2013) 
argue that a relatively decentralised and incentive-based compliance system can yield a higher 
compliance rate, if implemented appropriately. 
The economic theory of the farm or unskilled labour market and the implication of the minimum 
wage on the market discussed in Chapter 2 and this chapter are useful to assist with 
identification of a model suitable: (a) for the analysis of a single industry, rather than the 
agricultural sector as a whole, and (b) to be conducted for various categories of farm labour, in 
order to compare the implications of the legislation in the industry and different farm labour 
levels. From Section 3.2, the demand for farm labour can be expressed as a function of the real 
price of sugarcane, farm labour wage and price of other inputs (substitutes, e.g. the price of 
farm labour contractors), and a measure of technology (Schuh, 1962; Friedman, 1962). From 
Section 3.2, the supply of farm labour can be expressed as a function of the real wage farm 




The Chapter presents the implications of the SD and to some extent ESTA on employment and 
wages using similar preceding studies and relevant legislation documents. Based on the 
discussion it is prevalent that the SD has impacted on employment, wages, wage distribution 
(wage gap between semi-skilled and unskilled labour) and wage structure (basic and non-cash) 
of farm labour, and increased the cost and risk of utilising labour. However, the implicat ions 
have never been differentiated between labour categories, regions and industries in the SA 
Agricultural Sector, which is the aim of the research study. The demand for and supply of farm 
labour were also presented in the context of the sugar industry in line with the expected impacts 
of the SD on the demand for and supply of labour to demonstrate expected shifts in curves and 
substitution effect (to show how labour may be replaced by capital) charts. However, the 
illustrated impacts are dependent on the compliance rate of farmers with the overall BCEA. 
Nonetheless, the expected implications of the SD on the demand for farm labour are stronger 
on unskilled labour, relative to semi-skilled labour. Having considered relevant economic 
theory on minimum-wage legislation, the next chapter presents an overview of the SA Sugar 









CHAPTER 4: THE SA SUGAR INDUSTRY PROFILE 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the SA Sugar Industry structure and the functions of the 
major stakeholders, i.e., the organisations representing sugarcane growers and sugarcane 
millers. It then discusses sugarcane price determination, the distribution of proceeds and 
protection of the industry through the Sugar Act, notional price and tariff protection; the 
contribution of the industry to the national economy and the location of the industry. 
 
4.1 The Structure and Functions of the SA Sugar Industry   
The SA Sugar Industry comprises a symbiotic partnership between sugarcane growers, 
represented by SACGA, and sugarcane millers’, who are represented by the South African 
Sugar Millers’ Association (SASMA) Non-Profit Company (NPC). Their mutual dependent 
relationship is managed by the South African Sugar Association (SASA) that represents the 
interest of both parties at an industry and agricultural sector level. The organisation provides 
the partnership with specialised independent services in administration, marketing, logistics and 
research in terms of Section 2 of the Sugar Act. The industry is governed by the sugar agreement 
and the Act the review of which was finalised in 2014.  
The operations of SASA are managed by the SASA Council, where the chairpersonship of the 
council alternates between representatives of the growers and millers every two years (SASA, 
2014). Based on the 2013 production statistics, the industry has an estimated 22 955 registered 
private individual/natural growers, where 1 383 are LSG, inclusive of 367 PDI or land reform 
growers (SACGA, 2014). Most of the growers predominantly farm in KZN on 264 763 hectares 
(89% of LSG land), with increasing operations in Mpumalanga utilising 34 132 hectares (11% 
of LSG land) and some farming operations being revitalised in the Eastern Cape. Sugarcane is 
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crushed by six milling companies that own 14 sugar mills currently operating in cane-growing 
regions. However, the sustainability of the sugarcane milling operation in the Umzimkulu Mill 
region has been doubtful, as the mill did not crush sugarcane in the 2011 and 2015 seasons due 
to a drought-related decline in yields on the South Coast, resulting in Illovo deciding to divert 
cane from Umzimkulu to the Sezela Mill.  
The SACGA was formed in August 1927 as an association incorporated, not for gain in terms 
of Section 21 of the Companies Act, but to unify growers and strengthen their voice power. 
After a robust consultative process, the organisation structures of the KwaZulu Cane Growers 
Association, Natal Cane Growers’ Association and the Mangete Cane Growers’ Association 
were incorporated within the SACGA in 1992, to represent the interests of all growers in SA. 
Today the Association prides itself as a non-racial and apolitical organisation representing all 
cane growers in SA. Individual growers are not direct members of the organisation, but are 
members through 26 member organisations and they can freely join any member organisat ion 
operating in their cane supply area. The executive director, management team and staff 
administer the day-to-day business affairs of the SACGA. The organisation provides growers 
directly with various services, such as financial and economic advice through its regional 
services division. Other divisions provide growers with financial and economic information 
dissemination (survey results and adjusted secondary data to suit a sugarcane farming 
operation), industry negotiations and the organisation of training for growers, to ensure the 
sustainability of sugarcane farming and the industry (SACGA, 2014).  
The SASMA’s NPC represents the interests of millers and refiners in SA. The association is 
responsible for the administration of matters pertaining to the partnership with growers in the 
industry, legislative matters affecting the industry, training and scientific support, as well as 
technological support through the services of the Sugar Milling Research Institute (SMRI). The 
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SMRI is the institution funded by a determined levy per ton of sugar produced from 14 SA 
sugarcane mills and affiliated mills from other countries, such as Swaziland, Malawi, Tanzania, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia. The institution conducts research and compile milling 
statistics to improve milling efficiency and stimulate technological adoption (SASMA, 2014).  
 
4.2 Sugar Industry Proceeds and Price System 
The industry is regarded as one of the world’s leading cost-competitive producers of high 
quality sugar and during a “normal” season produces about 2.2 million tons of sugar from about 
20 million tons of sugarcane. About 60% of the sugar is sold within the South African Customs 
Union (SACU), known as the Local Market Demand (LMD), and 40% is sold to other parts of 
Africa, Asia and the Middle East (SASA, 2014). The LMD market consists of SA, Lesotho, 
Botswana and Namibia, i.e., those countries in the SACU bloc that do not produce sugar. The 
industry earns revenue from selling refined and brown sugar, molasses (mainly utilised by sugar 
millers) and raw sugar exports in the LMD market.  
The proceeds for each season are shared between millers and growers, based on a predetermined 
formula (taking into account the performance of growers) after covering operating costs of the 
SASA and other industrial costs. Seasonal sugar sales between the LMD and export markets 
depend on production and imports, as they have a potential to distort sales performance on the 
LMD market. The LMD market usually takes first preference, given its relative lucrative and 
stable price. This is as a result of the export market being subjected to price and exchange rate 
volatility. The price of sugar in the LMD is determined in a regulated environment through use 
of a dollar-based reference price system established by the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) to compute the level of import duty (SASA, 2014).  
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The reference price is based on a long-term average global price of sugar adjusted for distortions 
and it only triggers protection when the global price drops below it. The DTI also participates 
in the determination of the notional price, an artificial price used for the purpose of distributing 
proceeds between millers and growers. Protection and the notional price provide growers with 
a relatively downside price risk protection level, compared to other commodities, e.g. maize. 
The protection provides some level of competitiveness of the industry, as it only takes effect 
when global prices of sugar drop below the reference price and it does not apply when the LMD 
market price is above the reference price. Therefore, the Recoverable Value (RV) price depends 
on the production level, LMD market, global sugar prices and exchange rate performance. 
Figure 3 represents the division of proceeds process leading to the calculation of the RV price.   
Figure 3: The Division of Proceeds Representation (SACGA, 2014) 
Growers are paid based on the RV price system introduced in the 2000/01 season to replace the 
sucrose payment system. The RV price per ton is determined by the division of grower shares  
from industry proceeds and the total tons of RV delivered by growers to the mills in a given 
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season, after accounting for operating costs of SACGA. This price system penalises (rewards) 
growers for producing poor (high) quality sugarcane by subtracting non-sucrose and fibre 
content from the total sucrose of delivered sugarcane. Growers are paid based on relative RV 
deliveries, to ensure that they do not only deliver sugarcane when the sucrose content is 
optimum, e.g. September or October. The relative RV concept adjusts and standardises RV 
deliveries to ensure fairness between growers, irrespective of the sugarcane delivery month. 
This concept assumes that the average RV percentage of each grower’s delivery is the same as 
the average for the mill of delivery. 
 
4.3 Economic Contribution of the Sugar Industry in SA 
An independent survey of the costs of production of more than 100 global sugar industr ies 
consistently ranks the SA sugar industry among the top 15 competitive producers of quality 
sugar. This makes the industry a critical integral part of the country’s economy through its 
contribution towards foreign exchange earnings, as a net exporter of sugar, agricultural and 
industrial investments, indirect and higher direct employment and its backward and forward 
linkages with other industries. Industry operations are diversified, producing sugar and 
processing various milling by-products (SASA, 2014).  
Its monetary inflow contributes significantly to the rural, small- to medium-sized town 
economies of KZN and Mpumalanga provinces and their development. The industry generates, 
on average, an annual revenue of R12 billion, constituting R5.1 billion in the value of sugarcane 
production. It provides approximately 137 000 direct and 110 000 indirect jobs, which 
represents about 11% of the total agricultural workforce. It is estimated that approximately two 
percent of SA’s population depends on the industry for a living (SASA, 2014). 
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4.4 Sugar Industry Location and Selected Regions 
Figure 4 below presents the commercial sugar industry areas, which stretch from the Northern 
Pondoland in the Eastern Cape Province through the South and North coastal belt, extending to 
the inland areas of the Midlands and northern irrigated areas of Zululand and Mpumalanga 
Province Lowveld. The Illovo and Tongaat milling companies operate the highest number of 
sugarcane milling operations, where Illovo operates four mills on the South Coast (Sezela, 
Umzimkulu) and the Midlands (Eston and Noodsberg), and Tongaat operates four mills on the 
North Coast (Maidstone, Darnal, Amatikulu and Felixton). The TSB milling company owns 
three sugarcane milling operations that are based in irrigated areas, (Komati and Malelane in 
Mpumalanga) and (Pongola in KwaZulu-Natal). The Umfolozi, Gledhow and UCL sugarcane 
milling operations are owned separately by milling companies comprised largely of growers 
and private investors.  
 
Figure 4: SA Sugar Industry Map (SASA, 2014) 
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CHAPTER 5: EMPLOYMEMT AND WAGE TRENDS IN SUGARCANE 
COMMERCIAL FARMING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
This chapter outlines the annual Labour Utilisation and Cost Survey (LUCS) of LSG conducted 
by the SACGA. The SACGA conducts the LUCS by collecting primary data, using a postal 
survey of a randomly-stratified sample of 320 registered3 LSGs, i.e. approximately 20% of the 
LSG population. The purpose of conducting the LUCS on an annual basis is to estimate 
employment, average wage payment and productivity for the industry, by region and labour 
category. The findings of the analysis of the LUCS data are reported annually by SACGA in its 
LUCS Report. This study makes use of estimated results from the LUCS reports from 1978 to 
2012, but does not make direct use of the raw data. This chapter presents and analyses 
descriptive statistics from the findings of those surveys for the industry as a whole, as well as 
for selected sugarcane producing regions. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse employment 
and wage trends in sugarcane farming in South Africa.   
  
5.1 An overview of the Labour Utilisation and Cost Survey methodology 
The LSG’s LUCS estimates farm labour employment, productivity and costs in the industry. 
The estimates exclude Miller Cum Planters (MCP) (they are not natural growers) and SSG (they 
have limited employment creation and relatively poor record keeping). LSGs have credible 
employment records, they employ more labour, and account for over 78% of sugarcane 
production and more than 73% of the total AUC, relative to other types of sugarcane producers. 
This section outlines the LUCS procedure, in order to assess the suitability of the data for the 
purposes of this study. A randomly-stratified sample of 320 LSGs by homogeneous region, 
                                                                 




where some of the regions are also mill areas in the industry, is drawn. The sample represents 
about 20% of the LSG population in the industry. The key element of the survey is to repeat the 
sample, in order to produce grower panel data and to control the variability of obtained results, 
due to high sample inconsistency. This presents a statistical challenge, as the sample of growers 
may become less representative of the population over time or during seasons of poor 
participation from growers.  New growers are added to the sample over time to replace growers 
that have not returned a completed the survey form for a period of two to three consecutive 
seasons.  This is necessary to guard against a decline in the survey response rate over time.    
Non-responding growers are replaced by a proportional number of growers drawn randomly 
from the growers’ register database maintained by SASA. In some regions with traditiona lly 
poor response rates to the postal survey (notably Mpumalanga), the selection of growers for the 
survey is guided by SACGA’s regional staff in order to purposefully select growers that practice 
labour record keeping and are relatively more likely to respond to the survey. The LSG sample 
was adjusted during the 2011/12 and 2012/2013 seasons to include PDI growers, who are 
referred to as New Freehold Growers (NFG) or Land Reform Growers (LRG) in the industry 
and are part of the replacement process. Growers respond to the survey by completing and 
returning survey forms to SACGA every season, mostly via postal service.  
The basis of conducting the analysis annually, one year in arrears, is predominantly driven by 
the nature of the data input (AUC, tons of sugarcane and labour records) of the survey, which 
is usually almost two years old upon finalisation of the estimated results. The fundamental point 
is that the estimate results are produced by moving from sample to population estimates, using 
raising factors. The raising factors are computed, using the actual AUC and the sugarcane 
delivery records of LSGs obtainable from the SASA database. This enables the estimation of 
statistics for the population, rather than just average statistics for the sample. The AUC survey 
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is conducted one year in arrears, since it also accounts for the actual area harvested. Growers 
also have to wait until the end of the season to have the necessary information; however, the 
major delay is mostly due to the area survey.  
Despite all the challenges inherent in the estimation process, the findings provide reasonably 
reliable estimates of employment and wages of farm workers by LSGs over a sufficient ly 
lengthy period of time for the purpose on this study. As far as the author is aware, similar data 
are not available for employment on farms on a national level or for other agricultural industr ies 
in South Africa. The number of growers, AUC and sugarcane production data are reliably 
known, and the LUCS has employed a fairly consistent methodology over the past four decades, 
hence its statistics are considered sufficiently reliable for use in this study. The AUC is cross-
checked to ensure its accuracy and the data are stored in the same database maintained by 
SASA. The latter information justifies the reason for choosing the industry for this study, as it 
allows the SACGA to use farm level labour data with this information, to estimate wage, 
employment and productivity statistics for homogeneous production areas, regions and the 
industry for the LUCS Report. Section 5.4 discusses the data contained in the LUCS Reports to 
enable assessments and the determination of the extent to which it meets the need of the study. 
 
5.2. SA Cane Growers Association Labour Utilisation and Cost Survey and Statistical 
Book Reports 
The importance of this section is to build on Section 5.1 by detailing wage information elicited 
for the LUCS from the LSGs and the extent to which it is statistically reliable. The question is 
whether it is possible to fully and accurately measure the non-cash wage? The survey form 
require growers to supply information on primary employment, basic wages and employment 
duration in months, productivity (number of months indicated) and annual bonuses, as well as 
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other benefits information from the labour category. The other benefits wage component 
consists of the provision of rations, pension/provident fund contributions, housing, 
unemployment insurance fund (UIF), workman’s compensation, medical, transport support, 
etc., as long as the growers are able to provide a realistic estimate value for the non-pecuniary 
benefits. Hence, some of the benefits are often left unaccounted for, as a result of the difficulty 
in furnishing realistic values. However, it is not clear if growers do experience such a challenge 
in line with the stipulated 20% and if SACGA do ensure strong stringency of the prescribed 
guideline when conducting the survey.  
The primary data are analysed to produce secondary data, such as labour units (labour = 
estimated to have worked for 12 months, or approximately 300 days, inclusive of annual and 
sick leave per season), aggregate employment, wage (a combination of basic and other 
payments) and various productivity indicators provided per labour category for the industry and 
regions. A drawback of the data is that estimated wages between 1978 and 1996 were based on 
a cost to company or aggregate level; as the wages were not broken down to show all forms of 
payment. The SACGA started collecting a breakdown of labour wages data in 1997, probably 
in anticipation of the introduction of farm workers’ SD, given that access to the cash component 
and non-pecuniary benefits data would separately add more meaningful information to the data 
and probably yield good research outputs.  
Since LUCS reports only show the composite wage, raw data was extracted to reproduce the 
analysis and to enable the separation of all wage component categories. This was only possible 
for the 16 years between 1997 and 2012, due to the unavailability of raw data for other years 
on the database. The availability of data over the 1978 to 2012 study period would enable a 
strong analysis to show any possibility of redistribution between basic, bonus and non-
pecuniary benefits, as hypothesised by Newman et al. (1997) in KZN, Conradie (2005) in the 
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wine and grape industry of the Western Cape, Murray and van Walbeek (2007) in the South 
and North Coast of the sugar industry and Roberts and Antrobus (2013) in Eastern Cape regions.  
However, the data can enable the use of descriptive statistics and graphical displays to illustra te 
whether the proportion of non-pecuniary benefits are in line with the 20% (10% for 
accommodation and the other 10% for food) maximum deduction from the aggregate wage, as 
stipulated in the SD. Similar to Roberts and Antrobus (2013), the information supplied on the 
survey forms is neither cross-checked through an employee survey nor verified by SACGA and 
it is deemed correct. Verification is only done to ascertain the submission of correct season 
information (e.g. the 2013/14 season, in case of the 2012/13 season), by growers using various 
screening tactics employed by the Research Economist at SACGA. However, as Roberts and 
Antrobus (2013) pointed out, it must be acknowledged that some growers may have a concealed 
incentive to adjust their actual LUCS information in accordance with the SD guidelines, as the 
survey is in the interest of the industry and conducted by the growers’ representative body. This 
has the potential of making the industry appear to be in compliance with the prescribed 
regulations and look appealing to government stakeholders.  
The attrition problem, or low response rate, could also well be due to the lack of interest from 
growers who are less compliant with the legislation and who are not in a position to give out 
labour-related information. Equally so, the majority of responsive growers could be those 
adhering to the stipulated labour-related legislation and therefore always in a position to share 
their information. The general complaints by growers regarding legislation must be taken into 
consideration. Some growers indicate that, in general, there are too many regulations requiring 
compliance in the agricultural sector, which has increased administration activities, allowing 
them less time to complete other core business functions. In the end, they have to prioritise the 
administration activities and surveys, e.g. the STATSSA agricultural survey takes priority over 
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the completion of voluntary survey forms, resulting in SACGA and other stakeholder surveys 
getting limited, or no, attention. 
 
5.3 Aggregate Employment in Sugarcane Farming: 1978/9 to 2012/13 Season 
LUCS results show a decrease trend in the estimated total aggregate farm labour employment 
in sugarcane farming from 105 758 in 1978/79 to 68 752 employees in the 2012/13 season. 
Total aggregate labour units (full-time equivalent farm works) also show the similar trend by 
decreasing from 79 143 to 51 825 units during the same period. Over the study period, aggregate 
employment and labour units averaged around 77 175 and 59 459, respectively. However, 
average aggregate employment and labour units are higher and lower over a shorter period, 
before and after 1994. This is used as a benchmark to measure the impact during a period of 
poor labour policy and a period of anticipated and eventual policy change. During these periods, 
the aggregate employment and labour units averaged 91 645 and 69 839 before 1994, and 66 
143 and 51 670 post-1994, respectively.  
The linear trend line in Figure 6 supports the latter, by showing a significant decrease in total 
employment, which exemplifies the lack of total employment and the units’ resilience over a 
long period. A number of speculated factors might have contributed to the decrease in farm 
labour employment, such as vagaries in sugarcane production, loss of land due to development, 
the production cost squeeze, to some extent a shift in land from sugarcane farming to close 
substitute enterprises, requiring less labour, an improvement in the availability of labour 
substitutes and the strength of labour-related legislation, have probably led to the decrease in 
employment. The long-term implications of the minimum wage have proved to distort resource 
allocation in sugarcane farming. Growers still prefer the use of labour in most parts of the 
industry and for most farming activities, due to terrain inconvenience, but the continuous 
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increase in the cost of labour will eventually lead to the usage of labour substitutes at the 
expense of labour. 
 
 
Figure 5: Farm Labour Employment Trend in the Industry (SACGA, 2014) 
 
5.4 Employment in Sugarcane Farming in Selected Regions 
The selection of regions for the study was largely informed by the need to compare areas of the 
industry with different production systems (e.g. coastal vs. inland or dryland vs. irrigated), in 
line with the need to utilise a sufficiently lengthy time series of data for each region, according 
to the latter categories. Some regions did not meet the criteria of sufficient time series due to 
reclassification, e.g. Pongola Mill from the Northern Irrigated to the Zululand North region, 
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and the Felixton Mill from the Zululand region have been combined with the Tugela region, to 
form the Zululand South region. In the process, the time series for these regions were distorted; 
for example, the low survey response rates to SACGA’s LUCS in the North Coast region over 
the last decade of the study period. Due to the latter implications on the data, it was decided to 
compare the industry to the South Coast and Midlands regions. These regions use different 
production systems due to their inherent differences in climatic and topographical conditions. 
The purpose of this section is to provide background knowledge about the regions and the 
perception of farmers about the change in production system over time. 
 
5.4.1 South Coast Region 
The region stretches from northern Pondoland in the Eastern Cape Province, sharing a border 
with the Eston Mill area in the Midlands. It consists of two mills, Umzimkulu and Sezela, and 
accounts for about 40% and 60% of the area in the region, respectively. These areas also 
produce about 62% and 38%, respectively, of sugarcane in the region, while the region accounts 
for 17% and 15% of the AUC and sugarcane production in the industry. The Umzimkulu AUC 
is about 70% and 30% inland and coastal, respectively, which is the other way round in Sezela. 
The coastal (inland) part of the region is relatively steeper (flatter), but in general, the South 
Coast region has an undulating feature that makes the region less conducive for technologica l 
adoption. A typically inland area is relatively colder, with an 18- to 24-month cycle, while the 
coastal area is relatively warmer, with a 12- to 13-month cycle, due to the Eldana problem4. In 
general, the region has an average of 16-month cycle. The region experienced a long-term mean 
rainfall of 1 023 mm in 2013, which is sufficient for dryland sugarcane growing season water 
                                                                 
4 The current payment system makes farmers on the coast cut their cane early, to avoid Eldana 
from lowering the RV content of sugarcane. 
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requirement. A typically coastal (inland) part of the region has relatively marginal (good) soil 
and, as a result, about 70% of the area has marginal soil. In general, the South Coast region 
contributes about 27% of farm labour employment in the industry, with the bulk coming from 
Sezela. 
Umzimkulu and the coastal areas in the region are diversified with macadamia nuts, while the 
inland area in Sezela is diversified with livestock and timber. The region has lost AUC due to 
development, but there is also evidence of LSG land making way for macadamia, which is less 
labour-intensive. The willingness to adopt new technology in the region is deterred by the 
topography and the impact and suitability of technology on operation factors have contributed 
to the slow adoption rate.  
The region is relatively more rural, with low education level of individuals from the surrounding 
community from which most of the labour is sourced. Cutters are mainly sourced from northern 
Pondoland in the Eastern Cape Province and Lesotho. In general, the areas surrounding both 
mills have a limited presence of non-agricultural activities, such as construction, tourism, 
catering, industrial and retail providing labour with an opportunity cost. Besides the industry, 
the Eastern Cape is also a source of labour in the mining sector, which to some extent provides 
competition as a source for cutters. Growers in the region paid Category B (lower wage rate) 
after the introduction of SD in agriculture and, as a result, the area experienced huge minimum 
wage increases between 2007 and 2009, leading to a single minimum wage introduction in the 
sector.  
The impact of the minimum wage on employment has been strong on the unskilled compared 
to semi-skilled labour, as redundant and social responsibility related employment has been 
reduced significantly.  Growers have become strict during recruitment, with more emphasis on 
expected productivity from the prospective employees. The legislation resulted in an immed ia te 
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decrease in the wage gap between semi-skilled and unskilled labour, causing an uproar from 
semi-skilled labour that resulted in the eventual wage increase of semi-skilled labour, to 
maintain a sizable wage gap. There has not been a strong substitution of casual labour and 
contractors for permanent labour, apart from the NFGs in Sezela, who rely on contractors, due 
to limited resources. Growers still prefer their own labour, probably owing to the low 
availability of quality labour in the region. The preference is, in a way, a retention strategy for 
quality labour. Labour training is not undertaken by growers to improve productivity and only 
astute growers are doing so, to improve farming operation efficiency.  
A reasonable number of growers are using bonus payment and wage differentiation to induce 
labour productivity and reward hard work for important activities usually performed by cutters, 
drivers, etc. The recent large increase in the minimum wage has seen growers cut employment 
by reducing the working hours from around 8 and 9 hours to around 7 and 6.5 hours. There has 
not been much use of labour cost saving technologies in the region, except for more usage of 
knapsack sprayers to do more chemicals spot spraying during weeding, compared to the labour-
intensive method of hand hoeing. The method has reduced the head count of field workers, but 
has not made a significant dent on the costs of labour. The introduction of applicable harvesting 
technologies would significantly impact on labour costs, as cane cutters account for a larger 
proportion of the total costs of labour. In some areas, a chopper harvester can be used to harvest 
cane, but it would require growers to change their farming operation, which takes years to 
achieve5 and optimal utilisation can prove to be a challenging factor.  
Growers are now making various applicable deductions from labour wages, in line with SD 
guidelines, which resulted in an increase in cash payments at the expense of non-pecuniary 
payments. The provision of rations to farm workers by their employers has decreased, with 
                                                                 
5 Unlike many cash crops, sugarcane is a perennial crop and growers tend to replant only 10% 
of their area under cane on an annual basis.    
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growers now preferring the establishment of shops on farms, offering basic food stuffs for the 
convenience of labour and to minimise administration activities associated with monitor ing 
deductions. The general view of the grower is that the minimum wage is set much higher, 
relative to realisable margins, and they believe they are presented as villains, yet they just do 
not have enough resources to afford the prescribed wage. They are hoping for a provision of 
relevant support from the government. As a result of high labour costs, growers are shift ing 
from sugarcane production to less labour-intensive enterprises, such as macadamia. The 
Introduction of ESTA has discouraged growers to invest in compounds, because of the 
deterioration of their condition, due to low maintenance. In some instances, the preference has 
been to destroy compounds and not to establish such structures on their farms, which has 
resulted in labour staying off-farm. These factors have consequently led to the isolation of 
labour from the farms and additional labour transport costs.            
 
5.4.2 Midlands Region 
The Midlands region shares its borders with the South and North Coast regions. The region 
consists of three mills, Eston in the south, while Noodsberg and UCL are the neighbouring mills 
in the north. It accounts for about 21% and 18% of the AUC and sugarcane production in the 
industry. The south (north) areas account for about 39% and 37% (61% and 63%) of the AUC 
and sugarcane production in the region. The region is mainly inland, with a 24-months average 
production cycle due to the low average temperature6 and rainfall conditions. However, some 
believe that the actual average cycle is close to 22.5 months long. Consequently, on average 
about 50% of the AUC is harvested each season. Minimal supplementary irrigation can reduce 
the production cycle to about 18 months and improve the yield, but may result in two winters 
                                                                 
6 Sugarcane often suffers from frost damage due to very low temperatures.  
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and a low yield during the third season. The longer cycle gives sugarcane enough time to grow 
and accumulate a good quantity of sucrose. As a result, yields per AUC are generally lower (43 
tonnes) and higher (86 tonnes) per area harvested, with a higher average sugarcane quality 
(12.6% RV). In general, the Midlands north (south) has a higher (lower) cane yield with lower 
(higher) quality cane, since the south area is drier, relative to the north. The region contributes 
about 20% of the total farm labour employment in the industry. 
 
5.4.2.1 Midlands South (Eston) 
The sub-region covers, amongst other areas, Umbumbulu, Ixopo and Richmond to 
Pietermaritzburg and consists mainly of the Eston Mill area.  The area experienced a long- term 
mean rainfall of 820 mm in 2013, which is relatively sufficient for dryland sugarcane growing 
season water requirement. Despite the area possessing undulating features, with a gradient slope 
of about 12%, in general most parts are accessible with a tractor and only about 15% to 20% of 
the area is inaccessible. The area has visible enterprise diversification involving mostly 
vegetables, livestock, pastures and timber. Over time (about 40 years) there has been a 
significant move from timber and maize to sugarcane, due to the higher returns from sugarcane 
in the area, relative to other sugarcane areas.  
Growers indicated that, even if there might be movement of land from sugarcane to other 
enterprises, it is on a small scale and definitely not at the expense of sugarcane production, e.g. 
around Tala Valley. Vegetables are often used as rotation crops to break monoculture, rather 
than competing against sugarcane, and timber is typically planted on marginal land for 
sugarcane production. Growers indicated their preference to rather get rid of other enterprises 
to make way for sugarcane production. Sugarcane growing conditions are generally good in 
Mid Illovo, Umbumbulu and Richmond and poor from central Eston to Pietermaritzburg. The 
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area has an average yield per AUC and area harvested of about 41 and 84 tonnes, respectively, 
with an average quality (RV) of about 13% per season.  
The adoption of technology is considered to be in line with its financial implications, ease of 
use7  and its impact on labour productivity improvement. Sugarcane farming has gone through 
technological improvement stages that have been relatively strong on land preparation or 
planting, weed management, loading and extraction activities, but less on harvesting 
improvement. Chopper harvesters can be utilised in some terrains, but are expensive and would 
require growers to restructure some of the fields, by laying them out properly, and over the 
years growers have preferred to acquire relatively flat land, in order to convenience 
mechanisation. Negative comments were made about field damage (stool damage), yield and 
ratoon performance reduction in the long-term, as a result of the use of a Bell loader8. Stacking 
is relatively labour-intensive and expensive, but results in less field damage and cleaner 
sugarcane9 delivered to the mill. These side effects have resulted in the retrogression of 
mechanisation and the preference of cutting and stacking. Growers indicated a strong emphasis 
on financial viability before they could consider technological adoption relative to other factors. 
The region paid the lower minimum wage (Category B) and experienced high wage increases 
before introduction of the single minimum wage in 2009. The area is still predominantly rural, 
with an improvement in the education level of young labour from the surrounding community, 
where most labour is sourced. Cutters/stackers are mainly sourced from Port St Johns to 
Northern Pondoland in the Eastern Cape Province and Lesotho, where development and 
education levels are still very low, the areas that traditionally supplied labour to mining and 
                                                                 
7 Sloppiness, technological complexity and whether the fields will need to be restructured to 
suit the technology. Changing the fields to make them compatible in the Midlands would take 
a long time, due to a longer cycle (24 months). 
8 Fast, easy to use, more output and can reduce the number of cutters/stackers by half.  
9The presence of tops in sugarcane sent to the mill is more controlled and sugarcane is also 
relatively cleaner from unwanted bodies, e.g. soil.     
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other industrial sectors. The employment of local labour in the region has certainly improved 
from past levels. In general, the area has limited non-farm employment opportunities, with the 
exception of areas close to town, but during the infrastructural boom of the 2010 Soccer World 
Cup, a lot of good labour was lost to the construction industry.  
Despite the increase in labour costs due to the minimum wage, growers maintained their labour 
forces, but they are not replacing lost employment through retirement and dismissal, which 
eventually decreases the labour force over time, and they have cut down on social 
responsibility10 related employment. The impact on employment of unskilled labour has been 
clear, as replacements have only been prevalent for skilled labour and growers seem more 
prepared to pay for a skill. Labour recruitment has become stricter, with more emphasis on the 
perceived productivity of prospective employees. Employment has also been cut at the intens ive 
margin by reducing the number of working hours from 49 to 42 and days from six to five, to 
improve productivity and this action has been strong in response to the increase in the minimum 
wage rate. The legislation has resulted in a decrease in wage discrepancy between skilled and 
unskilled labour, but relatively not in line with probable expectation11, as it has not narrowed 
as much as one would have thought.  
Anecdotal information provided by growers suggest that there does not seem to be a correlation 
between the minimum wage and training to improve productivity, rather farm workers are 
mostly trained to meet the requirements of the Occupation Health and Safety Act (OHSA). 
Cutters are continuously trained to improve sugarcane topping, while knapsack and 
mechanisation operators are trained for health and safety reasons; however, the end result does 
                                                                 
10 Now social responsibility employment is not more than five employees, whereas in the past, 
a grower would look after about 10 employees. 
11 The increase in the minimum wage increased general labour wages very close to drivers’ 
wages, to the extent that there was pressure to also increase the wages of drivers, to maintain a 
reasonable wage gap between the two labour categories.  
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impact on labour productivity. Growers are of the view that productivity has more to do with 
the quality of supervision by supervisors and indunas on the farm. There is limited substitut ion 
of casual labour and contractors for regular labour, as growers still prefer regular labour and 
technological substitution is largely dependent on financial viability. There has been a growing 
preference of utilising knapsacks to do more spot spray during weeding; however, the 
phenomenon has not made a material impact on labour costs12. Some growers do practise wage 
differentiation and bonus payments to promote productivity, mostly of cutters and 
mechanisation operators.  
There has been a change in consumption from the more staple to the more luxurious food items 
by labour, due to the SD, and contrary to Murray and van Walbeek (2007) and Roberts and 
Antrobus (2013), growers cited less unruly labour behaviour due to high consumption of 
alcohol, as a result of a minimum wage driven by higher buying power. The establishment of 
farm shops is more preferred to the provision of rations to labour, to reduce administrat ive 
duties associated with the SD guidelines on deductions. Growers still meet sometimes, but 
mainly for transparency and to standardise labour conditions, rather than as collusive behaviour 
to control wages. In the past, most growers would eventually match wages, not because of 
strong ties, but to preserve the movement of labour to other growers. After introduction of the 
minimum wage, growers’ discussions now revolve around labour working hours, conditions 
and payments in kind. The provision of residential employment is structured as a form of work 
accommodation, to prevent permanent settlement, hence, the limited impact of ESTA in the 
area. 
 
                                                                 




5.4.2.2 Midlands North (Noodsberg and UCL) 
The area consists of Noodsberg and UCL mill areas, with a long-term mean rainfall of 878 mm 
in 2013, which is sufficient for dryland sugarcane growing season water requirement. There are 
three main enterprises in the area, where sugarcane is more prevalent, followed by wattle and 
pine enterprises. Maize and livestock (mainly beef) are visible, and some growers have recently 
been establishing macadamia. Similar to the Midlands South, macadamia is usually established 
on relatively less productive soil, so it is not taking away land from sugarcane production. 
Sugarcane is still regarded as the most profitable enterprise, compared to macadamia nuts, 
unlike on the South Coast region, due to the conducive conditions. However, wattle production 
is currently viewed as relatively competitive, given that it is relative closer to the mill, compared 
to the Midlands South growers. Despite the latter, growers prefer wattle, mainly to supplement 
sugarcane, especially in summer, as there is no cash flow from sugarcane. It is possible for 
afforestation permits to act as a protection for sugarcane from wattle; however, the general view 
is that wattle is not affecting sugarcane, but rather that sugarcane has been taking land from 
wattle over time. Despite the latter, there has been no recent major sugarcane expansion in the 
area.  
The area is very convenient for mechanisation, with less than 1% of the fields inaccessible to 
tractors, and about 40% to 50% of the area can easily be harvested with a chopper harvester. 
The financial implications determine technological adoption, but with consideration of the side 
effects, e.g. field damage. Stool damage has been the most discouraging factor for the utilisa t ion 
of Bell loaders and chopper harvesters. The practicality of technology (hidden costs or risk) is 
important, as some growers tend to adopt technology on the basis of the visible costs. Adoption 
is often based on the friendly complementary use of existing technology, as it may require a 
complete system change to accommodate new technology and this can be very costly. 
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Sometimes the adoption of technology is based on the expected user-friendly with current 
systems in both sugarcane and diversified enterprises, in order to spread fixed costs. In general, 
there is scepticism regarding the use of new chemicals, due to the unexpected damage on 
sugarcane13 when dealing with weeds. A chopper harvester is a lot more accurate in separating 
tops from sugarcane, compared to a Bell loader, as it blows away sugarcane tops during 
harvesting. However, anecdotal information provided by growers suggest that the most limit ing 
factor about adopting a chopper harvester is its relative cost to labour, as it is relatively more 
expensive than labour, and it is mostly competitive with very large farming operation or 
contract business.  
Despite its proximity to urban areas, the farming area is still predominantly rural, but there has 
been an improvement in education level of recent young labour coming through. As a result, 
some growers in the past paid the higher minimum wage (Category A) before the conversion 
to a single minimum wage in 2009. Besides sugarcane farming, labour can work in five factories 
(two sugarcane mills and three forestry related factories, which are mainly industrial jobs), farm 
labour contractors, some tourism and construction. Labour contracting is said to be increasing 
in the area, mainly due to the increase in demand from farmers as labour legislation strengthens. 
Most of the farm labour is sourced locally (about 70%) and the other portion, which consists 
mainly of cutters/stackers, is sourced from the Eastern Cape, Lesotho, Mozambique and, 
recently, to some extent Zimbabwe.  
The introduction of the minimum wage and the recent (2012 and 2013) unanticipa ted 
substantial increases have impacted on farming operations through the reduction of spare labour 
who assisted during emergencies, e.g. backlogs after rain, labour strikes, etc., especially on 
growers without diversified farm operations. In the long run, when growers have enough time 
                                                                 
13 There’s a chemical that works well on weeds and growers only have to spray once and do 
not have to clean up, but it also causes damage to sugarcane.   
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to adjust their farming operations, indunas and relatively skilled labour are likely going to be 
retained and menial labour is likely to be replaced by labour contractors and the use of more 
chemicals, rather than hand hoeing. The minimum wage is not the only problem, because other 
labour related legislations are also exerting pressure to change farming operations.  
Growers prefer own labour as it gives them control over their farming operations. However, the 
increase in the number of contractors that keep their charges relatively low will eventua lly 
compel growers to employ less labour, as they would still be able to maintain a level of control 
over their operation by choosing a good contractor to absorb most costs. Growers did not 
indicate any secular employment reduction, but are no longer replacing retiring and absconding 
labour. The impact of the legislation on employment affects unskilled labour relative to semi-
skilled labour, as farmers have mainly been replacing unskilled labour. To some extent, 
unskilled labour has been replaced by an increase in spot spraying. The legislation has impacted 
the way growers pay labour, as it has compelled them to increase wages of semi-skilled labour, 
in order to maintain a reasonable wage gap between the labour categories. Nonetheless, the 
wage gap has narrowed by a reasonable distance between the wages of the latter labour 
categories.  
The legislation has stabilised labour movement between farms, owing to wage standardisat ion 
and non-pecuniary benefits, especially for unskilled labour, and the movement, if any, is largely 
dependent on the way growers treat labour. Growers have also become more stringent about 
the labour recruitment process, with more emphasis on expected productivity, and have 
significantly reduced social responsibility related employment. Some activities are better done 
using labour, e.g. appropriate removal of noxious weeds, cleaning river areas, etc., but they are 
no longer completed appropriately due to employment reduction of menial labour, which has 
significant cost implications in the long-run.  
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Although mechanisation has been adopted, it was indicated that labour is still efficient relative 
to current planters and chopper harvesters. Sometimes technology is made available for risk 
management during labour strikes and labour contractors have mostly affected casual labour 
relative to regular labour. The relative flatness of the area has been conducive for Bell loader 
utilisation relative to cutting and stacking. Labour training is mainly linked to the OHSA and, 
to some extent, to SASFARMS regulations, which eventually impact on labour productivity. 
The legislation has led to a reduction in the labour force, working days and hours, with an 
attempt to minimise rising labour costs and maintain expected increase in labour costs. Wage 
differentiation to penalise under-productivity has decreased significantly, due to the tightness 
of the legislation over the years, and it is mainly practiced through productivity bonus payments, 
especially to cutters/ stackers and drivers. 
There has been a significant shift from the provision of rations and accommodation to shopping 
transport assistance. Labour evictions are generally not happening, growers rather wait for 
labour to retire, to find alternative accommodation somewhere else or they allocate a small 
portion of land on their farms for settlement, before they can convert or demolish compounds. 
Growers now prefer the daily collection of labour from communities, compared to on-farm 
living, which has resulted in the separation of labour from farms and additional labour transport 
costs, which growers say they would rather experience. Credit acquisition has increased over 
the years due to income improvement, especially for high income labour relative to low income 
labour.  
Growers still meet for discussions about issues affecting agriculture to moderate their approach 
to farming activities and the frequency of meetings is dependent on the importance of the 
farming issues, e.g. huge increases in the minimum wage. As the wage rate is now set outside 
the labour market, growers are now mainly discussing moderation of their labour force, working 
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days and hours. No unruly behaviour related to alcohol abuse was cited due to the minimum 
wage increase. A backward bending supply curve is probably being experienced, as some 
labour are now opting to work less hours in some instances, because they are able to earn their 
ideal wage with less effort. 
 
5.5 Graphical Presentation of Data 
Various charts are plotted, showing the proportion of basic wage, bonuses (monthly, which are 
mainly based on productivity, and annual, which mostly applies to some permanent, semi-
skilled and skilled labour), as well as other benefits from the composite wage, using data from 
the 1997 to 2012 period. Figures 6 to 8 and Figures 11 to14 each contain five charts showing 
the proportionate comparison between the industry and selected regions for both the aggregate 
and selected farm labour categories. Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the proportion of Drivers 
composite and basic wage above cutters, permanent and seasonal labour. Another set of charts 
in Figure 11 compares the real minimum wage with the real aggregate basic wage and real basic 
wages, whilst charts in figure 12 to 13 show the relationship between employment and wages  
for selected farm labour categories in the industry and selected regions. Aggregate employment 
and wage data were computed, using only the data for selected farm labour categories (drivers, 
cutters, permanent and seasonal labour), rather than using all types of farm labour in the 
industry. The approach prevents an account of relatively less important farm labour categories, 
such as clerks, cooks, general staff and security, etc., which would distort the analysis.  
Five charts for the industry and selected regions show the relationship between the real wage 
and employment during the study period. Both the minimum wage and wage data were 
presented in 2012 Rands, to deflate the data from nominal to real terms. Plotting proportions 
separately and the relationship between real basic wage and the minimum wage is due to the 
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fact that other benefits and various monthly and annual bonuses are not directly linked to the 
minimum wage, rather to the basic wage level.  
It would therefore not be ideal for farmers to directly link bonuses and other benefits to a formal 
wage, since monthly bonuses are usually performance-based, which is not always guaranteed 
and is independent of the minimum wage level, while other benefits are capped at 20%. It would 
not also be ideal in terms of the legislation stipulation for farmers to use annual bonuses to make 
up for paying less than the minimum wage during the year. The year 1997, in some charts, 
seems like an outlier, especially the proportion of other benefits from the composite wage. This 
is probably due to the fact that farmers did not appropriately account for non-pecuniary benefits 
or the research team at SACGA was probably still getting familiar with changes in the analys is. 
It would have been useful to have the data starting from at least 1994, to allow observations 
over a longer time series. 
 
5.5.1 Proportion of Basic Wage, Bonuses and Other Benefits from the Composite Wage 
Chart A in Figure 6 shows an increase in the proportions of the real average basic wage in the 
industry and selected regions over time. However, the increase in the industry real average basic 
wage fluctuated between 70% and 80% since 2002, while it has fluctuated around 90% in both 
selected regions since 2003. The latter suggests that the basic wage is, on average, less than the 
80% stipulated in the SD in the industry, relative to the two regions, which is probably 
influenced by the wages of drivers and cutters at that level. Chart B shows that the basic wage 
proportions for drivers have been between 60% and 70% in the industry and on the South Coast, 
and for some levels it has been around 80% in the Midlands since 2003. The finding may not 
be surprising, since the composite wage for drivers is relatively higher, which provides room 




Figure 6: The Basic Wage as a proportion of the Composite Wage for Selected Labour 
Categories in the Industry and Selected Regions (SACGA, 2014) 
Cutters in Chart C also present a similar trend, showing a basic wage proportion of less than 
80%; however, the South Coast has some movement around 80%. The trend is not unusua l, 
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payment, which also pushes their composite wage higher. The proportion for permanent labour 
in Chart D has fluctuated above and around 80% since 2004. Seasonal labour proportions in the 
industry on Chart E show fluctuations well above 80% and around 100% since 2000, while it 
fluctuated above 80% and 100% with some spell below 70% in the two regions. The trends in 
the charts present findings in line with the expectations. It would be possible to find that basic 
wage proportions for permanent and seasonal labour fluctuate mostly around 80%, compared 
to those for cutters and drivers, as a result of the SD. 
Figure 7 shows a huge decrease in the proportion of real average of other benefits in the industry 
and selected regions over time in Chart A. The industry and the Midlands show much lower 
levels after 2003 (below 10%) than on the South Coast (over 60%). Chart B shows the 
proportions for drivers since 2003 for the industry and regions to be from around 50%, to around 
5% and below. The proportion for cutters in Chart C also presents a similar trend, showing 
proportions around 10% and below; however, the South Coast show proportions over 10% since 
2003. The proportion for permanent labour in Chart D also mostly remained below and around 
10% since 2003 and from 60% and above in 1997. The seasonal labour in Chart E fell from 
around 60% and 50% and has fluctuated below 10% since 2003, reaching a much lower level, 
close to zero. It was expected that the average proportions for the industry and regions would 
fall from higher levels, similar to the proportions for the permanent and seasonal labour level, 




Figure 7: Other Benefits as a proportion of the Composite Wage for Selected Labour 
Categories in the Industry and Selected Regions (SACGA, 2014) 
Figure 8 presents a decrease in the proportion of bonuses in the industry and selected regions 
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high at between 15% and 20%, compared to the regions which are at around 5% and below, as 
indicated on Chart A. 
 
Figure 8: Bonuses as a proportion of the Composite Wage for Selected Labour Categories 
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Chart B shows a similar proportion of bonuses for drivers in the industry and regions at around 
20% and 30%, with a few outliers since 2002. Cutters in the Midlands, followed by the industry, 
seem to be receiving more bonuses relative to the South Coast in Chart C. The proportion 
contribution of bonuses on wages for permanent labour in the industry and the Midlands 
fluctuated between 10% and 15%, while on the South Coast they fluctuated mostly below 10%, 
since the marked drop in 2000 on Chart D.  
Chart E shows a huge variability for the bonus contribution on total wages of seasonal labour 
and a clear trend is only noticed for the industry plot. Growers seem to be paying seasonal 
bonuses to induce strong productivity, which follows seasonal fluctuations. It was expected to 
see the higher level of bonuses paid to drivers and cutters. Cutters are usually paid more in 
monthly productivity bonuses, based on the number of rows covered in sugarcane cut, while 
drivers are paid annual bonuses and monthly productivity bonuses, based on their sugarcane 
payloads between the field and loading, and from the loading zone to the mill. The higher 
proportion in the industry and Midlands in most charts suggests a higher payment of bonuses, 
in general, relative to the South Coast.   
 
5.5.2 Wage Redistribution Analysis between Drivers, Cutters, Permanent and Seasonal 
Labour  
Figures 9 and 10 show percentages by which the drivers’ total and basic wages are above the 
total and basic wages of cutters, as well as permanent and seasonal labour in the industry and 
selected regions. In Chart B and C of Figure 9 there has been a clear downward trend since the 




Figure 9: The Percentage of a Driver’s Total Wage above a Cutter’s, Permanent and 
Seasonal Labour’s Total Wage in the Industry and Selected Regions (SACGA, 2014) 
The findings suggest that the drivers’ composite wages have become relatively lower than those 
for permanent and seasonal labour in recent years and that the composite wages for cutters were 
less affected by the minimum wage, given that they have been earning relatively higher wages, 
compared to permanent and seasonal labour. Figure 10 shows similar trends, but with a much 
clearer downward trend in Chart B for permanent labour, compared to Chart C for seasonal 
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labour, which means that there is a small difference between the composite and basic wages for 
seasonal labour.  
 
 
Figure 10: The Percentage of Driver’s Basic Wage above Cutter’s, Permanent and 
Seasonal Labour’s Basic Wage in the Industry and Selected Regions (SACGA, 2014)  
 
5.5.3 Comparison between the Minimum Wage and Basic Wages  
Figure 11 compares the minimum wage to the average basic wage and the basic wage of the 
different labour categories in the industry and regions. In Chart A, it can be seen that the average 
wage in the regions was competitive, relative to the minimum wage, between 2003 and 2012, 
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above 50% increase in the minimum wage in 2013. However, the average wage trend is 
expected to have caught up with the minimum wage in 2015.  
 
Figure 11: Comparison between the Minimum Wage and Wages of Selected Farm 
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Growers are expected to have responded with an average basic wage matching the minimum 
wage in the industry and South Coast, which can only be confirmed by the SACGA’s 2013 to 
2015 season analysis results. Chart B shows the above minimum wage basic wage received by 
drivers in the Midlands, between the years 2003 and 2012, which can be expected remain above 
the higher minimum wage in 2013 to 2015.   
The industry and South Coast only show the minimum wage above the basic wage for drivers 
between 2003 and 2012. The basic wage of cutters in the industry and regions fluctuated around 
the minimum wage between 2003 and 2012; however it can be expected to move in line with 
the minimum wage, even with the huge increase since 2013 that created a new level of the 
minimum wage. The latter findings to some extent confirm that the total wage for cutters is 
relatively higher, but with a lower basic wage component. Charts D and E plot a comparison of 
the minimum wage and basic wages of permanent and seasonal labour, respectively, and show 
that the results are in line with the expectations. The minimum wage is higher, relative to the 
basic wage received by permanent and seasonal labour, given that their composite wage is lower 
than the composite wage of cutters and drivers. After accounting for the deductions, the wage 
of the two categories becomes much lower than the minimum wage. However, the basic wage 
trend of permanent labour on the South Coast followed the minimum wage closely between 
2003 and 2010. However, the minimum wage less the stipulated 20% deduction is significantly 
less than the basic wages in Chat A, B and C, slightly less than the basic wage of permanent 
labour in Chart D and competitive with the basic wage of seasonal labour in Chart E.  
 
5.5.4 The Relationship between Employment and Wages 
The industry is presented in Figure 12 and shows a relationship between employment and the 
composite wages for the industry and regions. Only Chart E for seasonal labour shows a strong 
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negative relationship between employment and wages, while Charts A and D, for aggregate and 
permanent labour, show a lacklustre negative to relatively flat relationship between wages and 
employment.  
 
Figure 12: Comparison of the Relationship between Real Wages and Employment for 
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Charts B (drivers) and C (cutters) show a lacklustre and a strong positive correlation between 
the level of employment and wages. The finding may suggest that growers probably paid 
enough wages to retain cutters or, based on the available cutters, paid relatively more for the 
required number of drivers. Furthermore, the observation may suggest the availability of 
competitive sectors for drivers in the sugarcane growing areas.  
In general, wages remained relatively flat, except for cutters, which decreased until the early 
1990s and started to increase considerably, with sharp increases only noticed for seasonal and 
permanent labour. This indicates that those who were able to get seasonal and permanent 
employment have gained higher wages from the perceived policy change and the actual change 
and seasonal employment seems to have been impacted, relative to permanent employment. 
The decrease in employment corresponds well with the increase in mechanisation, which can 
be argued to have probably been more labour saving, compared to a complementary 
relationship. The slight impact on drivers’ employment can be due to the introduction of 
relatively better-performing and multiple-task tractors.  
Figure 13 for the Midlands shows a similar presentation to the industry Figure 12 in Chart E 
for seasonal labour. However, the Midlands Chart E shows a clear negative relationship 
between employment and wage, relative to the industry. A poor negative relationship between 
employment and wage is prevalent in Chart D for permanent labour. Chart B and C present a 
relatively constant trend in the employment of drivers and cutters, but with more variability. 
The relatively constant employment with an increase in the wage of drivers and cutters, suggests 
that growers probably paid more for the required employment, which is probably due to the 
availability of strong competitive sectors in the region. Chart A shows a decrease in average 
employment until the early part of the 1990s, which then fluctuated to around 8 000 labour 
employed and a poor negative relationship between wage and employment. In general, wages 
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were flat in the Midlands until the early 1990s and they have shown an increasing trend in all 
charts since the early 1990s.  
 
Figure 13: Comparison of the Relationship between Real Wages and Employment for 
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Chart B and C in Figure 14 for drivers and cutters on the South Coast show a relatively solid 
positive correlation between employment and wages, when compared to the industry and the 
Midlands.  
 
Figure 14: Comparison of the Relationship between Real Wages and Employment for 
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The solid correlation between employment and wages for these labour categories on the South 
Coast suggests that growers paid what is necessary to retain and attract the required amount of 
labour, which may indicate the limited availability of a competitive sector for these labo ur 
categories in the region. While Chart D and E for permanent and seasonal labour show a strong 
negative relationship between employment and wage, this finding suggests a strong 
vulnerability of seasonal and permanent employment on the South Coast, in case of 
development of strong labour-saving technology, relative to the Midlands and the industry, 
where only seasonal employment is vulnerable. On the other hand, Chart A for aggregate 
employment presents a lacklustre negative relationship between employment and wages. Only 
the average wage and the wages of permanent and seasonal labour were flat until the early part 
of the 1990s and they then started to increase considerably, especially for both permanent and 
seasonal labour.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The source (LUCS) of labour data (quantity and wages), its process and associated challenges 
was explored in detail. Despite the challenges, the data is credible and it seems it is only the 
sugar industry that possesses such data in the SA Agricultural Sector. The data is suitable for 
both descriptive and econometric analyses in order to answer the research problem that seeks 
to determine the impact of the SD on labour categories (high and low income earners) by region 
with different labour requirements. The South Coast, Midlands South and North show high 
(low) labour (mechanisation) to low (high) labour (mechanisation) intensity. The descriptive 
analysis show high (low) impact on employment of unskilled (semi-skilled) labour, low (high) 
impact on wage distribution of semi-skilled (unskilled) labour and high (low) impact on wage 
proportions (basic and non-pecuniary) adjustment of unskilled (semi-skilled) labour. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Having provided a background to the South African Sugar Industry in Chapter 4 and a 
descriptive analysis of employment trends and wages in LSG sugarcane farming in Chapter 5, 
the purpose of this chapter is to specify an appropriate econometric model to study the impact 
of the minimum wage legislation on employment in sugarcane farming. The econometric model 
is based on the conceptual model presented in Chapter 3, with due consideration of the need to 
address high levels of collinearity in the data sets identified in Chapter 5. The structure of this 
chapter constitutes the data collection process in Section 6.1; an estimation and specification of 
an appropriate econometric model, and the empirical specification of the appropriate 
econometric model in Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4; a discussion of the multicollinearity problem 
and the description of the appropriate model to deal with multicollinearity in Sections 6.5 and 
6.6. 
 
6.1. Data Collection 
Wages and employment data, AUC and price per ton of sugarcane for this study were obtained 
from the SACGA, and as in Chapter 5, the farm labour data are estimated from farm level wages 
and employment data. A much longer time series of estimated farm labour data would have 
been more useful to enable a more sound analysis; however, only data from 1978 and 1979 
were obtainable for the industry and selected regions, respectively. The cap limited the 
utilisation of a much longer time series which, according to Gujarati and Porter (2010), has a 
bearing on the estimated econometric results. A future revision of the analysis, with a longer 
time series of estimated farm labour data in the near future, may be beneficial, as estimated 
results tend to improve with an increase in the length of the time series data, i.e., the null 
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hypothesis seems more likely to be rejected in survey data involving hundreds of observations 
(Gujarati and Porter, 2009).  
The price index of machinery and equipment, and chemicals data with a base year 2005 were 
obtained from the 2014 Abstract of Agricultural Statistics report. The supply function data, such 
as the rural population, life expectancy and CPI were obtained from the World Bank website 
database by country, while data for the alternative wage proxy were obtained from the Steel 
and Engineering Industries Federation of Southern Africa (SEIFSA). The CPI with the base 
year 2012 was used to deflate the nominal values of appropriate explanatory variables to real 
values. Only data utilised in the industry empirical model are presented in Appendix A, however 
all the empirical models were estimated using STATA 11. 
The literature review suggests that a number of studies applied a simultaneous equation model 
on time series data to study the aggregate demand and supply functions and estimated the 
structural change in the labour market overtime, while simple demand models (i.e., those not 
estimated simultaneously with supply) were mostly used when dealing with cross-section or 
less time span data, to compare states, industries and sectors in different regions. The 
simultaneous model enables the determination of different responses of the demand and supply 
of labour functions at once. The response of each function to respective explanatory variables 
enables the utilisation of more information and assists with resolving the inter-dependence 
relationship between the quantity of labour and wage, a problem often encountered when using 
OLS. The simultaneous-equation and 2SLS techniques are discussed, and an empirica l 




6.2. Econometric Estimation of Simultaneous Equations  
The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) procedure is usually associated with the simple or multip le 
regression single equation models, where there is a single dependent variable and more 
explanatory variables (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). The model emphasises the estimation and 
prediction of the average value of the response variable in respect of the fixed values of 
explanatory variables. However, certain relationships in some situations do not follow 
unidirectional procedure and this usually occurs when there is a multidirectional relationship 
between the response and some of the explanatory variables.  
Multidirectional relationships are mostly inherent in the analysis of the demand for and supply 
of labour models, where the quantity of labour and wage are mutually dependent variables. 
Friedman (1962) contends that the analysis of demand is further complicated by the 
simultaneous reaction of growers to the price, or other resource, change. Hence, a rise in unit 
price of farm output would induce more production, leading to a change in the quantity of labour 
needed by farmers and wage, ceteris paribus. Parameter estimation involving this model cannot 
happen without taking into account the full information in both equations and it allows one to 
estimate structural parameters to induce any changes in a labour market over time.  
As a result, parameter estimation, using the OLS model, would violate the assumption of the 
OLS model and yield inconsistent parameter estimates, as the wage variable would be 
correlated with the error term. The main assumption in the OLS Model is that all explanatory 
variables are independently distributed from the stochastic error term. This is based on the fact 
that the error term on the demand function follows the shift in the demand function and unless 
the supply function is completely inelastic, the shift in the demand function will change both 
the quantity of labour and wage. A simultaneous equation procedure also requires the 
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satisfaction of the main critical assumption that exogenous variables are uncorrelated with the 
error terms of the demand and supply equations (Maddala, 1977). 
 
6.2.1 The 2SLS Technique 
A number of methods can be used to estimate simultaneous equation models. They may be 
classified into single equation (limited information) methods and system or (full information) 
methods (Maddala, 1977; Gujarati and Porter, 2009). In a single equation method, each 
equation is estimated separately, using only information about restrictions on parameters of that 
specific equation, while system methods are based on the joint estimation of all sets of 
equations, using all restrictions on coefficients of all equations, as well as the variances and 
covariances of residuals.  
One of the system methods commonly used to estimate a simultaneous equation is a 2SLS 
Model, since it has been designed typically for over-identified equations; however, it can also 
be used on exactly identified equations. The basis of the 2SLS method is to replace endogenous 
explanatory variables that are correlated with the error term by a linear combination of all 
exogenous or predetermined variables by a proxy explanatory variable resembling all 
endogenous variables and to use it as an explanatory variable during estimation.  
The best proxy used should be highly correlated with the endogenous variables that it replaces. 
The proxy variable is called an instrumental variable and it yields consistent coefficient 
estimates, as it is uncorrelated with the error term. The application of a 2SLS method is based 
on a weighted average of multiple solutions and involves two successive applications of the 
OLS method. Firstly, reduced form equations are estimated by OLS to remove the expected 
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correlation between wage and the error term by the regression of the quantity of labour and 
wage on exogenous variables.  
The actual values of exogenous variables are then substituted into reduced form equations to 
obtain the proxies for endogenous variables, in order to produce instrumental variables. 
Secondly, the OLS method is applied on the original structural equations, where the proxies are 
used to replace endogenous variables to estimate consistent parameters. However, statistica l 
packages have improved over time and nowadays enable users to estimate the model without 
conducting all of the steps. 
 
6.2.2 Single Equation for Regular Farm Labour Demand Model 
As mentioned, the Single Equation for Regular Farm Labour Demand Model estimated using 
OLS regression does not produce consistent coefficient estimates, due to a higher correlation 
between some explanatory variables and the error term. However, Maddala (1977) argues that 
the model has its merits, and it is still crucial to use it to estimate results, since sometimes there 
is a possibility to say something about the biased direction of the estimates. It has also been 
indicated that the OLS method is relatively robust against specification errors, when compared 
to many simultaneous equation methods, and predictions from the equations estimated by the 
OLS method are often well comparable to those obtained from equations estimated using 
simultaneous equation methods. Hence, the OLS Model is estimated and the results are 




6.2.3 Partial Adjustment Model (PAM) 
The appropriate econometric model has an autoregressive term or lag variable of the quantity 
of farm labour demanded, where it’s coefficient estimate measures the time lag adjustment of 
labour made by growers over time, to reach the desired quantity of labour in the industry, in 
response to the continuous rise in the labour costs, as the desired quantity of labour is not 
directly observed. Mark Nerlov rationalised the PAM Model from Koyck’s adaptive 
expectation model (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). The PAM Model is based on the assumption 
that the long-run or desired quantity of labour is dependent on the costs of labour and a set of 
other inputs that are required to produce the desired level of output.  
The coefficient estimate represents a fraction of the desired change in the quantity of labour 
over time, and if the adjustment value is equal to one, it means that the actual change in the 
quantity of labour is equal to the change in the desire quantity of labour. This suggests an 
immediate adjustment, while the adjustment value that is equal to zero demonstrates no change, 
as the level of the quantity of labour at a given time is the same as in the previous period. 
The coefficient estimate is expected to fall between zero and less than one, since it is unrealist ic 
to expect growers to make a full adjustment to the desired quantity of labour, due to rigidit ies 
caused by, e.g., labour legislations, inertia and technology. The inability to perform immed ia te 
retrenchments is due to the need for growers to follow SA’s LRA and the nature of sugarcane 
farming, as a long-term perennial crop, with about a 12- to 24-month production cycle and the 
roots last for many years. The production cycle makes it difficult for growers to change their 




6.3 Econometric Specification of the Model for Analysis of Farm Labour Market in the 
Sugar Industry 
The preceding discussion suggests specification of an appropriate economic model to estimate 
the demand function for labour in the industry and regions using (6.1) and (6.2) simultaneous ly. 
YQDjkt = β0 + β1RWAGEjkt + β2RCONTt + β3RMECHt + β4RCHEMt + β5RPTONkt  + β6AUCkt 
+ β7POLICYt + β8YQDjkt-1 + U1jkt  …..…………...….………………………………...….... (6.1) 
YQSjkt = β9 + β10RWAGEjkt + β11RALTWAGEt + β12LIFEXPt + β13RPOPt + β14UEMPOPt + 
U2jkt ...….………………………………………………………………………………..… (6.2) 
 
Where in the demand function (6.1): 
YQDjkt = Annual quantity of farm labour demanded, 
β0 = Constant term, 
β1… β8 = Slope parameters to be estimated, 
RWAGEjkt = Real annual average monthly composite wage of farm labour (Rand), 
RCONTt = Real annual price of contractors (Rand), 
RMECHt = Real annual price of machinery and equipment (real price index), 
RCHEMt = Real annual price of farming chemicals (real price index), 
RPTONkt = Real average annual price per ton of sugarcane (Rand), 
AUCkt  = Area under sugarcane plantation (hectares), 
POLICYt = Dummy variable (where 1 is for 1994-2012 and 0 otherwise), 
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YQDjkt-1 = Lagged annual quantity of farm labour demanded, 
U1jkt = Error term,  
j = 1, 2, 3, 4 (Driver = 1, Cutters = 2, Permanent Labour = 3, Seasonal Labour = 4), 
k = 1, 2, 3 (Industry = 1, Midlands = 2, South Coast = 3), and  
t = 1…..35 (1978 - 2012). 
 
And where in the supply function (6.2): 
YQSjkt = Annual quantity of farm labour supplied, 
β9 = Constant term, 
β10…β14 = Supply equation slope parameters to be estimated, 
RWAGEjkt = Real annual average monthly composite wage of farm labour (Rand), 
RALTWAGEt  = Real annual alternative wage (real wage index), 
LIFEXPt = Life expectancy in SA (in years), 
RPOPt  = Rural population in SA 
UEMPOPt = Annual unemployment rate in SA, 
U2jkt = Error term, 
j = 1, 2, 3, 4 (Driver = 1, Cutters = 2, Permanent Labour = 3, Seasonal Labour = 4) 
k = 1, 2, 3 (Industry = 1, Midlands = 2, South Coast = 3), and  
t = 1…..35 (1978-2012). 
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6.3.1 Choice of variables and a priori expected coefficient signs in the regular farm 
labour demand function 
(a) Quantity of farm labour demanded (YQ Djkt) and real monthly composite wages 
(RWAGEjkt) in sugarcane farming 
The industry farm labour data available for this study span a period of 35 years (1978 – 2012), 
while the data for the two regions span a period of 34 years (1979 – 2012), which presents 
relatively small time series. Gujarati and Porter (2010) obtained improved estimated regression 
results by increasing their sample size from 10 to 40 observations. The data is not differentia ted 
by gender. The labour units or full-time equivalent farm works (FTEs) estimate for selected 
labour categories are used, rather than total employment, as they provide a conservative or 
standardised estimate of all labour categories employment, by expressing labour as having 
worked for 12 months and 300 working days, inclusive of annual and sick leave days. The 
Drivers category was selected to represent semi-skilled labour, while the Cutters/Stackers 
category was selected due to the importance of harvesting activities in sugarcane farming.  
The Drivers and Cutters categories are respectively made up of (Heavy/Lorry/ Ridge, Loader 
Operator and Tractor Drivers) and (Cutters and Stackers). The Permanent and Seasonal labour 
categories were chosen to represent the relatively unskilled component of the labour market at 
different levels. However, the two categories are often substitutes for one another, given 
differentiated conditions they experience. The Permanent labour category consists of field 
workers performing irrigation, chemicals application and other field-related activities, while 
seasonal labour consists mainly of seasonal (Togt) labour. Only these categories are used to 
estimate aggregate employment in the industry and regions, which excludes non-farm field 




The composite wages were adjusted for inflation using the CPI and are expressed in 2012 
Rands. The estimated average real monthly composite wage can be expected to inflict a 
negative impact on labour employment and the demand curve for labour is expected to be 
negatively sloped i.e. β1<0, ceteris paribus. 
 
(b) Real annual price of contractors (RCONTt) 
The RCONTt is important because farmers often hire labour or mechanisation contractors for 
certain services. However, when the real costs of farm labour increases, they are likely to 
replace their labour with contractors even for activities that they traditionally used their labour . 
To support the latter, Newman et al. (1997), Goedecke and Ortmann (1993), and Murray and 
van Walbeek (2007) hypothesised the possibility of an increase in utilisation of contractors as 
the real costs of labour continue to increase. The utilisation of contractors is probably as a result 
of market failure to appropriately allocate farm labour, due to labour-related legislations. The 
strength of contractor utilisation will depend on the continuous strength of labour-related 
legislations, as it is relatively easy to get rid of poor performing contractors, compared to labour. 
Sparrow et al. (2008) argued that an increase (decrease) in contractor chargers is likely to result 
in an increase (decrease) in the demand for labour in the industry, i.e. β2>0, ceteris paribus. 
Contracting by LSG is likely to be stronger in areas with a higher number of service providers, 






(c) Real price index of machinery and equipment (RMECHt) 
The real interest rate has mostly been used as the cost or price of capital when studding the 
demand for farm labour, since it is used by central banks to control the availability of money in 
an economy. The standard theory suggests that the demand for capital in an economy is likely 
to increase (decrease) when the real interest rates are low (high). Sparrow et al. (2008) used the 
real annual prime overdraft interest rate as a proxy for the price of capital and their find ings 
indicated replacement of farm labour with mechanisation in the farm sector. 
The price index of machinery and equipment (RMECHt) was considered after noticing a 
negative correlation coefficient between the real interest rate and the YDjkt. Therefore, an 
increase (decrease) in the RMECHt is expected to result in less (more) mechanisation, leading 
to higher (lower) YDjkt, i.e. β3>0, ceteris paribus. The impact of mechanisation is expected to 
be more visible in the Midlands, especially the northern part of the region, due to the relative ly 
more conducive terrains. However, the correlation coefficient between RMECHt and YDjkt was 
also unfavourable, which meant that both the real interest rate and RMECHt are not suitable. 
The inappropriate correlation coefficients mean that the trend between the real interest rate and 
RMECHt, and YDjkt  are not in line with a priori expectation, which may suggest less 
replacement of farm labour with mechanisation over the study period. The correlation matrix 
of the industry data is presented in Appendix B1 as an example to show the inappropriate 
correlation. 
 
(d) Real price index of chemicals (RCHEM t) 
Sparrow et al. (2008) used the real annual price index of chemicals to explain the demand for 
farm labour in SA. All visited growers also indicated more performance of spot and boom spray 
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(depending on terrain convenience), rather than hand hoeing during weeding. Hence, an 
increase (decrease) in the price of chemicals is expected to result in less (more) chemica ls 
application, compared to labour, i.e. β4>0, ceteris paribus. The impact is likely to be noticed 
across the industry, since the knapsack or boom sprayer can be easily used as a substitute for 
hand hoeing.  
 
(e) Real average annual price per ton of sugarcane (RPTONkt) 
The variable was used to determine the impact of sugarcane farming income on the quantity of 
labour demand. Conradie (2005) found a positive relationship between output and the demand 
for labour, while Latt and Nieuwoudt (1985) and Sparrow et al. (2008) showed a positive 
relationship between product gross value and the demand for labour. Schuh (1962) also 
presented a positive relationship between the demand for labour and product price in the USA. 
Therefore, an increase (decrease) in the price of sugarcane is expected to increase (decrease) 
the demand for labour, i.e. β5>0, ceteris paribus. The regions in the industry are expected to 
experience different sugarcane prices and VMPs, as the price of sugarcane is influenced by the 
quality of sugarcane (RV). Hence, the Midlands is expected to experience a relatively higher 
sugarcane price, due to good growing conditions, which makes the region better resourced to 
absorb high labour wages. 
  
(f) The annual area under sugarcane (AUCkt) 
The variable was used to measure the impact of change in farming extent on the demand for 
labour in the industry, given the fact that sugarcane is an extensive operation and labour-
intensive. The change in AUC is dependent on the strength of competition between sugarcane 
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and other enterprises for quality farmland, which is expected to impact on the demand for 
labour. The competition has become stronger in recent decades after deregulation and 
withdrawal of various supports to the farming sector. In general, the estimated average 
employment multiplier in the industry is about 0.25 (one labour per four hectares) (SACGA, 
2014), in other words, an increase of four hectares under sugarcane is likely to increase 
employment in sugarcane farming by one employee. However, this multiplier is expected to 
differ by region, as some regions are relatively undulating (flat), which makes them less (more) 
convenient for mechanisation, and in turn more (less) labour-intensive. Hence, the impact of 
the variable on the demand for labour is expected to be positive, i.e. β6>0, ceteris paribus. 
 
(g) Slope dummy variable to proxy the impact of the anticipated and actual change in 
labour-related policies in SA Sugarcane Farming (POLICYt) 
In econometric modelling sometimes the behaviour of the dependent variable is often not only 
influenced by quantitative variables, e.g. wage, but also influenced by qualitative variables, 
such as gender, legislation, etc., (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). A dummy variable has mostly been 
used to account for the structural change, as a result of factors outside market determination. 
Sparrow et al. (2008) used a dummy variable to account for the change in the demand for labour, 
due to the change in labour legislation since 1991. The null hypothesis test for this variable is 
that there is no structural change in the demand for labour, as a result of anticipated and actual 
change in labour-related policies (BCEA) post-1994 (i.e. during the period 1994-2012). The 
impact is determined by estimating elasticities pre-1994 and post-1994. It is expected that β7<0 
as anticipated and actual policy change has increased labour cost, ceteris paribus. The impact 
of the variable is expected to be strong in the Midlands relative to South Coast due to the 
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relatively convenient terrains. However, secular job shedding is expected in the South Coast in 
the event of relatively suitable technology discovery. 
 
(h) Lagged quantity of farm labour units demanded per annum (YDjkt-1)  
The autoregressive variable is used to account for the time taken by growers to adjust their 
labour requirement, and a model without the variable assumes that the labour market completely 
adjusts immediately, e.g., one year (Gardner, 1972). Sparrow et al. (2008) used the variable to 
measure the adjustment of annual labour utilisation made by farmers in SA. The variable is 
important as it acknowledges the inability of growers to make immediate changes, to achieve 
their labour requirements in response to external factors, e.g. legislation. The adjustment is 
expected to take time due to rigidity, inertia, technology and labour regulations. This is due to 
the fact that secular job shedding needs to happen in line with SA’s LRA and technology is not 
yet refined enough to improve its substitution ability. Sugarcane is a perennial crop with a 
growing cycle ranging between about 12- and 24-months, depending on the region. Given the 
10% replanting rate per season, it is evident that it will take time for growers to fully change 
row spacing and lay fields as is required for adopting mechanical harvesting technologies.  
Therefore, β8 >0 is expected, where the estimated adjustment factor (δ) from β8 is expected to 






6.3.2 Choice of variables and a priori expected coefficient signs in the regular farm labour 
supply function 
(a) Real monthly basic wages of farm labour in the industry (RWAGEjkt) 
This variable was defined in the demand function variables and a positive sloping supply curve 
is expected for the industry’s labour market, implying that β10>0, ceteris paribus. 
 
(b) Real composite monthly alternative wage index for employees in the steel industry 
(RALTWAGEt) 
The variable is important to represent non-farm wages and the availability of non-farm job 
opportunities. According to Gardner (1972), a broad index of non-farm wages is not a good 
measure due to schooling, work experience and other characteristics variance that would reduce 
the possibility of farm labour to find employment elsewhere. A narrow index would also not be 
a good measure, given the low availability of options and evolvement over time. Hence, it is 
important to account for the latter factors, in order for the variable to impact on farm labour 
supply. Gardner (1972) opted to use wages of manufacturing workers, as a measure of expected 
non-farm earnings available to farm labour, while in SA Ardington (1976, as cited by Latt and 
Nieuwoudt, 1985), suggested existence of a strong competition between agricultural, industr ia l 
and mining sectors. For this reason, the wage index (Rates E to H = Semi skilled, unskilled 
general labourers) obtained from SEIFSA (2014) was used as a proxy of an alternative wage 
available for farm labour, as it satisfies suggested sectors. The SEIFSA is an institution that 
represents the metal and engineering industry. Similarly, the alternative wage is inclusive of the 
basic wage and supplementary benefits as prescribed in the agreement. The impact of the 
variable on the supply of labour is expected to be negative i.e., β11>0, ceteris paribus. 
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(c) Life Expectancy (LIFEt) 
Sparrow et al. (2008) used a life expectancy variable to measure the impact of morbidity on the 
supply of farm labour. They justified their use of the variable based on the spread of HIV/AIDS 
epidemic since the 1980s and its momentum in the early 2000s, as statistical material indicated 
a drop in life expectancy in SA from 63 to 48 years between 1989 and 2004. Their argument 
was based on the higher vulnerability of the rural community to HIV/AIDS and related diseases, 
due to limited education about the disease and in adequate health services in rural areas. 
However, awareness, treatment of HIV/AIDS and related diseases has improved in recent years.  
The World Bank life expectancy data show an average of 57 years in SA, between 1978 and 
2012, with a peak of 62 years in the early 1990s. The STATSSA’s mid-year 2014 life 
expectancy report show an improvement to 59.6 years and a change in population composition 
from youth to adult base. Despite this improvement, the variable still has an impact on farm 
labour supply, as the rural community still face health service access challenges. A priori, β12 
is expected to be positive. 
 
(d) Rural Population (RPOPt) 
The supply of farm labour is highly dependent on changes in the rural population. It would be 
an ideal variable if the data were production or provincial area specific. However, due to the 
non-availability of a reasonable time series data of at least rural population by province from 
STATSSA, SA rural population data is the only option. While it can be argued as a broad and 
biased proxy, KZN accounts for a larger proportion of the rural population, which means it is 




(e) Annual unemployment rate (UEMPOPt) 
Both Schuh (1962) and Gardner (1972) used the variable to adjust the alternative wage, to 
account for unavailability of non-farm employment, by multiplying non-farm wage by one 
minus the unemployment rate. Schuh (1962) initially used the variable without adjustment and 
found it statistically ineffective, as correction results in average income of both the employed 
and unemployed proportion of the labour force, where the unemployed have a zero income. 
The unemployment rate accounts for the probability of obtaining non-farm employment 
opportunities and can be expected to approach zero as the unemployment rate increases. 
Sparrow et al. (2008) computed the unemployment rate as the proportion of the unemployed 
population in the SA total population. As a result, a higher unemployment rate would increase 
the supply of labour in the farming sector, which implies that β14>0, ceteris paribus.  
 
6.4 Empirical Simultaneous-Equation Regression  
The economic model presents a structural change in the demand for labour in the industry 
estimated using a 2SLS technique. The empirical model excludes the RCONTt and UEMPOPt 
variables, due to the unavailability of a good proxy of contractor charges and the unreliabi lity 
of using the national unemployment data to estimate an industry and regional models. 
The wage variable was treated as an endogenous variable determined by the intersection of the 
demand and supply functions, despite it being influenced by the SD of farm workers since 2003, 
as a large proportion of the time series is made up of the years before introduction of the SD, 
e.g. 1978 to 2002 (25 years), compared to 2003 to 2012 (10 years). The SD guidelines also 
provide farmers with an opportunity to pay less than the full minimum wage, by accounting for 
non-cash payments limited to 20%. Furthermore, the minimum wage is set hourly, daily, 
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weekly and monthly, which allows growers to control the amount that they can pay labour 
through labour adjustment at the intensive margin by cutting working hours or days. Therefore, 
the equilibrium quantity of labour demanded can be estimated simultaneously using the demand 
and supply functions, where the wage is determined endogenously as: 
YQDjkt = β0 + β1RWAGEjkt + β4RCHEMt + β5RPTONkt  + β6AUCkt + β7POLICYt + β8YDjkt-1 + 
U1jkt  ….……...………………….………...……………..……………………………….... (6.3) 
YQSjkt = β9 + β10RWAGEjkt + β11RALTWAGEt + β12LIFEXPt + RPOPt + U2jkt ...….…… (6.4) 
High levels of collinearity are anticipated in the dataset, which poses challenges for estimating 
the econometric model.  The next section explains the problem of multicollinearity and how it 
may be detected and how to remedy the problems of multicollinearity. 
 
6.5 Multicollinearity 
A multiple regression is used to fit data sets with multiple variables to predict and explain a 
relationship between the dependent and multiple explanatory variables. However, in order for 
the estimated relationship and prediction to be meaningful, the underlying regression 
assumptions must be satisfied (Tu et al., 2004). The important assumption relevant to 
multicollinearity requires that all explanatory variables must be linearly independent from one 
another. If the assumption is not satisfied, the estimated regression coefficients will likely have 
a higher variance, standard error and an inconsistent sign. Maddala (1977) suggested that 
collinearity is not a problem, unless if its strength is stronger, relative to multiple correlation. 
Furthermore, multicollinearity is a problem for coefficient estimates, but not for prediction 
purposes, especially when the collinearity between explanatory variables is stable.  
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A strong collinearity makes it difficult to separate the influence of each explanatory variable on 
the response variable, and to estimate coefficients with precision. The coefficient estimates are 
subjected to huge changes, even when a small change is made on one observation. If the 
assumption of nonlinear dependence between explanatory variables is satisfied, the coefficient 
estimates can only change when the scale of explanatory variables are changed. There are 
various methods that can be used to address multicollinearity, but each technique is dependent 
on the attributes of the problem, as multicollinearity is often mistaken for model specificat ion. 
There are also various indicators that are used to examine the extent of multicollinearity in a 
data set. However, they are not meaningful since multicollinearity is a problem associated with 
the behaviour of explanatory variables in drawn samples, rather than the population from which 
they are drawn (Maddala, 1977). 
 
6.5.1 Multicollinearity Detection 
A number of methods can be used to detect multicollinearity, however, only a select few that 
were applies in this study are are briefly discussed in this section. The pairwise correlation 
matrix is widely used to determine the strength of a linear association between the response and 
independent variables, to determine conformity with a priori expectation, and to examine the 
presence and degree of collinearity between the explanatory variables. According to Maddala 
(1977), using a simple correlation to examine the strength of collinearity may only be 
appropriate for a data set with two explanatory variables, since in a data set with many 
explanatory variables sometimes a simple correlation may indicate low or acceptable level of 
collinearity, while multicollinearity is very serious. 
The magnitude of R2, the coefficient of determination, can also guide suspicion or detection of 
multicollinearity (Maddala, 1977; Gujarati and Porter, 2009). The R2 statistic indicates the 
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variability of farm labour employment explained by the model in the industry and regions. A 
model with a relatively high R2, but with few or no statistical significant explanatory variables 
due to high variances and standard errors, compared to the coefficient estimates, and either with 
incorrect or correct signs but with less meaningful coefficient estimates, may suggest the 
presence of strong collinearity. According to Maddala (1977) and Gujarati and Porter (2009), 
if the R2 is less than R2x1x2, it can be concluded that there is strong collinearity; this criteria is 
known as Klein’s rule. However, this procedure sometimes can be misleading, as sometimes 
the R2 is greater than R2x1x2, while other procedures show strong presence of collinear ity. 
Another indicator is the variance inflation factor (VIF), which is the diagonal element of the 
inverse of the correlation matrix. The general rule of thumb is that a VIF greater than or equal 
to 10 indicates severe multicollinearity. 
 
6.6 PCA Regression Methodology 
The PCA Regression method may be used to identify and attempt to address collinear ity 
problems between explanatory variables, by identifying explanatory variables that are a major 
source of multicollinearity and variability. The application of the model is based on Chatterjee 
and Price (1977). The procedure is based on utilisation of a subset of PCs, while retaining all 
original explanatory variables, given that each PC is a linear combination of all explanatory 
variables (Hadi and Ling, 1998; Rook et al., 1990).  Empirical applications of the PCA 
Regression method include Rook et al. (1990), Khuele and Darroch (1997), Tu et al. (2005) 
and Lin et al. (2006).    
The PCA regression method entails use of the OLS Model to regress the standardised dependent 
variable on selected PCs (Draper and Smith, 1981; Hadi and Ling, 1998). This is necessary as 
it follows that the estimated linear regression model using orthogonal variables can be restated 
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in terms of original explanatory variables using mathematical and statistical concepts. However, 
these orthogonal variables are often difficult to interpret, since they are a linear combination of 
original variables. The PCs are a set of p variables, which are a linear combination of p origina l 
explanatory variables, and the number of PCs is equivalent to the number of explanatory 
variables. The presentation of the technique in this section is based on Chatterjee and Price 
(1977) and an application by Rook et al. (1990): 
W = XC …………………………………………………………………………..………. (6.5) 
Where W = n X p matrix of PCs; X = n X p matrix of original variables; C = p X p matrix 
satisfying Cʹ(XʹX) C = Ʌ and CʹC = CCʹ = I; Ʌ = diagonal matrix of the ordered eigenva lues 
(λ1 ≥ λ1 . . . .  λk) of X'X; n = number of samples. The columns of C are the normalized loading 
factors associated with respective eigenvalues. The PCs were obtained using all origina l 
explanatory variables for the industry and regional data sets. 
The loading factors are examined to identify explanatory variables that are strongly linear ly 
related, which gives a clear indication of the explanatory variables that provide major variability 
and multicollinearity within the data sets. The eigenvalues (λi) are also examined and each 
eigenvalue (λi) is considered as a sample variance measure of a given PC, which means the 
variability of explanatory variables captured by each PC. The closer the eigenvalue is to zero 
(λi < 0.01), the more observations associated with the PCs will be closer to zero (Chatterjee and 
Price, 1977).  
The eigenvalues that are closer to zero indicate a strong level of collinearity between 
explanatory variables captured by the PCs that correspond to the eigenvalues with smaller 
values. It is possible to identify variables contributing significantly to collinearity through 
observation of the loading factors that correspond to each PC and smaller eigenvalues. The 
correlation between the PC scores and the quantity of labour demanded can also be used to 
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indicate the source of variability between explanatory variables. This is achieved by examining 
the loading factors associated with each PC, to identify variables dominating each PC. In (6.5) 
W = XC and the original regression model is presented as follows: 
Y = b0 + b1X1 + ……. + bpXp ……………………………………………….....………..… (6.6) 
And can be restated in standardised form as:  
Y = Xβ + u ………………………………………………………………………...…….... (6.7) 
Where β is a p x 1 vector of regression coefficients and u is an n X 1vector of residuals. It is assumed 
that E (u) = 0, E (uuʹ) = σ2I and that X and Y have been centred and scaled so that XʹX and XʹY 
are matrices of correlation coefficients to satisfy C matrix in (6.5). Therefore, the model can be 
restated in terms of PCs as: 
Y = Wα + u ………………………………………………………………………………. (6.8) 
Where W = XC and α = Cʹβ. Hence, it is possible to calculate the regression coefficients in 
terms of the PCs (α) and restate them in terms of the β using the relationship β = Cα. If there 
are PCs with small eigenvalues, serious collinearity is eminent, which cannot be resolved by 
the procedure. However, collinearity can be removed by excluding PCs with smaller 
eigenvalues, when regressing the standardised dependent variable on selected PCs, which sets 
the contribution of other PCs with smaller eigenvalues to variables to zero. If all PCs are used, 
estimated results will be exactly the same as those from the original model and the collinear ity 
problem is not addressed. As much as it is more attractive to use a subset of PCs with larger 
eigenvalues, the procedure uses less than full information, depending on the amount of 
variability accounted by the few eigenvalues of selected PCs (Chatterjee and Price, 1977; Rook 
et al., 1990).  
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Despite using less than full information, estimating the coefficient of each original explanatory 
variable is possible, since the reduced model can be restated in terms of the original model as 
discussed. The coefficient estimate of each original explanatory variable is achieved by 
multiplying each respective coefficient estimate of the explanatory variable by the division of 
the standard deviations of the dependent and respective explanatory variable, i.e., bi = b̃i (sy/sxi). 
It should be noted that the computed t values for testing the null hypothesis of bi and b̃i equal to 
zero are identical and the b̃i is a scaled version of the bi. Hence, when constructing t values as 
either bi/sbi or b̃i/sb̃i, the scaling factor is cancelled (Chatterjee and Price, 1977; Chatterjee and 
Hadi, 2006; Chatterjee and Hadi, 2012).  
Computation of the intercept term is explained in Chatterjee and Hadi (2006) and Chatterjee 
and Hadi (2012). The estimation is done only after the coefficient estimates of the explanatory 
variables are adjusted to their original state. Hence, the estimation of the intercept coefficient 
is as follows:  
Y - y̅ = β1(X1 - X̅1) + β2(X2 - X̅2) + ·············· + βp(Xp - X̅p) ………………..………….. (6.9) 
Where Y and y are the observation and mean of the dependent variable and X, X̅ and β are the 
observation, mean and the restated coefficient estimate of each explanatory variable. 
Mathematically, (6.9) can be represented as: 
Y = y̅ - (β1X̅1 + β2X̅2 + βpX̅p) + β1X1 + β2X2 + ···· + βpXp …………….............….…….. (6.10) 
Where the intercept can simply be obtained from the following equation: 
β0 = y̅ - (β1X̅1 + ………. + βpX̅p) …………………………………………...………….… (6.11) 
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The constant does not appear clearly in (6.11), hence when dealing with no-intercept models, 
one only need to scale the data. The relationship between the estimates, β1, β2, βp, obtained using 
the original data and those obtained using the standardised data is given by: 
βi = b̃i (sy/sxi),        i = 1, 2, 3, 4, p,  
β0 = y̅ - ∑ β𝑖X?̅?,5i=1  …………………………………………………………………..….. (6.12)   
Reducing the level of collinearity using the procedure may result in coefficient estimate signs 
that are stable and consistent with theoretical expectation.  The results can be better interpreted, 
compared to the results obtained using the original model. Maddala (1992) and Draper and 
Smith (1981) highlighted the following considerations regarding use of the procedure: 
 The first PC usually accounts for a higher proportion of the variability of explanatory 
variables, but it may not be highly correlated with the dependent variable and the order 
of PCs does not suggest the strength of correlation between the PC and dependent 
variable. However, according to Draper and Smith (1981), the order of selection is 
irrelevant, given that all the PCs are orthogonal to one another and the fitted equation 
can be restated back into original explanatory variables.  
 One might find it compelling to use PCs that are highly correlated with the dependent 
variable and leave out other PCs. However, the same procedure can be used to select 
original explanatory variables based on their correlation with the dependent variable. 
 Sometimes it is difficult to attach economic interpretation to the linear combination of 
PCs. 
 A change in unit measurement of explanatory variables will result in a change in PCs.  
If the eigenvalues of the first two, three or few PCs can account for a large proportion of the 
total variability of explanatory variables, the methodology can yield reliable results and show 
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original variables that provide major variability. However, Hadi and Ling (1998) argue that the 
PCR sometimes may fail, as theory suggests removal of the last PC, yet it might be contributing 
everything to the fit with the dependent variable. They used an example to show the possibility 
of the first few PCs to account for almost, if not all, of the total variability of the explanatory 
variables, but poorly explain the variability of the dependent variable, which may fit perfectly 
with the last PC. The scatter plot of the residuals against each PC also showed a perfect linear 
relationship with the last PC. Hence, to avoid PCR failure, they suggested the selection of PCs 
to also account for their contribution to the regression sum of squares, rather than mainly 
focussing only on PC variance decomposition. Lin et al. (2006) also suggested selection of 
statistically significant PCs only. While taking nothing away from all the arguments, the 
interpretability of the PCs is important and each choice should depend on the objective of the 

















CHAPTER 7: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Having developed a suitable econometric methodology to analyse the time series wage and 
employment data with data of other appropriate predictor variables in Chapter 6, this chapter 
presents the results of the econometric analysis. Because multicollinearity is anticipated in the 
dataset, the chapter starts with an analysis of correlation amongst the variables used in the 
analysis in section one and two. Having confirmed the presence of multicollinearity in the 
dataset, the third section presents results of the 2SLS regression analyses of the demand for 
farm labour. The fourth section outlines the procedural estimation of the coefficients of 
appropriate predictor variables and the constant term using the PCA regression analysis of the 
demand for farm labour as an approach to remedy the collinearity, while the final section 
presents the estimated results using the PCA regression analysis. The 2SLS Model estimate 
results for the supply functions are inflicted with heavy multicollinearity and the PCA 
procedure did not adequately remedy the problem.  Hence, the supply functions estimate results 
are not presented in this chapter; however, the estimated results of the industry supply equation 
estimated using the 2SLS model are reported in Appendix C. 
  
7.1 Correlation Matrices for Farm Labour Demand Functions 
Table 1 reports correlation coefficients for variables used in estimating the Industry-leve l 
demand for labour. It shows a statistically significant (99% level of statistical confidence) 
negative relationship between the industry YQDjkt and RWAGEjkt. The relationship between the 
YQDjkt and YQDjkt-1 is statistically significant (99% level) and positive – this means that farmers 
have been making labour adjustments of (1 - ) = 1 – 0.9223 = 0.777, which is about 8%. The 
same approach is followed for the Midlands and South Coast. The correlation coefficient 
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estimates signs between the YQDjkt and other explanatory variables are in line with a priori 
expectations, except for RMECHt, hence it was omitted from the analysis. The results also show 
a strong correlation between the explanatory variables – the RWAGEjkt is negatively related to 
YQDjkt-1, while it is positively related to the AUCkt and POLICYt. The YQDjkt-1 and POLICYt are 
strongly related to most of the explanatory variables, except for RPTONkt and AUCkt. 
Table 1: Industry Aggregate Demand Function Correlation Coefficients Matrix 
VARIABLES YQ Djkt RWAGEjkt RCHEMt RPTONkt AUCkt POLICYt YQ Djkt-1 
YQ Djkt 1             
RWAGEjkt -0.4312*** 1           
RCHEMt 0.5893*** -0.3405** 1         
RPTONkt 0.0469 0.3041* 0.2474 1       
AUCkt 0.0297 0.7626*** -0.1708 0.2476 1     
POLICYt -0.7751*** 0.7562*** -0.5603*** 0.0363 0.4505*** 1   
YQ Djkt-1 0.9223*** -0.4580*** 0.5864*** 0.083 -0.0543 -0.8296*** 1 
 
Note: *** = statistically significant at the 99% level of statistical confidence; ** = statistically significant at the 
95% level of statistical confidence; * = statistically significant at the 90% level of statistical confidence. The 
subscripts are defined in Chapter 6, similarly for all the results tables in this Chapter, excluding elasticity Table. 
 
Table 2 shows a statistically significant (99% level) negative relationship between the YQDjkt 
and RWAGEjkt. The correlation coefficient estimate sign between YQDjkt and YQDjkt-1 is 
statistically significant (99% level) and positive – this implies farm labour adjustment of about 
36% over the study period, which is higher, compared to the industry outcome. The YQDjkt is 
also strongly negatively related to POLICYt. The correlation coefficient estimates signs 
between the YQDjkt and other explanatory variables are in line with a priori expectations. The 
results also show a strong correlation between the explanatory variables – RWAGEjkt is 
negatively correlated with the YQDjkt-1 and positively correlated with POLICYt and AUCkt. The 
YQDjkt-1 and POLICYt are strongly correlated with most of the explanatory variables, except 




Table 2: Midlands Aggregate Demand Function Correlation Coefficients Matrix 
VARIABLES YQ Djkt RWAGEjkt RCHEMt RPTONkt AUCkt POLICYt YQ Djkt-1 
YQ Djkt 1             
RWAGEjkt -0.3015* 1           
RCHEMt 0.5493*** -0.3731** 1         
RPTONkt 0.0013 0.1665 0.1368 1       
AUCkt 0.2724 0.4258** -0.0277 0.2478 1     
POLICYt -0.6237*** 0.7986*** -0.5379*** -0.0265 0.1111 1   
YQ Djkt-1 0.6367*** -0.4082** 0.5037*** 0.0388 0.1996 -0.7456*** 1   
Note: *** = statistically significant at the 99% level of statistical confidence; ** = statistically significant at the 
95% level of statistical confidence; * = statistically significant at the 90% level of statistical confidence.  
Table 3 indicates a statistically insignificant (94.96%) negative relationship between the YQDjkt 
and RWAGEjkt. The relationship between YQDjkt and YQDjkt-1 is statistically significant (99% 
level) and positive – which implies about 13% of farm labour adjustment over the study period. 
The magnitude is lower (higher), relative to the Midland (industry), respectively, which is in 
line with expectation. The YQDjkt is also strongly positively related to the RCHEMt and AUCkt. 
The relationship between YQDjkt and other explanatory variables are in line with a priori 
expectations. The results also show a strong correlation between the explanatory variables – 
RWAGEjkt is negatively related to the AUCkt, and positively related to the POLICYt. The YQDjkt-
1 and POLICYt are strongly related to most of the explanatory variables, except RPTONkt. 
Table 3: South Coast Aggregate Demand Function Correlation Coefficients Matrix 
VARIABLES YQ Djkt RWAGEjkt RCHEMt RPTONkt AUCkt POLICYt YQ Djkt-1 
YQ Djkt 1             
RWAGEjkt -0.3383 1           
RCHEMt 0.5478*** -0.3128* 1         
RPTONkt 0.1716 0.3896** 0.1878 1       
AUCkt 0.7490*** -0.5080*** 0.4401*** 0.1185 1     
POLICYt -0.7795*** 0.6523*** -0.5379*** 0.0436 -0.7958*** 1   
YQ Djkt-1 0.8658*** -0.3784** 0.5880*** 0.1319 0.7956*** -0.8341*** 1 
 
Note: *** = statistically significant at the 99% level of statistical confidence; ** = statistically significant at the 
95% level of statistical confidence; * = statistically significant at the 90% level of statistical confidence. 
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7.2 Correlation Matrices for Farm Labour Supply Functions 
Table 4 show correlation coefficients between the variables used in the industry and regional 
supply functions over the study period. The estimate results show a strong positive correlation 
between RWAGEjkt and RALTWAGEt, which is consistent with the findings from Latt and 
Nieuwoudt (1985). This suggests that wages in the sugar industry moved in sympathy (similar 
rate) with wages in the steel industry over study period, since it is important to ensure labour 
supply in these industries, as there is strong competition for labour between the farm and non-
farm sectors, given that they absorb most of the unskilled labour. It is worth noting the similar 
correlation coefficient estimate strength between the industry and South Coast, which is 
relatively higher compared to the Midlands. This was expected, given that the Midlands has 
relatively more competitive sectors for labour and is more conducive for mechanisation.  
The results indicate a statistically strong relationship between RWAGEjkt  and RALTWAGEt  
and LIFEt and RPOPt. These relationships suggest that an increase in rural population and 
improvement in life expectency results in a decrease in sugarcane farming and steel industry 
wages. This is possible, as an increase in rural population would raise the supply of labour in 
these industries; and an improvement in life expectency would increase the number of old 
people in employment, who are usually relatively unproductive and expected to earn lower 
wages, especially when they are paid hourly wages. The negative (positive) correlation between 
YQSjkt, and RWAGEjkt  and RALTWAGEt, and LIFEt and RPOPt are, respectively also in line 




Table 4: Aggregate Supply Function Correlation Coefficients Matrices  
Industry Correlation Coefficients Matrix  
VARIABLES YQ S jkt RWAGEjkt RALTWAGEt LIFEt RPOPt 
YQ S jkt 1         
RWAGEjkt -0.431*** 1       
RALTWAGEt -0.396** 0.963*** 1     
LIFEt 0.137 -0.801*** -0.786*** 1   
RPOPt 0.736*** -0.897*** -0.884*** 0.633*** 1 
Midlands Correlation Coefficients Matrix 
VARIABLES YQ S jkt RWAGEjkt RALTWAGEt LIFEt RPOPt 
YQ S jkt 1         
RWAGEjkt -0.324* 1       
RALTWAGEt -0.2624 0.9468*** 1     
LIFEt 0.0763 -0.7821*** -0.8061*** 1   
RPOPt 0.5608*** -0.9240*** -0.8845*** 0.6716*** 1 
South Coast Correlation Coefficients Matrix (K = 3) 
VARIABLES YQ S jkt RWAGEjkt RALTWAGEt LIFEt RPOPt 
YQ S jkt 1         
RWAGEjkt -0.338* 1       
RALTWAGEt -0.452*** 0.963*** 1     
LIFEt 0.264 -0.851* -0.806* 1   
RPOPt 0.756*** -0.826* -0.885* 0.672* 1 
 
Note: *** = statistically significant at the 99% level of statistical confidence; ** = statistically significant at the 
95% level of statistical confidence; * = statistically significant at the 90% level of statistical confidence. 
 
Table 5 presents the correlation coefficients between the RWAGEjkt and RALTWAGEt  for 
labour categories in sugarcane farming and sugarcane farming regions over the study period. 
All estimated coefficients in the table for drivers and cutters, and permanent and seasonal labour 
are respectively less (greater) than the aggregate coefficient estimates of the industry as whole 
and the regions. The findings are in line with a priori expectations. However, it is worth noting 
the lower coefficient estimates for drivers, relative to cutters in the industry, which probably 
exhibits the relatively low supply of cutters, compared to drivers in sugarcane farming. The 
coefficient estimates of permanent and seasonal labour on the South Coast are higher, relative 
to the industry as whole and the Midlands, espectively the Midlands, which is expected given 
the farming conditions in the region.  
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Table 5: Correlation Coefficients Between Real Farm Wages and Alternative Wage 
Labour Categories Industry (K = 1) Midlands (K = 1) South Coast (K = 3) 
Drivers (J = 1) 0.939*** 0.942*** 0.833*** 
Cutters (J = 2) 0.906*** 0.861*** 0.861*** 
Permanent Labour (J = 3) 0.968*** 0.961*** 0.980*** 
Seasonal Labour (J = 4) 0.970*** 0.916*** 0.980*** 
  
Note: *** = statistically significant at the 99% level of statistical confidence; ** = statistically significant at the 
95% level of statistical confidence; * = statistically significant at the 90% level of statistical confidence. 
 
7.3 Estimated Empirical Results of Farm Labour Demand Models 
The 2SLS Model results reported in Table 6 were estimated using STATA 11 (2009). The 
results show mixed signs of coefficient estimates of the predictor variables, where some are in 
(not in) line with a priori expectations. The results also show high adjusted R2 in all models, 
ranging from 71.34% to 98.24%, but with very few statistically significant coefficient estimates 
of the predictor variables. The estimated F statistics that ranges between 10.95 and 230.82 are  
highly statistically significant (at the 1% level of probability), which means that all the predictor 
variables as a group influence various sugarcane farming demand models.  
However, the estimated mean VIFs of each estimated model are less than 10, the indicator of 
severe multicollinearity. The VIFs of each predictor variable in each estimated model were also 
below the indicator level, but with relatively high VIF values for the RWAGEjkt, POLICYt and 
YQDjkt-1 variables. Despite the lower mean VIFs, there is enough evidence to suggest the 
presence of multicollinearity in all data sets, as other indicators suggest the presence of 
multicollinearity. Hence, it is not reliable to make a conclusion based on one indicator, which 
makes it important to explore other possible indicators to guide decision making. For this 
reason, the results are not interpreted, as it would be impossible to assign the impact of each 
explanatory variable on the quantity of labour demanded in each model.  
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Table 6: Estimated Results for Empirical Farm Labour Demand Functions using 2SLS Model, 1978 – 2012 
 
 
Note: (a) t-statistics values are in parentheses; *** = statistically significant at the 99% level of statistical confidence; ** = statistically significant at the 95% level of statistical 




AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT DRIVERS DEMAND (J = 1) CUTTERS (J = 2) PERMANENT LABOUR  (J = 3) SEASONAL LABOUR (J = 4) 
(K = 1) (K = 2) (K = 3) (K = 1) (K = 2) (K = 3) (K = 1) (K = 2) (K = 3) (K = 1) (K = 2) (K = 3) (K = 1) (K = 2) (K = 3) 
(βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) 
RWAGEjkt 
-6.986** 0.344 0.335 0.224 0.096 0.171** -2.805* 0.531*** 0.422 0.257 0.859 0.049 -4.974*** -1.745*** -0.776* 
(-1.97) (0.42) (0.38) (0.64) (1.2) (2.26) (-1.7) (2.7) (1.25) (0.14) (1.62) (0.12) (-3.03) (-2.98) (-1.66) 
RCHEMt 
45.67 53.656** 3.938 -4.746 0.067 0.227 6.819 9.608* -6.961 138.151*** 25.392** 38.285** -40.762 20.192* -26.66** 
(0.61) (2.38) (0.15) (-0.61) (0.02) (0.1) (0.28) (1.78) (-1.05) (3.12) (2.01) (2.54) (-1.25) (1.89) (-2.04) 
RPTONkt 
-5.837 -6.984** 1.465 -0.006 -0.592 0.466 -8.459** -2.77*** 0.541 -0.892 -2.705 -1.779 5.559 -1.492 4.245* 
(-0.45) (-2.37) (0.34) (0) (-1.61) (1.13) (-1.96) (-3.89) (0.5) (-0.13) (-1.59) (-0.77) (0.97) (-1.11) (1.76) 
AUCkt 
0.151*** 0.072*** 0.026 0.013*** 0.003 0.0002 0.052*** 0.008 0.003 0.061*** 0.022* 0.011 0.055*** 0.035*** 0.016 
(3.41) (2.87) (1.01) (2.92) (0.91) (0.11) (3.23) (1.47) (0.45) (2.84) (1.68) (0.84) (3.16) (2.91) (1.26) 
POLICYt 
-2413.276 -1694.935** -767.63 -626.328** -69.088 -204.828*** -534.789 -7.69 -72.896 -3647.91*** -1266.921*** -493.284 -931.396 -159.352 -416.627 
(-0.86) (-2.27) (-0.87) (-2.29) (-0.83) (-2.96) (-0.6) (-0.06) (-0.32) (-2.7) (-2.63) (-1.15) (-0.89) (-0.52) (-1.13) 
YQDjkt-1 
0.633*** 0.029 0.571*** 0.083 0.383** 0.055 0.620*** 0.192* 0.662*** 0.177 0.033 0.421** 0.564*** -0.099 0.198 
(4.69) (0.17) (3.09) (0.42) (2.13) (0.33) (4.33) (1.66) (4.24) (1.02) (0.17) (2.15) (4.01) (-0.47) (1.35) 
CONSTANT 
-18067.8* 459.048 1222.925 1294.496 545.886 437.877* -3561.727* 499.475** 468.736 -13434.94** -302.863 -1412.359 -4411.694 -539.719 2737.497* 
(-1.77) (0.19) (0.44) (1.07) (1.48) (1.68) (-1) (0.86) (0.65) (-2.42) (-0.22) (-1) (-1.02) (-0.5) (1.87) 
Adj. R
2
 95.55% 93.12% 93.41 89.84% 93.79% 71.39% 84.46% 71.34% 83.02% 97.26% 97.2% 97.41% 98.24% 91.61% 97.93% 
F – Value 88.54*** 55.16*** 57.7*** 37.47*** 61.4*** 10.98*** 23.42*** 10.95*** 20.55*** 147.55*** 139.9*** 151.67*** 230.82*** 44.67*** 189.84*** 
Mean VIF 4.37 2.87 3.44 3.21 2.44 2.38 3.41 1.68 2.74 4.42 3.17 3.9 3.74 3.14 2.74 
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7.4 Principal Component and Regression Analyses 
As suggested by theory, the 2SLS Model was used to relate farm labour employment variation 
to a select of predictor variables, where higher collinearity between explanatory variables 
resulted in inconsistent coefficient estimates. However, since the estimation of reliable 
coefficients is important to provide good prediction, contribute towards labour policy and 
interpretation of the economic impact on employment in a labour-intensive industry, the 
procedure was applied to improve the quality of estimated results, as presented in Table 6.   
 
7.4.1 Principal Component Analysis and Regression Results 
As indicated, the PCA extraction technique was used to reduce the level of multicollinearity in 
the data sets, following guidelines from Chatterjee and Price (1977), Chatterjee and Hadi (2006) 
and Chatterjee and Hadi (2012). The selection of retained PCs was based on the Kaiser Criterion 
(Manly, 1994), as it seemed to produce more favourable results than other prominent criterions. 
Hence, only two out of six PCs were selected, as it is required that each selected PC must have 
an eigenvalue greater than one. The procedure is illustrated using the industry aggregate 
demand for farm labour data and the results for all demand functions are reported in Table 9.   
Table 7 shows that the first two PCs explain 76.79% of the total variability in the explanatory 
variables. The loading factors of these PCs are relatively evenly distributed, compared to the 
loading factors of the last four PCs (the omitted PCs), as they show highly variable loading 
factors and dominance by few explanatory variables, which suggest high presence of 
multicollinearity within these PCs. Hence, an attempt to add at least the third PC was resulting 
in unfavourable results, even though the PC was only contributing 12.46% more to the total 
variability accounted by the PCs. It may seem appropriate to consider rotating the PCs to resolve 
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the high dominance in the last four PCs; however, it is relatively less important since the aim is 
to work back to original dependent variables than improving the interpretation of the PCs, and 
it would be difficult to work back to original variables after rotation or distort the process. 
Table 7: Industry Extracted Principal Components 
VARIABLES PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 
RWAGEjkt 0.4984 0.3126 0.1108 0.1326 0.7715 -0.1695 
RCHEM t -0.3675 0.4178 -0.1611 0.811 -0.0601 -0.0546 
RPTONkt 0.0685 0.6101 -0.6571 -0.42 -0.1168 0.037 
AUCkt 0.3538 0.466 0.5674 -0.021 -0.5408 -0.2069 
POLICYt 0.5392 -0.0916 -0.1467 0.2995 -0.1775 0.7471 
YQDjkt-1 -0.4426 0.3605 0.4319 -0.2411 0.2521 0.6049 
EIGENVALUES 3.04395 1.56329 0.747697 0.449765 0.120708 0.074585 
% VARIATION 50.73% 26.05% 12.46% 7.50% 2.01% 1.24% 
CUMULATIVE 
% 
50.73% 76.79% 89.25% 96.75% 98.76% 100.00% 
 
7.4.2 Standardised Coefficient Estimates Illustration 
The standardised aggregate demand function of the industry is estimated using the two selected 
PCs, where ZYQDjkt (j = 0, k = 1) is the standardised quantity of labour demanded estimated as: 
ZYQDjkt = α1PC1 + α2PC2 ……………………………………………..…………………. (7.1) 
The estimated aggregate industry demand function: 
ZYQDjkt = -0.3498PC1 + 0.3404PC2 …………………………………………………........ (7.2) 
Following Chatterjee and Price (1977), Chatterjee and Hadi (2006) and Chatterjee and Hadi 
(2012), procedure, ZYQDjkt is estimated using OLS regression as follows:  
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ZYQDjkt = b̃1ZRCWAGEjkt + b̃3ZRCHEMt + b̃4ZRPTONkt  + b̃5ZAUCkt + b̃6ZPOLICYt + 
b̃7ZYQDjkt-1 + U1 ………...……………....……………………………………...……......... (7.3) 
Equation 7.5 implies that the bĩ coefficient estimates corresponding to each predictor variable 
can be estimated from equation (7.1) to (7.3) coefficient estimates, using the loading factors of 
PC1 and PC2 (α1 and α2) in Table 7 as follows: 
b̃1 = (0.4984 x -0.3823) + (0.3126 x 0.3328) = -0.0865 
b̃2 = (-0.3675 x -0.3823) + (0.4178 x 0.3328) = 0.2795 
b̃3 = (0.0685 x -0.3823) + (0.6101 x 0.3328) = 0.1768 
b̃4 = (0.3538 x -0.3823) + (0.466 x 0.3328) = 0.0198 
b̃5 = (0.5392 x -0.3823) + (-0.0916 x 0.3328) = -0.2366 
b̃6 = (-0.4426 x -0.3823) + (0.3605 x 0.3328) = 0.2892 
 
7.4.3 Computation of Standard Errors 
The standard errors of estimated coefficients are estimated from the standard errors of the 
estimated standardised demand model as: 
s.e.(b̃i) = SQRT ((PC1 x s.e.(α1))2 + (PC2 x s.e.(α2))2)  …………..……………….....….. (7.4) 
Following the Chatterjee and Hadi (2006) and Chatterjee and Hadi (2012) procedure, the 
standard error s.e.(b̃i) of each estimated coefficient can be estimated using OLS to regress ZYDjkt 
on standardised explanatory variables. Equation (7.4) implies that the s.e.(b̃i) of each coefficient 
estimate corresponding to each predictor variable can be estimated from (7.1) to (7.4) 
coefficient estimates, using the loading factors of PC1 and PC2 in Table 7: 
s.e.(b̃1) = SQRT (((0.4984 x 0.0565) ^2) + ((0.3126 x 0.0788) ^2)) = 0.0014 
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s.e.(b̃2) = SQRT (((-0.3675 x 0.0565) ^2) + ((0.4178 x 0.0788) ^2)) = 0.0015 
s.e.(b̃3) = SQRT (((0.0685 x 0.0565) ^2) + ((0.6101 x 0.0788) ^2)) = 0.0023 
s.e.(b̃4) = SQRT (((0.3538 x 0.0565) ^2) + ((0.466 x 0.0788) ^2)) = 0.0017 
s.e.(b̃5) = SQRT (((0.5392 x 0.0565) ^2) + ((-0.0916 x 0.0788) ^2)) = 0.0010 
s.e.(b̃6) = SQRT (((-0.4426 x 0.0565) ^2) + ((0.3605 x 0.0788) ^2)) = 0.0014 
Table 8 presents the summary statistics used to restate the coefficient estimates of the 
explanatory variables to their original state, and to estimate the constant term demand function. 
Table 8: Summary Statistics for Variables used in Industry Aggregate Demand Model 
VARIABLES OBSERVATIONS MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
YQDjkt 35 44290.37 8799.22 33776.00 60779.00 
RWAGEjkt 35 1330.09 356.99 962.38 2057.87 
RCHEM t 35 86.46 9.10 70.27 104.94 
RPTONkt 35 298.98 43.93 223.83 402.54 
AUCkt 35 279354.20 21638.56 244108.00 311293.00 
POLICYt 35 0.54 0.51 0.00 1.00 
YQDjkt-1 34 44448.82 8880.72 33776.00 60779.00 
 
7.4.4 Computation of the Original Coefficient Estimates for the Explanatory Variables 
As per Chatterjee and Price (1977), Chatterjee and Hadi (2006) and Chatterjee and Hadi (2012), 
the t value for testing the null hypothesis of bi and b̃i equals to zero are identical and b̃i is a 
scaled version of bi. Hence, when computing t values as either bi/sbi or b̃i/sb̃i, the scaling factor 
is cancelled. The bi can be transformed to its original state by multiplication of b̃i and (sy/sxi), 
where sy and sxi are the standard deviations of the dependent and respective predictor variables. 
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bi = b̃i (sy/sxi) ……………………………………………………………………...……..… (7.5) 
b1 = -0.0865*(8799.22/356.9943) = -2.132 
b2 = 0.2795*(8799.22/9.0951) = 270.421 
b3 = 0.1768*(8799.22/43.9287) = 35.423 
b4 = 0.0198*(8799.22/21638.56) = 0.008 
b5 = -2366*(8799.22/0.5054) = -4118.951 
b6 = 0.2892*(8799.22/8880.718) = 0.286 
 
7.4.5 Computation of the Constant Term  
The coefficient estimate of the constant term is derived from restated coefficient estimates 
following Chatterjee and Hadi (2006) and Chatterjee and Hadi (2012) as: 
Y = y̅ - (β1X̅1 + β2X̅2 + βpX̅p) + β1X1 + β2X2 + ···· + βpXp …….….……………….…....... (7.6) 
YQDjkt = 44290.37 - (((-2.132)*(-1330.087)) + (270.421*(-86.4638)) + (35.423*(-298.9751)) + 
(0.008*(-279354.2)) + (-4118.951*(-0.5429)) + (0.286*(-44448.82))) - 2.132RWAGEjkt + 
270.421RCHEMt + 35.423RPTONkt + 0.008AUCkt  - 4118.951POLICYt + 0.286YQDjkt-1  
 
Therefore, the original industry aggregate quantity of farm labour demand function is presented 
as:  
YQDjkt = 402.116 – 2.132RWAGEjkt + 270.421RCHEMt + 35.423RPTONkt + 0.008AUCkt  – 




7.5 Principal Component Analysis Regression Results 
The estimated regression coefficients for the farm labour demand functions obtained using the 
Chatterjee and Price (1977), Chatterjee and Hadi (2006) and Chatterjee and Hadi (2012) 
procedure are reported in Table 9. The estimated regression equations exhibit reduced 
multicollinearity; evident from the relatively stable coefficient estimates signs and an 
improvement in their statistical significance. However, the results show a relatively low 
magnitude of the coefficient estimates of YQDjkt-1, which may suggest a shorter period of 
adjustment, relative to a priori expectations. Whilst this unexpected finding may have arisen 
from the loss of information from discarding four out of the six generated PCs, the magnitude 
of the coefficient estimates of other predictor variables seem relatively in line with expectations.  
The estimated adjusted R2 from all estimated demand functions ranges between 15.88% (drivers 
demand function) and 68.34% (South Coast aggregate demand for labour function), which 
show that the specified predictor variables explain about 16% to 68% of the total variability in 
the aggregate and labour categories (drivers, cutters, permanent and seasonal labour) demand 
function for farm labour. Given the estimated relatively highly statistically significant F 
statistics (at the 1% level of probability), the variables in each demand function as a group 
influence the various demand functions for farm labour in sugarcane production.  
 
(a) The Coefficient of Estimate of the Lagged Regressand (YQ Djkt-1) 
The coefficient estimates of the lagged regressand YQDjkt-1 variable presented in Table 9 have 
the expected positive sign and are highly statistically significant at the 1% level of probability, 
with t values ranging between 2.6 and 10.274.  
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Table 9: Estimated Short-Run Results for Empirical Farm Labour Demand Functions using Chatterjee and Price (1977) Procedure, 
1978 – 2012 
VARIABLES 
AGGREGATE EMPLO YMENT DRIVERS (J =1) CUTTERS (J = 2) PERMANENT LABO UR (J = 3) SEASO NAL LABO UR (J = 4) 
(K = 1) (K = 2) (K = 3) (K = 1) (K = 2) (K = 3) (K = 1) (K = 2) (K = 3) (K = 1) (K = 2) (K = 3) (K = 1) (K = 2) (K = 3) 
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(7.64) (5.273) (8.229) (4.235) (2.727) (5.185) (5.217) (2.6) (7.128) (8.388) (5.092) (10.274) (7.043) (7.33) (4.924) 
CO NSTANT 402.116 568.088 -932.05 1263.763 518.48 -16.301 1103.719 969.866 -983.18 -5723.83 -800.507 -301.498 7817.775 3598.789 -47.942 
Adj. R
2
 64.45% 45.31% 68.34% 34.04% 15.88% 43.06% 44.65% 26.88% 60.12% 67.78% 43.05% 75.87% 58.68% 62.52% 48.35% 
































Note: (a) t-statistics values are in parentheses; *** = statistically significant at the 99% level of statistical confidence; ** = statistically significant at the 95% level of statistical 




The industry aggregate coefficient estimate implies that the coefficient of adjustment of the 
aggregate demand for farm labour () in sugarcane farming over the study period is given by 
(1 -  = 0.286), ceteris paribus.  Therefore, LSGs are estimated to adjust their farm labour levels 
by closing the gap between the beginning year actual and their desired level of farm labour by 
about 71% each year. If about 71% of the gap is closed in the first year, about 29% of the 
desired change is still to be made at the beginning of year two. In that year, about 71% of that 
remaining gap is closed, implying that a further 21% of the desired change is achieved by the 
beginning of year three, and so on for subsequent years. On aggregate, LSGs are thus estimated 
to take about three years to make the full adjustment toward their desired (equilibrium) farm 
labour levels in response to a change in the predictor variables.  
The coefficient of adjustment of farm labour in the industry, regions and labour categories 
ranges between 0.156 and 0.34. Therefore, the adjustment magnitude ranges between about 
66% and 84%, with an average full adjustment period of three years, which is higher than the 
sector estimates reported by Sparrow et al. (2008). The higher rate of adjustment compared to 
Sparrow et al. (2008) is surprising considering that sugarcane is a perennial crop; however, 
relatively more rapid adjustment may be possible because a relatively high proportion of the 
workforce in sugarcane farming are seasonal farm workers. 
(b) The Long-Run Coefficient Estimates of Estimated Demand Functions 
Table 10 shows long-run coefficient estimates excluding YQDjkt-1, as the adjustment factors 
derived from YQDjkt-1 coefficient estimates were used to convert the short-run to long-run 
impact. The larger magnitude of the long-run coefficient estimates suggests a higher impact of 
the predictor variables over time. In the long-run LSGs have enough time to change their habits 
(reduction of labour requirements), adopt new technology (replace labour with mechanisat ion) 
and become more familiar about the implication of relevant legislations. 
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Table 10: Estimated Long-Run Results for Empirical Farm Labour Demand Functions using Chatterjee and Price (1977) Procedure, 
1978 – 2012  
VARIABLES 
AGGREGATE EMPLO YMENT DRIVERS (J = 1) CUTTERS (J = 2) PERMANENT LABO UR (J = 3) SEASO NAL LABO UR (J = 4) 
(K = 1) (K = 2) (K = 3) (K = 1) (K = 2) (K = 3) (K = 1) (K = 2) (K = 3) (K = 1) (K = 2) (K = 3) (K = 1) (K = 2) (K = 3) 
(βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) (βs) 
RWAGEjkt -2.986 -0.465 -0.543 0.172 0.025 0.074 -0.320 0.223 0.788 -0.668 -0.245 -0.726 -2.541 -1.132 -0.426 
RCHEMt 378.739 50.182 68.800 10.393 0.335 4.126 83.705 -2.736 11.526 162.226 26.309 32.315 97.350 49.768 18.606 
RPTO Nkt 49.612 4.754 8.187 3.044 0.442 0.979 10.642 0.814 4.895 26.517 2.834 0.852 4.611 2.111 1.461 
AUC kt 0.011 0.033 0.050 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.003 0.016 0.017 0.026 -0.022 0.004 0.016 
PO LICYt -5767.507 -877.941 -1202.237 -75.077 -11.650 -48.303 -1294.309 129.697 14.864 -1976.565 -458.233 -689.806 -2038.168 -1040.530 -398.671 




(c) The Coefficient Estimate of Real Monthly Composite Wages (RWAGEjkt) 
Most of the coefficient estimates of RWAGEjkt are statistically significant with a priori 
expected sign; however the coefficient estimates of the Midlands and South Coast drivers, and 
cutters in the industry signs are unexpectedly positive. These estimated positive relationships 
are statistically significant for the industry and the South Coast, except for the Midlands. The 
findings probably reflect that the econometric model of the demand for drivers does not 
adequately account for substitution of machinery for elementary farmworkers giving rise to an 
increase in the demand for drivers in sugarcane production. Nonetheless, the lower impact on 
drivers in the Midlands suggests that mechanisation in sugarcane farming was relatively more 
advanced in that region by the early 1980s than on the South Coast and the industry as a whole. 
The statistical significance of the positive coefficient estimates for cutters reflects the limited 
availability of cutters in sugarcane farming, which can be backed by anecdotal evidence. The 
higher impact on the South Coast (-0.52) than in the Midlands (-0.118), is reflective of the high 
labour-intensity of the South Coast, as the Midlands is relatively flat and convenient for 
mechanisation harvesting, hence it requires a lower number of sugarcane cutters.    
The industry and Midlands permanent labour, South Coast aggregate and the industry as a 
whole sugarcane cutters coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant within the common 
reference probability levels (1%, 5% and 10%). Therefore, a unit increase in wages will have a 
statistically significant effect on seasonal labour, South Coast permanent labour, and the 
aggregate industry and Midlands demand for labour, ceteris paribus. The magnitudes of the 
statistically significant coefficient estimates with a priori expected sign, suggest more impact 
of an increase in wages in the industry as a whole (-2.132), compared to the Midlands (-0.348). 
The labour category results show strong impact on Industry (-1.997) and the Midlands (-0.855) 
seasonal labour, and South Coast permanent (-0.563) and seasonal (-0.353) labour were 
strongly impacted, relative to sugarcane cutters and drivers.         
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(d) The Coefficient Estimate of Real Price Index of Chemicals (RCHEM t) 
Majority of the coefficient estimates of RCHEMt are statistically significant at a 1% probability 
level with an expected positive sign, except for cutters and drivers in the Midlands. In addition, 
the coefficient estimate of cutters in the Midlands is statically significant with an unexpectedly 
negative sign. This finding probably reflects the replacement of cutters with chemica l 
applicators, as seasonal labour often perform field work such as weeding during off-harvest ing. 
In general, the application of chemicals as a substitute for farm labour has had more impact in 
the industry as a whole (270.421) and the South Coast (52.288), compared to the Midlands 
(37.536), ceteris paribus. The relatively lower magnitude in the Midlands is indicative of the 
relative convenience (the strength of chemicals application) of the region to various 
mechanisation and tools that are used to apply chemicals, e.g. boom sprayers, knapsacks, etc. 
Permanent (between 19.653 and 111.449) and seasonal (between 15.406 and 76.517) labour 
were relatively more affected than cutters (7.607 and 64.774) and drivers (between 0.268 and 
7.743). It seems more permanent labour were replaced with chemicals application on the South 
Coast, while more seasonal labour were replaced in the Midlands. Permanent labour is more 
costly on the South Coast due to the high labour-intensity, compared to the Midlands, since 
seasonal labour is less costly on the South Coast and can be replaced easily in the Midlands. 
 
(e) The Coefficient Estimate of Real Price per Ton of Sugarcane (RPTONkt) 
 Most coefficient estimates of RPTONkt are statistically significant with an expected positive 
sign at the common reference probability levels (1%, 5% and 10%), except for the South Coast 
permanent and all seasonal labour. The results suggest that a unit increase in RPTONkt will 
result in more demand for farm labour in the industry as a whole (35.423) and the South Coast 
(6.22) than in the Midlands (3.556), ceteris paribus. The higher demand for farm labour is likely 
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to favour permanent labour (2.17 and 18.217), cutters (between 0.687 and 7.854) than drivers 
(between 0.354 and 2.268). The insignificance of seasonal labour coefficient estimates implies 
that farmers are largely prepared to maintain employment of relatively skilled farm labour.  
The magnitude of the coefficient estimates suggest that more drivers and cutters were employed 
on the South Coast (0.739 and 3.231), relative to the Midlands (0.354 and 0.687), whilst the 
Midlands employed more permanent labour (2.117). These findings reflect relatively high 
utilisation of permanent labour (mechanisation) on the South Coast (in the Midlands). Hence, 
it seems that with higher sugarcane prices the Midlands LSGs would prefer more utilisation of 
permanent labour, whilst the South Coast LSGs would prefer to utilise more mechanisat ion. 
The latter is highly dependent on other factors, such as the topographical convenience of 
mechanisation on the South Coast, which has been the main limiting factor. 
 
(f) The Coefficient Estimate Area under Sugarcane (AUCkt) 
Many coefficient estimates of AUCkt are statistically significant, except for the industry 
aggregate employment. The coefficient estimates of the variable are statistically insignificant 
for the industry as a whole, industry cutters, South Coast cutters and the Midlands seasonal 
labour. Despite the statistical significance of some of the coefficient estimates of AUCkt, their 
magnitudes are lower, relative to a priori expectations, since usually an additional hectare is 
expected to bring about a 0.1 to 0.3 increase in FTEs. It is speculated that the lower estimates 
may be related to dropping 4 of the 6 PCs or 23% of the information, which may indicate that 
whilst multicollinearity is reduced, it resulted in unintended consequences. However, as 
expected, an additional hectare will add more FTEs on the South Coast (0.038), compared to 
the Midlands (0.025). More permanent labour were employed on the South Coast (0.02) per 
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additional hectare, followed by permanent labour in the Midlands (0.013), whilst an additiona l 
hectare is likely to result in job shedding for seasonal labour in the industry as whole.   
 
(g) The Coefficient Estimate of Labour Policy Impact in Sugarcane Farming (POLICYt) 
Most of the coefficient estimates of POLICYt are statistically significant (at the 1% level of 
probability), except for the industry and Midlands drivers, and South Coast cutters. Therefore, 
the coefficient estimates of the industry aggregate demand function suggests that changes in 
labour legislation has resulted in a short-run reduction in employment of an estimated 4119 
FTEs in commercial sugarcane farming, including 56 Drivers, 1358 permanent elementary 
workers and 2557 seasonal elementary workers (seasonal and harvesting/cutters staff), ceteris 
paribus. Considering that in 1978, LSGs employed 60405 FTEs in sugarcane production, the 
policy changes reduced aggregate employment by LSG in sugarcane farming by 6.82 per cent, 
i.e. (4119/60405)*100 = 6.82. This presentation can be replicated for the two regions; however, 
in summary, more jobs were lost on the South Coast (about 914 employees), compared to the 
Midlands (about 657 employees). 
The long-run impact estimates in Table 10 show a relatively higher reduction of 5768 FTEs, 
including 75 Drivers, 1977 permanent elementary workers and 3332 seasonal elementary 
workers (seasonal and harvesting/cutters staff). Considering that in 1994, LSGs employed 
33776 FTEs, the change in policy over time has reduced employment by LSGs in sugarcane 
farming by 17.1 per cent, i.e. (5768/33776)*100 = 17.1. In comparison, the long-run shows 
relatively higher disemployment on the South Coast (about 1202 employees) and in the 
Midlands (about 878 employees). The statistically insignificant relationships in the Midlands 
and the industry as a whole confirm that relative to more elementary categories of farm workers, 
the demand for drivers has been impacted less by the changes in labour policy. 
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(h) Estimated Long- and Short-Run Wage Elasticities of Demand and Cross-Price  
Elasticities of Farm Labour for Chemicals 
Given that real aggregate farm wages (FTEs employment) in sugarcane farming increased 
(decreased) by about 70% and 36%, respectively, from 1978 to 2012, the simple wage elastic ity 
estimate of employment without considering other factors is -0.51 (∆employment/∆wage = -
0.36/0.7). The wage and cross-price elasticities of chemicals for permanent and seasonal labour, 
the industry and regions were estimated from the empirical results, given that their estimate 
results are in line with expectations (appropriate estimate signs), compared to estimate results 
of drivers and cutters (inappropriate estimate signs). At face value, the elasticities presented in 
Table 11 show increases in absolute values of wage and cross-elasticities in the long-run. The 
relatively lower magnitude of estimate wage elasticities than sector estimate reported (-1.34) 
by Sparrow et al. (2008) reflects few availability of effective substitutes in many sugarcane 
producing arears. Sugarcane farming is generally less mechanised than other extensive field 
cropping land uses. In the long-run, the impact of a 1% increase in wages on employment is 
relatively similar in the industry (-0.091), South Cost (-0.084) and the Midlands (-0.080). This 
impact was stronger on permanent labour in the South Coast (-0.222), while it was stronger on 
seasonal labour in the Midlands (-0.647) and industry (-0.203).  
The long-run cross-elasticity estimates of chemicals show more impact on labour (between 0.55 
and 2.791, compared to estimate of 0.13 by Sparrow et al. (2008), especially on seasonal labour, 
which confirms that chemicals have been a good substitute for labour in the sector. The differ ing 
estimates confirm suggestions that the demand for labour is impacted differently by a wage 
increase and substitutes at an industry, production areas and by labour category in the sector, 
which depends on growing conditions, resource profile, risk, etc. It is prevalent that the impact 
of a unit increase in wage and the price of chemicals have been stronger on seasonal labour, 
compared to permanent and the aggregate demand for labour. The impacts of wage and  the 
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price of chemicals on the aggregate demand for labour have been strong in the industry, South 
Coast and Midlands, respectively, while the impact on permanent (seasonal) labour was high 
(low) in the South Coast and Midlands, respectively.  
Table 11: Estimated Wage Elasticities (Ei) of Demand and Cross-Price Elasticities (Eij) 
of Labour for Chemicals, 1978 – 2012  
AGGREGATE MODEL ELASTICITIES 
ELASTICITIES 
WAGE (Ei) CHEMICALS (Eij) 
SHORT RUN LONG RUN SHORT RUN LONG RUN 
INDUSTRY -0.065 -0.091 0.530 0.743 
MIDLANDS -0.060 -0.080 0.412 0.550 
SOUTH COAST -0.064 -0.084 0.515 0.678 
PERMANENT LABOUR ELASTICITIES 
ELASTICITIES 
WAGE (Ei) CHEMICALS (Eij) 
SHORT RUN LONG RUN 
SHORT 
RUN LONG RUN 
INDUSTRY -0.028 -0.041 0.586 0.852 
MIDLANDS -0.065 -0.087 0.589 0.788 
SOUTH COAST -0.172 -0.222 0.687 0.887 
SEASONAL LABOUR ELASTICITIES 
ELASTICITIES 
WAGE (Ei) CHEMICALS (Eij) 
SHORT RUN LONG RUN 
SHORT 
RUN LONG RUN 
INDUSTRY -0.160 -0.203 0.624 0.794 
MIDLANDS -0.488 -0.647 2.106 2.791 
SOUTH COAST -0.125 -0.151 0.570 0.689 
 
The confirmation of chemicals as a strong substitute for labour in sugarcane farming is in line 
with expectation as it is relatively easy to practise, especially spot spraying using knapsacks. 
The impact is expected to get stronger with improvement in the quality of knapsacks and 
chemicals application mechanisation. However, it is apparent that chemicals application has 
reduced employment headcount significantly on weeding activities, which is usually a task of 




CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The SA government has yielded to sentiments about the relative poor employment conditions 
on the farm and other low income sectors considered vulnerable by introducing SDs. The SDs 
stipulates minimum labour employment conditions and wages. However, the legislation has 
resulted in higher real costs of hiring farm labour (higher wages, transaction costs and risk), 
which is an important input in sugarcane farming and accounts for a relatively high proportion 
of production costs. Increases in the real wages relative to the real prices of other factors of 
production have resulted in labour substitution in sugarcane farming. The objective of this study 
was to investigate how the impact of changes in labour-related policy (including the 
introduction of the minimum wage legislation) on employment and wages in sugarcane farming 
has varied by sugarcane farming region and by labour category over the period 1978-2012.  
A 2SLS Model was used to estimate the supply of and demand for farm labour by LSGs in 
sugarcane farming. However, due to a high multicollinearity level within the data sets, the PCA 
extraction procedure proposed by Chatterjee and Price (1977) was used to estimate the supply 
and demand functions separately. The procedure improved the statistical fit of the estimated 
farm labour demand functions significantly, while the theoretical fit of the functions were 
satisfactory.  
The wage elasticities of demand were estimated for the aggregate, seasonal and permanent 
employment of farm labour. The short-run wage elasticities of demand ranged between -0.028 
and -0.488, while the long-run ranged between -0.041 and -0.647. The absolute wage elasticit ies 
are relatively higher for the industry, followed by the South Coast and Midlands, whilst the 
wage elasticities for unskilled seasonal labour are relatively higher than for permanent unskilled 
labour. The demand for permanent workers is relatively more responsive to a change in wage 
on the South Coast, while the demand for seasonal workers is relatively more responsive to a 
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change in wage in the Midlands. This finding reflects the feasibility of mechanical harvesting 
and chemicals application as a replacement for seasonal labour in parts of the Midlands, and 
efforts to reduce the costly permanent labour by using more seasonal labour on the South Coast.  
It is concluded that the demand for farm labour in sugarcane farming is highly inelastic in the 
short-run, but less inelastic in the long-run, and that wage elasticities vary between labour 
categories, regions and at an industry level. The elasticities can be expected to become more 
wage elastic over time if the real cost of farm labour continues to increase, ceteris paribus. The 
estimates of wage elasticities of demand for farm workers derived from this study are consistent 
with observations that, by and large, sugarcane farming methods in South Africa have remained 
relatively unchanged over the period 1978-2012, due to limited availability of appropriate 
substitutes for farm labour. Also bearing in mind that the data used do not account for other 
unskilled labour categories in the LUCS and changes in the average number of hours worked 
per worker per day, and considering various anecdotal accounts that many sugarcane farmers 
have reduced working hours in response to increases in wage rates, it is likely that the wage 
elasticities of demand in this study are under-estimated. 
The cross-elasticity of demand for the price of chemicals on the demand for farm labour was 
also estimated, where the short-run elasticities ranged between 0.412 and 2.106, while the long-
run ranged between 0.550 and 2.791. Similarly, the cross-elasticities are relatively higher in the 
industry, followed by the South Coast and Midlands, whereas the average elasticity for 
permanent labour is lower than for seasonal labour. Therefore, it is concluded that the relative 
increase (decrease) in the price of chemicals will results in an increase (decrease) in the demand 
for farm labour in sugarcane farming. The substitution is stronger for seasonal labour in the 
Midlands, where mechanised chemical application is more feasible than on the South Coast. 
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The coefficient estimate of the policy variable of the industry aggregate employment shows a 
short-run decrease in aggregate employment of 4119 FTEs (including 56 Drivers, 1358 
permanent and 2557 (the sum of Togt labour and cutters) seasonal labour) and a larger long-
run decrease of 5768 FTEs employment (including 75 Drivers, 1977 permanent and 3332 (the 
sum of Togt labour and cutters) seasonal labour) in sugarcane farming by LSGs, ceteris paribus. 
Other things beings equal, considering employment levels in 1978 and 1994, the policy changes 
reduced employment by LSGs in sugarcane farming by 6.82% and 17.1% in the short- and 
long-run, respectively. In other words, when LSGs have had enough time to adjust to the farm 
labour legislation, they reduced their labour force (mostly unskilled seasonal and permanent 
labour) since the mid-1990s.  
On the other hand, the estimates of the coefficient of adjustment ranges between 0.156 and 0.34, 
which means that LSGs are estimated to make annual adjustments of between 66% and 84%, 
with an average full adjustment period of three years. The adjustment percentage is relative ly 
higher on the South Coast (76%), compared to the Midlands (75%) and Industry (71%). 
Therefore, it is concluded that LSGs have adjusted the size of their labour force according the 
current and their expectation of future policy changes in the costs of labour. The higher rate of 
adjustment for sugarcane farming compared to Sparrow et al.’s (2008) findings for the 
agricultural sector as a whole is surprising considering that sugarcane is a perennial crop; 
however, relatively more rapid adjustment may be possible because a relatively high proportion 
of the workforce in sugarcane farming are seasonal workers.  
Anecdotal information from LSGs suggest that they are now restricting labour from staying 
with their families, which can reduce the productivity of male labour due to consumption of 
less energy food, since some LSGs have reduced the provision of either raw or cooked rations. 
At the end, LSGs have to employ more cutters and offer productivity bonuses to get the same 
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amount of work done. It is therefore evident that the BECA and ESTA have also resulted in 
unintended consequences for farm labour, as some LSGs responded by introducing strict 
accommodation rules. 
The descriptive analysis of wage and employment data were presented, showing no wage 
benefits for drivers and cutters, as the basic wage of drivers and cutters on the South Coast and 
in the Midlands are relatively higher than the real minimum wage between 2003 and 2012. 
Permanent labour gained more wage increases than seasonal labour, probably because the 
number of hours and days worked by seasonal labour were significantly decreased. In general, 
the basic wage has improved from around 30% to about 80% of the composite wage, which is 
roughly in line with the SD stipulations. The change has strongly benefited unskilled labour 
categories, as they now earn above 80% of the composite wage in cash, compared to drivers 
and cutters. In other words, wage standardisation has mainly been achieved between unskilled 
labour, with wage differentiation largely driven by the number of hours and days worked. The 
legislation has also impacted on the wage structure and resulted in some wage redistribution 
from semi-skilled to unskilled labour. It is also apparent that wages have improved in general, 
but with job-shedding, especially of unskilled labour and on the South Coast.  
The positive relationship between farm labour employment and the price per ton of sugarcane 
and the area under sugarcane (except for the negative relationship for South Coast seasonal 
labour) suggests a need to consider the support provided to farmers, since some of the lost 
support, such as the price support, trade protection etc., have negatively impacted farming profit 
margins, which has an impact on investments in farming and farm labour employment. 
However, the sugar industry remains relatively protected through the dollar-based reference 
price tariff application and the notional price. Therefore, higher sugarcane prices will have a 
positive impact on farm labour employment in the sugar industry through affordability of more 
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labour employment and increased investments in sugarcane farming, which requires more 
labour employment due to limited availability of appropriate substitutes for farm labour in 
sugarcane farming.  
Overall, it is concluded that the impact of the SD on employment and wages varies by labour 
category and by sugarcane producing region. The impact on employment was greater for 
seasonal labour relative to permanent labour, and it was greater in the region (South Coast) with 
relatively higher labour intensity in sugarcane farming. However, real average wage rates of 
both permanent and seasonal workers increased. The SD increased the average basic wage 
approximately in line with the 80% stipulated by the SD, after accounting for deductions of 
20% for non-pecuniary benefits (10 % for accommodation and 10% for food rations and other 
handouts). Much of the benefit was realised by permanent and seasonal labour, as they earned 
relatively low wages before the SD. 
It is inevitable that the loss of employment can be alleviated by relaxing labour legisla t ion 
rigidities that were captured by the policy variable, e.g. employment contract conditions, when 
hiring and dismissing labour to provide flexibility to employers, as employment decreased by 
6.82% and 17.1% in the short- and long-run. However, it remain necessary to ensure that farm 
labour in this vulnerable sector are treated fairly by farmers, since there is no evidence that all 
farmers will treat their labour fairly without government intervention due to the relatively low 
bargaining power of unskilled labour. There is also a need to strengthen compliance inspection 
e.g. improving their strategy from the list approach to proper sampling of farmers to determine 
compliance rate.  
The government should consider improving access to education (availability of schools and 
quality of education) and skills development initiatives (training for various skills acquisit ion) 
in rural areas, as it is expected to improve labour productivity and income, and the 
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employability of rural people in non-farm sectors (Gisser, 1965; Gallasch and Gardner, 1978; 
Roberts and Antrobus, 2013), given the strong negative correlation between the rural population 
and non-farm wage. The sugar industry should explore and expedite the implementation of 
options (maximising revenue from sugarcane production) that are expected to grow sugarcane 
profit margins, as an increase in the price per ton of sugarcane is expected to have a positive 
impact on farm labour employment.  
The results of this study compared to those of Sparrow et al. (2008) indicate that the impact of 
SD on employment of farm workers is not uniform across the farm sector. Despite sugarcane 
farming being relatively labour intensive, the wage elasticities of demand for labour in 
sugarcane farming are less elastic than those for the farm sector as a whole. In other words, the 
extent of labour substitution in response to the introduction of minimum wages in the sector 
has been relatively less in sugarcane farming. However, the results of this study cannot be 
extrapolated to higher real wage rates than those that prevailed during the study period – hence 
it cannot necessarily be expected that the 2013 and beyond increases in the minimum wage will 
also result in relatively low rates of labour substitution in sugarcane farming. Therefore, 
research is recommend to up-date this study once sufficient data on post 2013 employment in 
sugarcane farming is available.  
To some extent the study has explored and highlighted the importance of compliance on the 
effectiveness of the SD on the farm labour market, but there is limited information to make 
conclusive remarks. Hence, more research dedicated to the issues of compliance is 
recommended to contribute towards the limited availability of such research and the 




The democratic government of SA embarked on a comprehensive policy reform in line with 
the country’s Constitution since its inception in 1994, to reposition the country in the global 
community and facilitate the lifting of various sanctions on the country. In the process, labour 
legislations were introduced and extended to cover vulnerable labour in the farm and other low 
income sectors. The important farm labour legislations relevant to this study are the BCEA, 
which includes the farm sector SD, and ESTA, as they influence wage computation and farm 
labour employment conditions. 
The legislations are considered necessary to improve the conditions of employment, income 
level and the rights of farm labour to land. These changes were intended to make employment 
in the low income sectors attractive to unskilled labour, as it is expected to reduce the 
dependence on social security, since most of the unskilled labour resides in rural areas. 
However, the legislation has resulted in unintended consequences, as LSGs have reacted by 
replacing labour with close substitutes, e.g. chemicals application. The BECA and ESTA also 
resulted in unintended consequences, as some LSGs have introduced strict accommodation 
rules. Labour is no longer allowed to stay with family members, which can be counter -
productive as it may result in male labour consuming less energy food stuff, since they do no 
longer receive raw or prepared rations. As a result, LSGs have to employ more cutters or offer 
more productivity bonuses to get the same amount of work done. 
The secondary time-series data on employment in sugarcane farming for the period 1978-2012 
was obtained from the SACGA, the 2014 Abstract of Agricultural Statistics, SEIFA and the 
World Bank. These data were analysed using descriptive statistics, the 2SLS and PCA 
extraction regression to determine the impact of the BECA and ESTA on employment and wage 
computation in sugarcane farming. The study bridges the gap by estimating the short- and long-
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run elasticity of demand for farm labour to determine structural changes, as well as the 
adjustment of labour by LSGs, in order to differentiate the impact at the industry as whole, 
regions and labour category level in sugarcane production. The estimated short-run wage 
elasticities ranged between -0.028 and -0.488, while the estimated long-run elasticities ranged 
between -0.041 and -0.647. This finding that the demand for farm labour in sugarcane 
production is relatively inelastic is consistent with observations that, by and large, sugarcane 
production methods remained relatively unchanged in the industry and each of the two regions 
over the study period. The demand for permanent unskilled workers is relatively more 
responsive to a change in wage on the South Coast, while the demand for seasonal unskilled 
workers is relatively more responsive to a change in wage in the Midlands. This finding reflects 
the feasibility of e.g., chemicals application as a replacement for seasonal labour in parts of the 
Midlands, and efforts to reduce costly permanent labour on the South Coast. 
The legislation decreased aggregate employment in the short-run by 4119 FTEs and 5768 FTEs 
in the long-run, ceteris paribus. When considering employment levels in 1978 and 1994, the 
legislation reduced employment by 6.82% and 17.1%, respectively. Other things being equal, 
the estimated coefficients of adjustment range between 0.156 and 0.34, which means LSGs are 
estimated to make annual employment adjustments ranging between 66% and 84%, with an 
average full adjustment period of 3 years. The higher rate of adjustment compared to Sparrow 
et al. (2008) is surprising considering that sugarcane is a perennial crop; however, it suggests 
that relatively more rapid adjustment of labour may be possible because a relatively high 
proportion of the workforce are seasonal workers. 
The legislation has impacted on the wage structure and resulted in some wage redistribution 
from semi-skilled to unskilled labour. Cutters did not benefit since they earned relatively higher 
wages. Permanent labour gained more wage increase than seasonal labour, probably because 
the number of hours and days worked by seasonal unskilled labour were significantly reduced. 
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The average cash wage improved from around 30% to about 80% of the composite wage. This 
change has mainly benefited unskilled permanent and seasonal labour, since drivers and cutters 
earn more cash wages substantiated by monthly productivity and annual bonuses. Drivers and 
cutters still earn relatively higher wages than unskilled labour, which indicates that wage 
standardisation has mainly been achieved between permanent and seasonal unskilled labour. 
The wage difference between the unskilled labour categories is influenced mainly by the 
number of hours and days worked. It seems that the legislation has improved wages with a 
decrease in employment, especially the employment of unskilled labour and employment on 
the South Coast. The South Coast and Midlands aggregate, drivers and cutters real basic wages 
are relatively higher than the real minimum wage between 2003 and 2012.  
In order to prevent further employment loss, the government should consider relaxing certain 
elements of the legislation, e.g. employment contract conditions, when hiring and dismiss ing 
labour. The support provided to farmers must be considered, since some of the lost support has 
negatively impacted farm profit margins. The sugar industry also needs to explore and expedite 
the implementation of options that can improve farm profit margins. More focus should be 
directed on education and skills development in rural areas, as it is expected to improve farm 
labour productivity and income, and the employability of the rural community in non-farm 
sectors given the strong negative correlation between rural population and non-farm wages. The 
relatively less estimated wage elasticities of the demand for labour in sugarcane farming than 
for the farm sector as a whole should not necessarily lead to a conclusion that the 2013 and 
beyond increases in the minimum wage will also result in relatively low rates of labour 
substitution in sugarcane farming. Hence, this research must be updated when sufficient data 
about employment after 2013 is available. Furthermore, more research on the issues of 
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Appendix A: Empirical Data for Demand and Supply Functions  
Due to the high amount of data used in the empirical analysis, only the industry as whole 
demand and supply functions data are presented. The Appendices below contains data presented 
in real terms for the supply of and demand and  for farm labour functions, where the demand 
function is made up of: aggregate quantity of labour demanded (YQDjkt = AGQd), based on 
selected labour categories and regions; industry average real wage (RWAGEjkt = 
AVGRWAGE), based on selected  labour categories and regions; real interest rates (RINTt); 
real price index of machineries and equipment (RMECHt); real price index of chemica ls 
(RCHEMt); real price per ton of sugarcane (RPTONkt); area under sugarcane (AUCkt); proxy 
for policy effect (POLICYt) and the lag aggregate quantity of labour demanded (YQDjkt-1 = 
AGQd-1), based on selected labour categories and regions. While the supply function consists 
of: Aggregate quantity of Labour supplied (YSDjkt = AGQs), based on selected labour categories 




Appendix A1: Industry Aggregate Demand Function Data 
Year YQDjkt RWAGEjkt RINTt RMECHt RCHEMt RP/TONkt AUCkt POLICYt YQDjkt-1 
1978 60405 1097.516 0.895 55.41 104.9419 309.7602 272713 0  
1979 60779 1042.949 -2.907 54.47 96.40901 323.5209 282077 0 60405 
1980 52625 1027.16 -3.660 54.77 95.63276 402.5362 283644 0 60779 
1981 59023 1109.354 -1.088 54.31 89.46922 318.0182 284054 0 52625 
1982 55775 1160.094 4.092 55.52 93.77902 309.3091 285495 0 59023 
1983 56624 1100.011 3.888 56.68 93.03265 373.7836 285295 0 55775 
1984 56576 1109.15 9.687 57.33 91.45778 262.0562 286773 0 56624 
1985 52419 1060.314 4.476 61.49 98.08825 273.3024 279322 0 56576 
1986 53466 1015.01 -3.645 65.96 102.3321 288.1123 273007 0 52419 
1987 53372 969.9986 -3.151 67.11 94.99247 223.8318 268165 0 53466 
1988 51590 965.1876 2.261 68.98 90.06606 250.674 257548 0 53372 
1989 50636 1011.477 4.444 72.95 87.22447 269.5475 256235 0 51590 
1990 45992 1029.656 5.842 70.79 86.25898 258.5856 246937 0 50636 
1991 42050 1000.688 4.314 66.78 87.28573 230.185 248023 0 45992 
1992 37932 962.378 4.352 62.06 81.49177 337.3314 248763 0 42050 
1993 36580 981.4809 5.881 63.83 78.53946 325.6412 244108 0 37932 
1994 33776 1047.015 6.097 64.47 77.22557 310.323 247943 1 36580 
1995 35687 1145.818 8.483 65.6 76.02653 289.7793 246178 1 33776 
1996 35958 1121.069 11.332 64.92 81.6958 278.112 251701 1 35687 
1997 33934 1417.644 10.500 65.04 92.4898 281.1459 255587 1 35958 
1998 36050 1274.109 13.950 65.66 87.43293 276.6886 275863 1 33934 
1999 34417 1285.426 12.187 67.55 85.9693 254.4196 278170 1 36050 
2000 36529 1490.73 8.697 67.94 80.35235 259.3827 289485 1 34417 
2001 38223 1467.356 7.633 75.49 81.21059 302.7262 295519 1 36529 
2002 35564 1476.058 6.033 88.78 85.15445 295.7162 299426 1 38223 
2003 39250 1511.921 8.597 89.58 78.74713 275.1196 299918 1 35564 
2004 40483 1603.89 9.769 87.42 74.61946 255.6481 306342 1 39250 
2005 40609 1629.361 6.993 82.64 70.26905 269.3411 306423 1 40483 
2006 38361 1805.884 6.239 81.98 70.64401 294.5426 310397 1 40609 
2007 42109 1843.59 5.669 74.92 72.6081 289.7986 311293 1 38361 
2008 48655 1862.387 3.222 76.03 76.56615 311.8304 303663 1 42109 
2009 39847 2057.87 4.275 81.9 81.28306 329.5089 303344 1 48655 
2010 39525 1944.733 5.345 90.27 88.98646 368.9887 301929 1 39847 
2011 36439 2057.028 3.809 95.16 93.9521 373.1639 293160 1 39525 







Appendix A2: Industry Aggregate Supply Function Data 
Year YSDjkt RWAGEjkt RALTWAGEt LIFEt RPOPt 
1978 60405 1097.516 58.08 55.89 51.70 
1979 60779 1042.949 58.07 56.41 51.64 
1980 52625 1027.16 58.76 56.97 51.58 
1981 59023 1109.354 60.04 57.56 51.39 
1982 55775 1160.094 62.64 58.17 51.20 
1983 56624 1100.011 63.27 58.77 51.01 
1984 56576 1109.15 61.72 59.35 50.82 
1985 52419 1060.314 59.62 59.91 50.63 
1986 53466 1015.01 56.72 60.45 50.10 
1987 53372 969.9986 56.13 60.96 49.56 
1988 51590 965.1876 54.39 61.42 49.03 
1989 50636 1011.477 56.47 61.82 48.50 
1990 45992 1029.656 59.44 62.12 47.96 
1991 42050 1000.688 60.02 62.29 47.47 
1992 37932 962.378 58.14 62.33 46.98 
1993 36580 981.4809 58.06 62.19 46.49 
1994 33776 1047.015 58.08 61.89 46.00 
1995 35687 1145.818 58.31 61.37 45.51 
1996 35958 1121.069 62.39 60.61 45.03 
1997 33934 1417.644 63.69 59.61 44.55 
1998 36050 1274.109 66.43 58.44 44.07 
1999 34417 1285.426 69.42 57.16 43.59 
2000 36529 1490.73 70.25 55.84 43.11 
2001 38223 1467.356 70.09 54.57 42.64 
2002 35564 1476.058 69.07 53.44 42.16 
2003 39250 1511.921 76.29 52.52 41.69 
2004 40483 1603.89 86.45 51.87 41.22 
2005 40609 1629.361 89.25 51.56 40.74 
2006 38361 1805.884 90.43 51.61 40.29 
2007 42109 1843.59 90.40 52.00 39.83 
2008 48655 1862.387 88.48 52.64 39.37 
2009 39847 2057.87 90.03 53.47 38.91 
2010 39525 1944.733 93.83 54.39 38.45 
2011 36439 2057.028 97.14 55.30 38.01 






Appendix B: Aggregate Demand Model Econometric Results  
Appendix B1: Correlation Matrix Including Real Interest Rates and Price Index of 
Machinery and Equipment Variables 
 
 
Appendix B2: Correlation Matrix 
 
              
                 0.0000
       agqd1    -0.8296*  1.0000 
              
              
      policy     1.0000 
                                
                 policy    agqd1
              
                 0.0000   0.0064   0.0000   0.0012   0.0003   0.6407   0.7602
       agqd1     0.9223* -0.4580* -0.6847* -0.5329*  0.5864*  0.0830  -0.0543 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0001   0.0000   0.0005   0.8360   0.0066
      policy    -0.7751*  0.7562*  0.6023*  0.6619* -0.5603*  0.0363   0.4505*
              
                 0.8654   0.0000   0.9665   0.0013   0.3267   0.1516
         auc     0.0297   0.7626* -0.0074   0.5221* -0.1708   0.2476   1.0000 
              
                 0.7892   0.0757   0.0477   0.4811   0.1519
       rpton     0.0469   0.3041  -0.3370*  0.1231   0.2474   1.0000 
              
                 0.0002   0.0454   0.0013   0.0655
       rchem     0.5893* -0.3405* -0.5205* -0.3148   1.0000 
              
                 0.0006   0.0000   0.1886
       rmech    -0.5492*  0.7884*  0.2275   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.1863
        rint    -0.6804*  0.2287   1.0000 
              
                 0.0097
    avgrwage    -0.4312*  1.0000 
              
              
        agqd     1.0000 
                                                                             
                   agqd avgrwage     rint    rmech    rchem    rpton      auc
. pwcorr agqd avgrwage rint rmech rchem rpton auc policy agqd1, sig star(5)
              
              
       agqd1     1.0000 
                       
                  agqd1
              
                 0.0000   0.0064   0.0012   0.0003   0.6407   0.7602   0.0000
       agqd1     0.9223* -0.4580* -0.5329*  0.5863*  0.0830  -0.0543  -0.8296*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0005   0.8360   0.0066
      policy    -0.7751*  0.7562*  0.6619* -0.5604*  0.0363   0.4505*  1.0000 
              
                 0.8654   0.0000   0.0013   0.3264   0.1516
         auc     0.0297   0.7626*  0.5221* -0.1709   0.2476   1.0000 
              
                 0.7892   0.0757   0.4811   0.1519
       rpton     0.0469   0.3041   0.1231   0.2474   1.0000 
              
                 0.0002   0.0453   0.0654
       rchem     0.5894* -0.3405* -0.3149   1.0000 
              
                 0.0006   0.0000
       rmech    -0.5492*  0.7884*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0097
       rwage    -0.4312*  1.0000 
              
              
        agqd     1.0000 
                                                                             
                   agqd    rwage    rmech    rchem    rpton      auc   policy
. pwcorr agqd rwage rmech rchem rpton auc policy agqd1, sig star(5)
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Appendix B3: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Appendix B4: Ordinary Least Squares 
 
       agqd1          34    44448.82    8880.718      33776      60779
      policy          35    .5428571    .5054327          0          1
                                                                      
         auc          35    279354.2    21638.56     244108     311293
       rpton          35    298.9754    43.92843     223.83     402.54
       rchem          35      86.464    9.094528      70.27     104.94
       rwage          35    1330.087    356.9943    962.378    2057.87
        agqd          35    44290.37     8799.22      33776      60779
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize agqd rwage rchem rpton auc policy agqd1
                                                                              
       _cons    -15064.18    11084.9    -1.36   0.185    -37808.51    7680.155
       agqd1     .6359439    .150494     4.23   0.000     .3271558    .9447321
      policy     -3117.12    3086.53    -1.01   0.322    -9450.157    3215.917
         auc     .1346888    .047415     2.84   0.008     .0374014    .2319763
       rpton    -8.553396   14.22862    -0.60   0.553    -37.74811    20.64132
       rchem     45.41349   83.22449     0.55   0.590    -125.3491     216.176
       rwage    -4.969648   3.571516    -1.39   0.175    -12.29779    2.358499
                                                                              
        agqd        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2.3652e+09    33  71671953.9           Root MSE      =    3145
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8620
    Residual     267059478    27  9891091.78           R-squared     =  0.8871
       Model    2.0981e+09     6   349685834           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,    27) =   35.35
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      34
. reg agqd rwage rchem rpton auc policy agqd1
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Appendix B5: Two Stage Least Squares 
 
 
Appendix B6: Principal Component Analysis 
 
Instruments:   rchem rpton auc policy agqd1 raltwage life ruralpop
Instrumented:  avgrwage
                                                                              
       _cons    -15199.17   10735.96    -1.42   0.157    -36241.25     5842.92
       agqd1     .6743251   .1442129     4.68   0.000      .391673    .9569773
      policy    -2005.321   2867.955    -0.70   0.484     -7626.41    3615.768
         auc     .1475457   .0444674     3.32   0.001     .0603913    .2347001
       rpton    -8.221502   13.25442    -0.62   0.535    -34.19969    17.75668
       rchem     12.56032   84.46272     0.15   0.882    -152.9836    178.1042
    avgrwage    -7.328648   3.540771    -2.07   0.038    -14.26843   -.3888641
                                                                              
        agqd        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  2835.9
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8866
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000
                                                       Wald chi2(6)  =  260.07
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =      33
                                                                              
       _cons    -612.1039   1492.395    -0.41   0.685    -3692.255    2468.047
    ruralpop    -45.79008   13.43697    -3.41   0.002    -73.52262   -18.05754
        life     20.94843    13.9757     1.50   0.147    -7.896002    49.79286
    raltwage     8.342995   3.895945     2.14   0.043       .30216    16.38383
       agqd1      .008682   .0044132     1.97   0.061    -.0004265    .0177904
      policy     163.2172   73.14156     2.23   0.035     12.26047     314.174
         auc     .0049289   .0022506     2.19   0.038     .0002838    .0095739
       rpton     .4659234   .3458888     1.35   0.191     -.247956    1.179803
       rchem     2.498203   2.317223     1.08   0.292     -2.28431    7.280716
                                                                              
    avgrwage        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                  Root MSE        =    71.9346
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.9585
                                                  R-squared       =     0.9688
                                                  Prob > F        =     0.0000
                                                  F(   8,     24) =      93.29
                                                  Number of obs   =         33
                       
First-stage regressions
. ivregress 2sls agqd rchem rpton auc policy agqd1 ( avgrwage =  raltwage life ruralpop), first
                                                                                            
           agqd1    -0.4426    0.3605    0.4319   -0.2411    0.2521    0.6049             0 
          policy     0.5392   -0.0916   -0.1467    0.2995   -0.1775    0.7471             0 
             auc     0.3538    0.4660    0.5674   -0.0210   -0.5408   -0.2069             0 
           rpton     0.0685    0.6101   -0.6571   -0.4200   -0.1168    0.0370             0 
           rchem    -0.3675    0.4178   -0.1611    0.8110   -0.0601   -0.0546             0 
           rwage     0.4984    0.3126    0.1108    0.1326    0.7715   -0.1695             0 
                                                                                            
        Variable      Comp1     Comp2     Comp3     Comp4     Comp5     Comp6   Unexplained 
                                                                                            
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
                                                                              
           Comp6        .074585            .             0.0124       1.0000
           Comp5        .120708     .0461231             0.0201       0.9876
           Comp4        .449765      .329057             0.0750       0.9675
           Comp3        .747697      .297932             0.1246       0.8925
           Comp2        1.56329      .815595             0.2605       0.7679
           Comp1        3.04395      1.48066             0.5073       0.5073
                                                                              
       Component     Eigenvalue   Difference         Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated = principal)             Rho              =    1.0000
                                                  Trace            =         6
                                                  Number of comp.  =         6
Principal components/correlation                  Number of obs    =        34
. pca rwage rchem rpton auc policy agqd1
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Appendix B7: Principal Component Regression 
  
 
Appendix C: Aggregate Supply Model Econometric Results 
Appendix C1: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Appendix C2: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Appendix C3: Ordinary Least Squares 
 
                                                                              
        PCA2     .3328054   .0788153     4.22   0.000     .1722639    .4933469
        PCA1    -.3822511   .0564822    -6.77   0.000    -.4973016   -.2672006
                                                                              
       Zagqd        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    30.6460833    34  .901355391           Root MSE      =  .56609
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6445
    Residual    10.2547493    32  .320460916           R-squared     =  0.6654
       Model     20.391334     2   10.195667           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,    32) =   31.82
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      34
. reg Zagqd PCA1 PCA2, noconstant
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
    ruralpop     0.7364* -0.8974* -0.8840*  0.6330*  1.0000 
              
                 0.4318   0.0000   0.0000
        life     0.1372  -0.8008* -0.7856*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0185   0.0000
    raltwage    -0.3962*  0.9626*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0097
    avgrwage    -0.4312*  1.0000 
              
              
        agqd     1.0000 
                                                           
                   agqd avgrwage raltwage     life ruralpop
. pwcorr agqd avgrwage raltwage life ruralpop, sig star(5)
    ruralpop          35    45.39435    4.644101    37.5724    51.7014
        life          35    57.45733    3.637654   51.55734   62.32517
    raltwage          35     69.4741    14.26437   54.39288        100
    avgrwage          35    1330.087    356.9943   962.3781    2057.87
        agqd          35    44290.37     8799.22      33776      60779
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize agqd avgrwage raltwage life ruralpop
                                                                              
       _cons    -140860.1   33252.05    -4.24   0.000    -208769.8   -72950.32
    ruralpop     3448.585   317.1873    10.87   0.000     2800.802    4096.367
        life    -279.6035   295.2658    -0.95   0.351    -882.6168    323.4098
    raltwage     452.8435   159.8639     2.83   0.008     126.3579    779.3291
    avgrwage     9.930603   7.220075     1.38   0.179    -4.814758    24.67596
                                                                              
        agqd        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2.6325e+09    34    77426277           Root MSE      =  3505.7
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8413
    Residual     368690810    30  12289693.7           R-squared     =  0.8599
       Model    2.2638e+09     4   565950652           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,    30) =   46.05
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      35
. reg agqd avgrwage raltwage life ruralpop
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Appendix C4: Two Stage Least Squares 
 
 
Appendix C5: Principal Component Analysis 
 
 
Appendix C6: Principal Component Regression 
 
Instruments:   raltwage life ruralpop rchem rpton auc policy agqd1
Instrumented:  avgrwage
                                                                              
       _cons    -164658.7      30986    -5.31   0.000    -225390.2   -103927.3
    ruralpop     3533.515   323.3196    10.93   0.000     2899.821     4167.21
        life     72.39662   299.4664     0.24   0.809    -514.5468      659.34
    raltwage      231.217    234.103     0.99   0.323    -227.6165    690.0506
    avgrwage     22.09059   10.17322     2.17   0.030     2.151438    42.02975
                                                                              
        agqd        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  3561.7
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8211
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000
                                                       Wald chi2(4)  =  153.90
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =      33
                                                                              
       _cons    -612.1039   1492.395    -0.41   0.685    -3692.255    2468.047
       agqd1      .008682   .0044132     1.97   0.061    -.0004265    .0177904
      policy     163.2172   73.14156     2.23   0.035     12.26047     314.174
         auc     .0049289   .0022506     2.19   0.038     .0002838    .0095739
       rpton     .4659234   .3458888     1.35   0.191     -.247956    1.179803
       rchem     2.498203   2.317223     1.08   0.292     -2.28431    7.280716
    ruralpop    -45.79008   13.43697    -3.41   0.002    -73.52262   -18.05754
        life     20.94843    13.9757     1.50   0.147    -7.896002    49.79286
    raltwage     8.342995   3.895945     2.14   0.043       .30216    16.38383
                                                                              
    avgrwage        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                  Root MSE        =    71.9346
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.9585
                                                  R-squared       =     0.9688
                                                  Prob > F        =     0.0000
                                                  F(   8,     24) =      93.29
                                                  Number of obs   =         33
                       
First-stage regressions
. ivregress 2sls agqd raltwage life ruralpop (avgrwage = rchem rpton auc policy agqd1), first
                                                                        
        ruralpop    -0.4910   -0.5554    0.6610    0.1165             0 
            life    -0.4583    0.8198    0.3358    0.0713             0 
        raltwage     0.5219    0.1056    0.5844   -0.6123             0 
        avgrwage     0.5258    0.0911    0.3299    0.7787             0 
                                                                        
        Variable      Comp1     Comp2     Comp3     Comp4   Unexplained 
                                                                        
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
                                                                              
           Comp4       .0354658            .             0.0089       1.0000
           Comp3       .0921409     .0566751             0.0230       0.9911
           Comp2        .380932      .288791             0.0952       0.9681
           Comp1        3.49146      3.11053             0.8729       0.8729
                                                                              
       Component     Eigenvalue   Difference         Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated = principal)             Rho              =    1.0000
                                                  Trace            =         4
                                                  Number of comp.  =         4
Principal components/correlation                  Number of obs    =        35
. pca avgrwage raltwage life ruralpop
                                                                              
         PC2    -.9913646   .1816423    -5.46   0.000    -1.360919   -.6218105
         PC1    -.2457497   .0599981    -4.10   0.000    -.3678167   -.1236828
                                                                              
       Zagqd        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    33.9999998    35  .971428566           Root MSE      =   .6537
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5601
    Residual    14.1018007    33  .427327294           R-squared     =  0.5852
       Model    19.8981991     2  9.94909955           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,    33) =   23.28
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      35
. reg Zagqd PC1 PC2, noconstant
